Nabong v. Paddayuman, Civil Action No.: 17–0400 (RC)

• Decision Date: 05 February 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 17–0400 (RC)
• Parties: Louie NABONG, Plaintiff, v. Ofelia PADDAYUMAN and Maria Cristina Louise Sy, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

289 F.Supp.3d 131

Louie NABONG, Plaintiff,

v.Ofelia PADDAYUMAN and Maria Cristina Louise Sy, Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 17–0400 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed February 5, 2018

Robert M. Stern, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

A. Euphus Belu–John, Belu–John Law, PLLC, Washington, DC, Jason Christopher Crump, Smith Graham & Crump LLC, Largo, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Louie Nabong brings this action against Defendants, Ofelia Paddayuman and Maria Cristina Louise Sy alleging that Defendants lured Ms. Nabong to the United States with promises of gainful employment, but then isolated and imprisoned her, subjected her to forced labor, and otherwise threatened and mistreated her. This case now comes before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot."). For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Defendants' motion.

II. BACKGROUND¹

In March 2014, Ms. Nabong was living and working in the Philippines when Ms. Paddayuman contacted her about potential employment in the United States. According to the Complaint, Ms. Paddayuman offered to employ Ms. Nabong in the United States as an "in-home caregiver of [Ms. Paddayuman's] two grandchildren," emphasizing "that Ms. Nabong's responsibilities would be limited to childcare and would not involve cleaning, laundry, or other housework." Compl. ¶ 16. Enticed by the offer, Ms. Nabong expressed interest in the position. Compl. ¶ 16. Then, a short time later, Ms. Paddayuman informed Ms. Nabong that she had been hired for the job. Compl. ¶ 16.

Ms. Paddayuman told Ms. Nabong that "she [Ms. Paddayuman] would handle most of the paperwork associated with Ms. Nabong's admission to the United States." Compl. ¶ 17. Defendants then proceeded to secure a G–5 visa for Ms. Nabong, which allows a foreign national to enter the United States as a domestic or personal employee of a foreign employee of an international organization working in the United States under a G–4 visa. Compl. ¶ 18; See Dep't of State, Visas for Employees of International Organizations and NATO, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/other-visa-categories/visa-employees-nato.html. Although Ms. Nabong was consistently told that she would be working for Ms. Paddayuman, throughout the visa paperwork process, Ms. Paddayuman instructed Ms. Nabong to identify Ms. Sy, a World Bank Group employee with a G–4 visa, as her employer both "on the visa" and "during [an] interview with United States embassy officials." Compl. ¶¶ 18–20. Ms. Paddayuman also provided Ms. Nabong with an employment contract prepared on a World Bank template that identified Ms. Sy as Ms. Nabong's prospective employer. See Compl. ¶ 22; Compl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 1–3. According to the Complaint, "the preparation of Plaintiffs' immigration and employment documents, application for and processing of Plaintiffs' G–5 visa, and [Ms.] Paddayuman's communications with [Ms. Nabong] regarding her employment and move to the United States occurred at the International Finance Corporation, a member organization of the World Bank Group, in Washington, D.C." Compl. ¶ 8.

On February 21, 2014, Ms. Nabong received a G–5 visa and, one month later, arrived in the United States. See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 23. Ms. Nabong then went to live with and work for Ms. Paddayuman at Ms. Paddayuman's home in Burke, Virginia. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. Ms. Nabong alleges, however, that over the course of her employment, Ms. Paddayuman held Ms. Nabong captive through coercion and intimidation and forced her to work long hours performing housework beyond which she had originally agreed under inhumane conditions and without adequate pay. See Compl. ¶¶ 24–47. This treatment persisted for more than a month when, on May 6, 2014, a special agent from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed Ms. Nabong from the home. See Compl. ¶ 52.

On March 6, 2017, Ms. Nabong commenced this suit against both Ms. Paddayuman and Ms. Sy asserting several claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"), the Fair Labor Standards Act, Virginia labor laws, and common law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. See Compl. ¶¶ 55–119. Defendants responded to Ms. Nabong's complaint by moving to dismiss for lack of venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See generally Defs.' Mot.

