Nabors v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 15 October 1917
• Docket Number: 19562
• Citation: 115 Miss. 564,76 So. 549
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: NABORS v. MATHIS

76 So. 549

115 Miss. 564

NABORS v. MATHIS

No. 19562

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 15, 1917

Division B

APPEAL from the circuit court of Alcorn county, HON. CLAUDE CLAYTON Judge.

Suit by S. M. Nabors against M. C. Mathis. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

T. H Johnson, for appellant.

Appellant contends that the court below erred in granting the third and fifth instructions for appellees for two reasons, towit first, these instructions do not correctly state the law as applicable to the case at bar; and, second, because these two instructions are in direct conflict with the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth instructions given for appellant, and left the jury without a proper guide as to the law in the case.

We contend that if the words charged in the declaration were spoken by appellee, or if he made use of synonymous words conveying the same specific idea, appellant was entitled to recover without being required to prove that the words were spoken in an insulting manner and in a manner calculated to lead to a breach of the peace as was charged in the instructions complained of by appellant.

The words alleged to have been uttered by appellee charged appellant with the commission of a crime, the crime of accepting a bribe--a felony, one involving great moral turpitude. It is true that the charge of crime in the declaration is not made with the technical accuracy and precision as would be required in an indictment, nor is it charged by the specific name of the offense; this is not necessary, for if the defamatory words taken in the natural and ordinary signification fairly import a criminal charge, it is sufficient. 25 Cyc. 539.

In the case of Furr v. Speed, 21 So. 562, where the words charged to have been uttered were, "Mrs. Furr poisoned me," this court, on page 563, about the middle of the first column, said: "Poisoning was and is a crime at common law and by statute,--murder, if death ensues; attempt to murder if death does not follow--and to charge either crime upon a person by any expression generally and commonly understood to the persons addressed constitutes the wrong, and the words are actionable."

The crime charged against appellant by the words used in the declaration was as unquestionable a charge of accepting a bribe, as the charge in the case above cited, viz., "Mrs. Furr poisoned me" was a charge of murder, or attempt to murder, and would generally and commonly be so understood.

Nor is it necessary that the crime should be directly charged, for if it is published as an expression of belief, or as an opinion, it is as effectual as if made in positive language. 25 Cyc. 360.

If the words alleged in the declaration, either directly, or indirectly as the expression of an opinion, charge appellant with a crime, they are actionable per se under the common law. We presume that appellee will admit this, and that it will not be necessary to cite authorities to support a principle of law so elementary.

If the words were actionable per se at common law and plaintiff would be entitled to recover upon proof of the words alleged, or synonymous words, what effect does section 10, Code of 1906, have upon them? This statute does not change the common law slander, further than to extend the grounds warranting an action of slander much further than at common law, and makes words actionable which were not so at common law.

In the old case of Crawford v. Mellton, 12 Smed. & M. 330, where the words charged to have been uttered were, "Crawford swore a lie and I can prove it," this court, after stating that such words were not actionable at common law, but were made so by the statue, as from their usual construction and acceptation they are insulting? and likely to lead to a breach of the peace, in commenting on the purpose of the statute, said:

"Manifestly, the first object of the statute was to extend the grounds warranting the action much further than they existed at common law, and to make words actionable, which theretofore were not so. Still, while this seems to be the main scope, it further provides, that no plea, exception, demurrer, etc."

Thus clearly showing that it was not the purpose or intention of the legislature, by such statute, to change the common law as to slander, but simply to extend the law to words which were not actionable at common law; and the secondary object of the statute was to change the common law pleading to the extent therein set out. Words which were actionable per se at common, are still actionable per se under the statute, and it is not necessary to allege or prove that the words were spoken in an insulting manner as a condition precedent to recovery. The words themselves constitute the grossest kind of insult. If appellee uttered such words, he charged appellant with a most odious crime, one that would not only render him infamous under the law, but forever infamous in the eyes of all right thinking people.

The very language of the statute itself is such as to preclude the idea that words which are in themselves insulting, such as a charge of crime, must be said in an insulting manner before recovery can be had. It provides that, "All words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, shall be actionable, etc." There is absolutely nothing in the statute which requires words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and which are calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, to be spoken in an insulting manner, in order that they may be actionable. This court has said in the case of Crawford v. Mellton, supra, page 330:

"The only thing necessary to bring words spoken of another within the meaning of our statute, are, that they must be insulting and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace."

If the words uttered by appellee are not inherently insulting, and are not calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, it would be impossible to conceive of words which would be considered as insults, words which are sufficiently cross to arouse the ire of a man to the point where he would be calculated to commit a breach of peace. If these words do not come within the literal meaning of the statute, no words can be uttered to fall within its condemnation. If such words, from heir usual construction and common acceptation, are considered insults, and are calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, they are actionable regardless of the manner of their speaking.

W....