N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pleasant River Granite Co.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1917
• Parties: NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. v. PLEASANT RIVER GRANITE CO. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

102 A. 298

116 Me. 496

NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

v. PLEASANT RIVER GRANITE CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 24, 1917.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Washington County.

Action by the Northern Pacific Railway Company against the Pleasant River Granite Company and Arthur J. Dalot. Heard on report. Judgment for plaintiff against the Pleasant River Granite Company for $265.90, with interest from date of the writ and costs, and judgment for defendant Dalot and for his costs.

Argued before CORNISn, C. J., and SPEAR, KING, BIRD, HANSON, and MADIGAN, JJ.

C. B. & E. C. Donworth, of Machias, for plaintiff.

H. H. Gray, of Milbridge, for de-fendants.

KING, J. This ease comes up on report. It is an action to recover for freight, demurrage, and storage on a certain stone-working lathe and equipment shipped from Columbia, Washington county, Me., to one William Smith, at St. Cloud, Minn.

It may be stated at the outset that no cause of action is proved against the defendant Arthur J. Dalot, and the word "defendant" as herein used refers only to the Pleasant River Granite Company.

On June 12, 1913, the defendant delivered the lathe and equipment at Columbia to the Maine Central Railroad Company, then operating the Washington County Railway, to be shipped over its line and connecting lines to William Smith, as consignee, at St. Cloud, Minn. A bill of lading in standard form was issued for the shipment, signed by the defendant and by the agent of the initial carrier, naming the consignee, the destination of the shipment, and describing the property shipped. The lathe and equipment were transported in accordance with the terms of the bill of lading to their destination at St. Cloud, and the consignee was notified of their arrival, but he refused to receive them, not, however, on account of any default or neglect of duty on the part of any of the carriers over whose lines the shipment was made. The plaintiff is the last of the connecting carriers, and brings this action to recover such sums as it has paid as the freight charges of the preceding carriers, and for its own freight charges, and for demurrage and storage charges.

1. As to the defendant's liability: It claims that it is not liable at all because it was not the owner of the property at the time of the shipment, the title thereto, as it claims, being then in said William Smith by virtue of a sale of the lathe and equipment from the granite company to him. Considerable evidence was presented, on the one side and the other, bearing on that issue of title. But we do not deem it necessary to determine that issue.

We can entertain no doubt that the defendant, the shipper of the property, is liable to pay the freight and all other lawful charges accruing against the property incident to its shipment. The carrier's contract and right to recover compensation for his services arise from the circumstances of his employment. He has the right to look for his compensation to the party who required him to perform the service. And such is the well-settled doctrine.

In Holt v. Westcott, 43 Me. 445, 451 (69 Am. Dec. 74), the court said:

"Without further citations, we think the general rule deducible from them to be that in all cases where goods are shipped by a consignor under a contract, or for his benefit, he is originally liable for freight, and that the insertion in a bill of lading of a provision that the goods are to be delivered to the consignee, etc., 'he or they paying freight,' will not, of itself, relieve him from that liability; that provision being designed for the benefit of the carrier, he may waive it if he choose so to do, and resort to his employer, the consignor, for his freight, unless there is some special stipulation by which that employer is to be exonerated."

To the same effect the court of Massachusetts held, in Wooster v. Tarr, 8 Allen, 270, 85 Am. Dec. 707, saying:

"The shipper or consignor, whether the owner of the goods shipped or not, is the party with whom the owner or master enters into the contract of affreightment. It is he that makes the bailment of the goods to be carried, and, as the bailor, he is liable for the compensation to be paid therefor."

Again, in Finn v. Railroad Corporation, 112 Mass. 524, 17 Am. Rep. 128, the court said:

"We do not think the carrier's contract and right to recover his freight can be made to depend upon what may prove to be the legal effect of the negotiations between consignor and consignee upon the title to the property which is the subject of transportation."

See, also, 4 R. C. D. p. 857; 4 Elliott on Railroads, § 1569; 2 Moore on Carriers (2d Ed.) pp. 669, 270; 6 Cyc. p. 500.

The defendant delivered the lathe and equipment to the initial carrier, requested that the shipment be made, and signed the bill of lading. And it does not appear that the carrier had any information concerning negotiations between the consignor and consignee as to a sale of the property from the former to the latter. But the defendant urges in support of its contention the fact that there is printed on the back of the bill of lading a provision that the "owner or consignee shall pay the freight and all other lawful charges accruing on said property, and, if required, shall pay the same before delivery." We think that provision in no way relieves the consignor or shipper of his liability to pay the freight if the carrier sees fit to look to him for his compensation. That...