N., C. & St. L. R. v. Henry
| Decision Date | 18 March 1914 |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Henry. |
Appeal from McCracken Circuit Court.
WHEELER & HUGHES and CLAUDE WALLER for appellant.
S. A. ANDERSON, J. R. GROGAN and W. M. OLIVER for appellee.
In this action for damages for personal injuries against defendant, Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, plaintiff, Toy Henry, recovered a verdict and judgment of $12,000. Defendant appeals.
It is admitted that at the time of the accident defendant was engaged and plaintiff was employed in interstate commerce. The action is prosecuted under the Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. L., 66, Chap. 149), as amended April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. L., 291, Chap. 143; U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp., 1911, p. 1324), relating to the liability of railroad common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to their employes while so employed, and is based upon a violation of the Safety Appliance Act of Congress. The Act provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any such common carrier (railroad engaged in interstate commerce) to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be coupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars."
Plaintiff was brakeman on defendant's train bound from Lexington, Tennessee, to Paducah, Kentucky. In the train were three cars which had been picked up at Paris, Tennessee, and brought to Murray, Kentucky. Two of these cars were loaded with coal, while the third was loaded with household goods. At the time of the accident these three cars were being switched by the engine on to the house track for the purpose of being unloaded. The switching operations were being carried on under the direction of plaintiff, and it was his duty to give the necessary signals. The two coal cars were both equipped with automatic couplers. The couplers are so constructed that they may be worked from the outside by lifting a lever attached to the end of the car. Connected with the lever is a chain, the other end of which is attached to the coupling pin. By lifting the lever the coupling pin is removed. The knuckles or couplers are thus opened and the cars uncoupled.
According to plaintiff's evidence, the engine was headed north. The cars were in its rear, and were being backed south on the house track in response to a signal from plaintiff. He stopped the train by signal, and attempted to uncouple the cars by the use of the pin lifter, which extended out to the corner of the car. There was only one pin lifter on the side of the train where he was working, the other pin lifter being on the opposite side of the other car. He tried the pin lifter two or three times. Thinking that he had succeeded in uncoupling the cars he signaled for the engine to go ahead. When he saw the cars were not uncoupled, he again signaled the engineer to stop. The engineer pulled to the south side of the crossing just a little, and stopped. Plaintiff went in between the cars to lift the pin on the opposite side of the head car. While in this position the train backed without any signal from him, and the wheels of the car ran over his left leg. His leg and knee were so crushed that amputation above the knee was necessary. Plaintiff also stated that at Paris, Tennessee, he had occasion to attempt to use the coupler which he first attempted to uncouple at Murray, and it failed to work there as it should. He further stated that when automatic couplers are in good condition there is no trouble in lifting the pin and uncoupling it by means of the pin lifter. On cross-examination witness stated that he might have gone around the end of the train and uncoupled on the other side, but this was not the customary way to do the work.
William Armstrong, who was present at the time of the accident, and who was about 30 feet distant from plaintiff, testified that he saw plaintiff give a signal with a downward motion of his hands. The train then stopped. He saw plaintiff go in between the cars, and while he was between the cars the train backed for a distance of about 15 feet. He then gave the alarm to the man on the engine. Cooper Armstrong testified that he was on the same side of the train as his brother, William Armstrong. He saw plaintiff go in between the cars and take hold of the lever. He then saw plaintiff give the stop signal and the train stopped. Plaintiff then went in between the cars, but he could not see what plaintiff was doing. While the plaintiff was between the cars the cars moved backward about 15 or 20 feet. After the accident the cars were together.
For the defendant the station agent, conductor and car inspector testified that they tested the coupler in question shortly after the accident, and it was free from defects, and in good workable condition. The head brakeman testified to the same effect. On cross-examination, however, the head brakeman testified that the train stopped some two or three times, and it was either on the second or third movement of the train that plaintiff was injured. The station agent also testified that he was present when the accident occurred, and that the train was moving when plaintiff went in between the cars for the purpose of uncoupling. Defendant also proved by two witnesses that the Messrs. Armstrong stated to them that the train was moving when plaintiff went in between the cars. This evidence was admitted for the purpose of impeachment only.
Defendant first insists that the verdict is flagrantly against the evidence. In this connection it is argued that on one side we have simply the statement of plaintiff that he tried the lever two or three times but it failed to work, while on the other side is the positive evidence of the station agent, conductor, head brakeman and car inspector, to the effect that the coupler was free from defects and in workable condition. It will be observed that the Act of Congress provides in effect that any car used in moving interstate commerce shall be equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be coupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars. In construing this Act the Federal Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that it imposes an absolute duty, not dependable upon the exercise of diligence or the existence of wrong intent, on the part of the railroad company. Whether the carrier knew its cars were not so equipped is immaterial. It is the duty of the carrier to know that its couplers are in order, and to keep them in order at all times. St. Louis R. Co., v. Taylor, 210 U. S., 281; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S., 559; Del. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 220 U. S., 580; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S., 1. It is likewise well settled by the same court that the failure of a coupler to work at any time is sufficient to sustain the charge of negligence. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co. v. Brown, 229 U. S., 317, 33 Sup. Ct. R., 840; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. U. S., supra. In view of plaintiff's evdence that he attempted to use the coupler in question at Paris, Tennessee, and it failed to work there as it should, and that he pulled on the lever two or three times on the occasion in question without succeeding in uncoupling the cars, and in view of the further fact that his evidence as to the circumstances under which he went between the cars is corroborated to a certain extent by the Messrs. Armstrong, and also by the head brakeman, who testified for defendant, we conclude that the evidence, considered in the light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, is sufficient not only to take the case to the jury, but to sustain its finding that the coupler was not in workable condition.
The fact that plaintiff acquired knowledge of the defective condition of the coupler at Paris, Tennessee, and never reported its condition to the conductor, and with knowledge of its condition went in between the cars on the occasion in question, in no way affects defendant's liability. While he might with propriety have informed the conductor, yet he was under no legal obligation to inform him of that which the statute required him to know. His knowledge of the unworkable condition of the coupler has a bearing on no other phase of the case than that of assumed risk and contributory negligence. By the express terms of the...
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