Myers v. Holiday Inns, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 January 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:11–cv–1948 (RC).
• Citation: 915 F.Supp.2d 136
• Parties: Glynda MYERS, Plaintiff, v. HOLIDAY INNS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

915 F.Supp.2d 136

Glynda MYERS, Plaintiff,

v.HOLIDAY INNS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:11–cv–1948 (RC).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Jan. 16, 2013.

Glynda Myers, Washington, DC, pro se.

Joan Augusta Harvill, International Law Center, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Paul Raymond Pearson, Law Offices of Roger S. Mackey, Chantilly, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting the Defendants' Motion for Transfer

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is a District of Columbia resident who alleges that she was injured in a Georgia franchise of a Holiday Inn. The defendants are Holiday Inns, Inc., a corporation licensed to do business in the District; the Island Group, LLC, a franchisee of the Holiday Inn located in Georgia; and Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., a licensing corporation. The plaintiff brings suit against all three defendants alleging negligence that resulted in physical injury. The plaintiff claims that this court has jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) and D.C.Code § 13–423, the District's long arm statute. The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) or alternatively, 12(b)(3), asserting that the plaintiff's claim is barred for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. For the reasons discussed below, the court transfers this matter to the Southern District of Georgia.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Glynda Myers (“the plaintiff”) is a District of Columbia resident. The plaintiff names three defendants in the present action: Holiday Inns, Inc., ¹ incorporated in Delaware and having no ownership interest in Island Group (“HHI”); the Island Group, LLC,² a Georgia-based limited liability company with its principal place of business in Georgia, which owns and operates the Holiday Inn franchise where plaintiff alleges she was injured (“Island Group”); and Holiday Hospitality Franchising,Inc.,³ a Delaware-incorporated licensing company (“HHFI”) (collectively “the defendants”). Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Island Group is liable under a respondeat superior theory of negligence for the acts of its employees, and that both HHI and HHFI are liable as controlling entities of Island Group. The defendants assert that this court must dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, improper venue.

The plaintiff was a guest at the Island Group's Holiday Inn franchise. Compl. ¶ 6. On November 6, 2009, after sunset, upon attempting to exit the hotel, the plaintiff alleges that she was instructed by a hotel employee to exit through the back door. Id. ¶ 7. The employee escorted her to the back door and held the door open for her to exit. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. The plaintiff then alleges that as she stepped out of the doorway, because there was little lighting and shrubs blocked her view of the surroundings, “she fell[,] striking her head, sustained right eye trauma, a laceration above her right eye[,] trauma to her ribs[,] and injured her right hand.” Id. ¶ 9. The plaintiff has brought a negligence suit in this court seeking compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Id. ¶ 14. She alleges that jurisdiction over all three defendants is appropriate in this court because Island Group is a party to the advertisements in the District of HHI and HHFI. Def.'s Mot. ¶ 8. The defendants ask that this court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(3), on the grounds that Island Group is the only properly named defendant, and jurisdiction notwithstanding, the appropriate venue is in Georgia where that franchise is located. Def.'s Mot. ¶ 9.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss

The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) challenges the personal jurisdiction of the court. To withstand a defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of specific and pertinent jurisdictional facts. Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1052 (D.C.Cir.1984); Naegele v. Albers, 355 F.Supp.2d 129, 136 (D.D.C.2005); United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 116, 121 (D.D.C.2000). “A plaintiff makes such a showing by alleging specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum.” Id. (citing Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C.Cir.1983)). Unlike a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this court need not treat all of a plaintiff's allegations as true when making a personal jurisdiction determination. The court may instead “receive and weigh affidavits and any other relevant matter to assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts.” Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d at 120 n. 4 (citation omitted). However, the court must resolve any factual discrepancies with regard to establishing personal jurisdiction in favor of the plaintiff. See Crane v. New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C.Cir.1990).

B. The District of Columbia Long Arm Statute

Where subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the District's long arm statute determines whether there is a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants. D.C.Code § 13–423 (2001); Crane, 894 F.2d at 455. The long arm statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly, or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia[.]”. D.C.Code § 13–423(a)(1) (2001). For a plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction, she must establish that both the forum state's jurisdictional statute confers such jurisdiction, and that such exercise is in accord with the due process standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A); Lewy v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., Inc., 723 F.Supp.2d 116, 122 (D.D.C.2010). The District's long arm statute is coextensive with the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction, Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.Cir.1987), and thus requires that “non-resident defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state, so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C.Cir.2004); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir.1990). Section 13–423 further provides that “[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only claims for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.” § 13–423(b).

In the District, for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction under the “transacting business” provision in § 13–423(a)(1) and in accordance with the extensive application of the long arm statute under the due process clause, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the District. Because § 13–423(a)(1) is limited by § 13–423(b), this court is limited to exercising specific jurisdiction in that § 13–423(b) disallows “claims that do not relate to the acts that form the basis for personal jurisdiction.” Brunson v. Kalil & Co., Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 221, 227 (D.D.C.2005) (citing Schwartz v. CDI Japan, Ltd., 938 F.Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.1996)). Under the general jurisdiction conferred by the long arm statute, the plaintiff must meet a three-pronged test as to not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. The plaintiff must prove that that the defendant (1) transacted business in the District; ⁴ (2) that the claim arose from the business transacted in the District; and (3) that the defendant “had minimum contacts with the District of Columbia such that the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F.Supp. 65, 71 (D.D.C.1992), overruled on other grounds, (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). The minimum contacts test will only be satisfied if the defendants “purposefully avail[ed]” themselves “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), and if litigation in the forum is consistent with fair play and substantial justice, World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

C. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants

For jurisdiction over the defendant to be conferred upon this court, “ ‘the most critical inquiry is not whether the nonresident defendant is physically present in the forum[,] but whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are of such a quality and nature that they manifest a deliberate and voluntary association with the forum.’ ” Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 326 (D.C.2000) (citing Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C.1981) (en banc)). The burden belongs to the plaintiff to establish that such personal jurisdiction over the defendant exists. Under International Shoe and Burger King, this inquiry requires asking whether the defendants were transacting business in the District. Because both HHI and HHFI cannot be said to have transacted business in the District, and because all events occurred in a jurisdiction other than the District, personal jurisdiction is lacking in this case.

The plaintiff alleges that because HHI advertised in the District, this is sufficient for “doing business” under the statute...