Nabinett v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | GJH-20-1357 |
| Parties | JOYCE NABINETT, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Joyce Nabinett brought this civil action against the United States of America under the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that the Department of Energy's negligence caused her to slip and fall in a Department of Energy building located in Washington, D.C. ECF No. 1; ECF No. 7-2. Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 6.[1] No. hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
On or about November 6, 2018, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff was walking on the United States Department of Energy premises located at 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585 (the “Premises”) when she stepped on a wet, slippery floor at or near the door to the courtyard of the GH Corridor, whereupon she slipped and fell to the ground. ECF No. 7-2 at 7.[3] On the day of Plaintiff's fall, it had been raining for a period of time and, during that period of time, patrons, employees, and/or other individuals tracked water inside the Premises, causing the floor in the area where Plaintiff slipped and fell to become wet and slippery. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff sustained severe, painful, and permanent injuries to her body, as well as severe and protracted shock to her nervous system, as a result of her fall. Id. at 9. Plaintiff, because of these injuries, has been forced to expend, and will continue to expend in the future, large sums of money from hospitalization, x-rays, doctors, nurses, medical treatment, and medications. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff was forced to take time off from her employment and suffered a loss of wages. Id.
Defendant owned and/or maintained the premises where Plaintiff's fall and resulting injury occurred and, consequently, had a duty: (1) to maintain the floors of the Premises in a safe condition; (2) to provide mats at the entry/exit ways to prevent water from being tracked into the Premises pursuant to safe walking surface codes; (3) to rid the Premises' floors of all dangerous, unsafe, and slippery conditions; and (4) to warn the Plaintiff of all dangerous, unsafe, and slippery conditions. Id. at 7-8. According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant breached these duties. Id. at 9. Although Defendant “knew or should have known” that the subject floor on the Premises was in a dangerous, unsafe, and slippery condition on the day of Plaintiff's fall, Defendant failed to provide mats, wet floor signs, and/or warnings at the location of Plaintiff's slip and fall in violation of multiple safe walking surface codes, and also failed to take reasonable efforts to clean/dry the floor. Id. at 7-9. Moreover, Defendant failed to correct, prevent, and/or warn Plaintiff about the dangerous condition on the Premises despite having “had a reasonable time to rid the subject floor of the dangerous, unsafe, and slippery condition[;] prevent the dangerous, unsafe, and slippery condition from forming on the subject floor[;] and/or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous, unsafe condition created by the substance on the subject floor of the Premises[.]” Id. at 8. Plaintiff's injuries were a result of Defendant's breach. Id. at 9.
On January 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the United States Department of Energy. ECF No. 7-2 at 7. The administrative claim was denied on March 30, 2020. Id.; ECF No. 6-3. Plaintiff then initiated the instant action in this Court on June 1, 2020. ECF No. 1. Defendant responded to Plaintiff's Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim on October 19, 2020. ECF No. 6. On October 28, 2020, Plaintiff, in one filing, opposed Defendant's Motion and filed a first Amended Complaint. ECF No. 7; ECF No. 7-2. Defendant replied in support of its Motion to Dismiss on November 12, 2020, and, in the same brief, argued that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was futile. ECF No. 8.
Defendant argues the Court should dismiss this action for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) “test[s] the adequacy of a complaint.” Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 654, 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing German v. Fox, 267 Fed.Appx. 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do “not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Prelich, 813 F.Supp.2d at 660 (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, the Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). However, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the Court need not accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles Cty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Plaintiff brings her negligence claim against Defendant under the FTCA. “The FTCA allows an individual to sue ‘the United States for money damages . . . for injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the federal Government while acting in the scope of his employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable[.]'” Moorman v. United States, 829 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2011). “The FTCA only provides jurisdiction, not the substantive cause of action.” Chang-Williams v. Dep't of the Navy, 766 F.Supp.2d 604, 619 (D. Md. 2011). “[A]n action under the FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)). Thus, in evaluating Defendant's argument that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the Court must look to the District of Columbia's negligence law since the District of Columbia is the state in which Defendant's alleged misconduct occurred.[4]
Defendant presents two arguments against Plaintiff's claim: (1) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege in sufficient detail the scope of the employment of the federal employees involved, a requirement under the FTCA, ECF No. 8 at 6; and (2) Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged a negligence claim under District of Columbia law, ECF No. 6-1 at 4-6; ECF No. 8. The Court addresses each argument separate below.
Defendant argues the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim because “[t]he Amended Complaint lacks any factual allegations concerning the negligence of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment that proximately caused Plaintiff's fall.” ECF No. 8 at 6. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Specifically, “[Plaintiff] does not identify any particular Government agents or employees who shirked some responsibility or took some action contributing to her accident.” Id. Defendant cites Moorman v. United States, 829 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011), and Barnett v. United States, 193 F.Supp.3d 515 (D. Md. 2016) to support its argument. Id. However, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case.
In Moorman, the plaintiff alleged that she fell down a stairway at the National Guard Armory, but she “fail[ed] to allege any federal Government action or omission. 829 F.Supp.2d at 3. Instead, the plaintiff stated that she “ha[d] reason to believe the District of Columbia [not the federal Government] had responsibility for maintaining and repairing the steps” down which she fell. Id. The District of Columbia is not an agency of the federal government. Id. Thus, in Moorman, the court dismissed the FTCA claim. Id.
In Barnett, aside from alleging that the Government was liable for his fall on a public sidewalk, the plaintiff failed to allege that any employee of the Government acted negligently. Barnett v. United States, 193 F.Supp.3d at 519. Instead, the plaintiff in Barnett only alleged that the Government owned the H lot, which is not where the plaintiff's fall occurred. Id. Moreover, the court in Barnett recognized that the county code for the Maryland county in which the plaintiff's fall occurred stated that the county is responsible for the maintenance of public sidewalks-that county code is consistent with...
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