III. ANALYSIS

On a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating "proper venue with respect to each cause of action and each [defendant]." Lamont v. Haig , 590 F.2d 1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ; see also Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 757 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("We are also puzzled by the district court's order because it does not address separately why venue is improper as to each of the three employment discrimination claims advanced by [the plaintiff]."). But, unless contradicted by evidence, "a court should accept the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations as true, resolve any factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Myers v. Holiday Inns, Inc. , 915 F.Supp.2d 136, 144 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Hunter v. Johanns , 517 F.Supp.2d 340, 343 (D.D.C. 2007) ). However, the court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. See 2215 Fifth St. Assocs. v. U–Haul Int'l, Inc. , 148 F.Supp.2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2001). If a court finds that venue is improper, it must dismiss the case or, in the interests of justice, transfer the case to a proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Here, Ms. Nabong claims that venue is proper in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which is often referred to as the "transactional venue" provision. See 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3806 (4th ed. 2017). Section 1391(b)(2) provides that "a civil action may be brought in ... a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). "This section does not require a plaintiff to bring suit in a district where every event that supports an element of the claim occurred; rather, it merely requires a plaintiff to show that some considerable portion of the events occurred in their chosen forum." Maysaroh v. Am. Arab Commc'ns & Translation Ctr., LLC , 51 F.Supp.3d 88, 93 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Modaressi v. Vedadi , 441 F.Supp.2d 51, 57 (D.D.C. 2006) ). In analyzing transactional venue, this Court must assess each of Ms. Nabong's claims individually and ascertain the facts that have "operative significance." See e.g., Lamont v. Haig , 590 F.2d at 1134–35. For claims sounding in tort, courts typically "focus on where the allegedly tortious actions took place and where the harms were felt." 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3806 (4th ed. 2017). For claims based on contracts, courts usually consider "where the contract was negotiated or executed, where the contract was to be performed, and where the contract was allegedly breached." Id. But "the site of the alleged breach weighs heavily in the venue analysis." Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G. , 533 F.Supp.2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2008). Here, Ms. Nabong argues that "a substantial part of the events" underlying her claims occurred in the District of Columbia because Ms. Paddayuman lured Ms. Nabong to the United States through communications that Ms. Paddayuman made from Washington, D.C and because her employment and immigration documents were prepared there. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 3; Compl. ¶ 8.

Contrary to her assertions, most of Ms. Nabong's claims concern the conditions under which she served in Virginia, rather than the fact that she was allegedly lured to the United States under false pretenses or that documents were prepared on her behalf in Washington, D.C. For example, at least four of Ms. Nabong's claims rely exclusively on the allegation that Defendants failed to adequately pay Ms. Nabong for her work in Virginia. See generally Compl. (Count Six (Fair Labor Standards Act violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 216(b) ), Counts Seven and Eight (Virginia labor law violations, Va. Code Ann. §§ 40.1–28.10, 40.1–28.12, 40.1–29 ), Count Ten (unjust enrichment) ). Likewise, at least three of Ms. Nabong's claims under the TVPRA concern only the circumstances under which she labored in Virginia, which will succeed or fail on the merits regardless of any acts performed or events that occurred in the District.² See generally Compl. (Count One (peonage, 18 U.S.C. § 1581, 1595 ), Count Two (sale into involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584 – 85 ), and Count Three (forced labor, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 ). Compl. ¶ 118. And while Ms. Nabong premises her breach of contract claim on a written document that she claims Defendants created in the District, see Compl. ¶¶ 8, 116, Ms. Nabong does not allege that it was executed in the District.³ Indeed, Ms. Nabong claims that she had never seen the purported contract prior to her interview with U.S. officials and that her signature on that document was forged. Compl. ¶ 22. Moreover, even it contemplates performance in Virginia and the breaches that Ms. Nabong alleges—Ms. Paddayuman's failure to sufficiently compensate Ms. Nabong and the "inhumane working hours and working conditions"—all occurred there. Thus, § 1391(b)(2) in and...