N.Y. ShipBldg. Co. v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 03 June 1913
• Citation: 87 A. 86,84 N.J.L. 543
• Parties: NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CO. v. BUCHANAN et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

87 A. 86

84 N.J.L. 543

NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CO.

v. BUCHANAN et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 3, 1913.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Camden County.

An award was made against the New York Shipbuilding Company under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the company brings certiorari. Reversed.

Argued February term, 1913, before TRENCHARD, PARKER, and VOORHEES, JJ.

Gaskill & Gaskill, of Camden, for prosecutor.

William C. French, of Camden, for defendants.

PARKER, J. The employer admitted liability and conceded the claims of petitioner for a weekly payment of $7.91 to run for 400 weeks. The controversy below was on the question whether there should be a commutation of this into a lump sum, pursuant to paragraph 21 of the act. P. L. 1911, p. 143.

We find nothing in the case to justify the award of a lump sum. The statute says that the commutation may be ordered, "provided the same be in the interest of justice. Unless so approved, no compensation payments shall be commuted." The amendment of 1913 to this section (chapter 174, § 6), which may be regarded to some extent as a legislative interpretation of the original section, declares that "commutation is a departure from the normal method of payment, and is to be allowed only when it clearly appears that some unusual circumstances warrant such a departure."

The determination of the judge states no reason whatever for commuting the payments, except his own opinion that they should be commuted. If we look at the evidence—a course which would seem to be irregular where there is no specific finding of fact to support—we find simply a claim of petitioner's attorney quite unsupported by any actual testimony, and indeed contradicted by what testimony was given, that petitioner would have a chance of improvement in health by an immediate expenditure of a considerable sum. His counsel stated that certain physicians who could be produced would testify to the need for such expenditure; but they were not called, and so no such testimony was given.

Paragraph 20 of the act requires the "determination" of the trial judge to be filed in writing, and that there shall be contained in this determination (or in the judgment entered thereon, according as we construe the statute), "a statement of facts as determined by the trial judge." Clearly it is intended that the judgment in every phase shall be supported by a specific finding of fact which may be submitted to and considered...