Nabors v. Town of Somers

• Decision Date: 13 April 2010
• Citation: 72 A.D.3d 769,900 N.Y.S.2d 92
• Parties: Elizabeth Miller NABORS, appellant, v. TOWN OF SOMERS, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

900 N.Y.S.2d 92

72 A.D.3d 769

Elizabeth Miller NABORS, appellant,

v.TOWN OF SOMERS, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 13, 2010.

Andrew C. Risoli, Eastchester, N.Y., for appellant.

Sokoloff Stern LLP, Westbury, N.Y. (Brian S. Sokoloff and Melissa L. Holtzer of counsel), for respondent Town of Somers.

Hodges, Walsh & Slater LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Paul E. Svensson of counsel), for respondent Selective Insurance Co.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In a hybrid action, inter alia, to recover damages for alleged termination of insurance coverage and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Town of Somers dated May 11, 2007, which adopted the recommendations of a hearing officer dated January 4, 2007, made after a hearing, finding the plaintiff/petitioner guilty of two charges of misconduct and one charge of incompetence, and terminated her employment, the plaintiff/petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated March 20, 2009, which, upon the granting of the application of the Town of Somers to convert the action insofar as asserted against it into a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, among other things, denied her motion, in effect, for summary judgment on the second cause of action asserted against the defendant/respondent Town of Somers to recover back pay, granted the cross motion of the defendant/respondent Selective Insurance Co. pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the third cause of action asserted against it, granted the separate cross motion of the defendant/respondent Town of Somers for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action asserted against it, in effect, severed the proceeding, and transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, Second Department.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying the plaintiff/petitioner's motion, in effect, for summary judgment on the second cause of action to recover back pay and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion as unnecessary, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof granting the cross motion of the defendant/respondent Town of Somers for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action asserted against it and substituting therefor a provision denying that cross motion as unnecessary; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

ADJUDGED that the petition is granted to the extent of awarding the plaintiff/petitioner back pay, the petition is otherwisedenied, the proceeding is otherwise dismissed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a hearing to determine the portion of the delay in making the determination dated May 11, 2007, that is attributable to the Town of Somers and a determination thereafter of the amount of back pay to be awarded to the plaintiff/petitioner in accordance herewith.

In January 2003 the plaintiff/petitioner Elizabeth Miller Nabors began working part time for the defendant/respondent Town of Somers. Although Nabors worked approximately 10 hours per week during the course of her part-time employment with the Town, Nabors submitted claims to the Unemployment Insurance Division of the New York State Department of Labor (hereinafter the UID) in which she stated that she had not worked any days during that period. After her position became full time, Nabors received notice from the UID that she had received benefits to which she was not entitled. The UID made an initial determination that Nabors willfully misrepresented her eligibility for unemployment benefits, and imposed a penalty upon Nabors. Thereafter, Nabors requested a hearing before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. After the hearing, an administrative law judge (hereinafter the ALJ) sustained the initial determination. The Town then commenced a disciplinary action charging Nabors with two counts of misconduct, alleging that she made false representations to the UID and to the ALJ, and one charge of incompetence, alleging that Nabors made false and willful misrepresentations that excluded her from coverage under the Town's insurance policy. The Town placed Nabors on unpaid suspension effective February 10, 2006, "for the period allowed by Civil Service Law § 75(3)," and scheduled a hearing for March 3, 2006.

In a letter dated February 28, 2006, Nabors's newly retained counsel requested an adjournment of the hearing originally scheduled for March 3, 2006, until sometime after March 9, 2006. In so doing, Nabors's attorney acknowledged that her "client is currently on an unpaid suspension pending the decision of the aforementioned hearing and agree that such condition will continue until a hearing is conducted and the matter resolved." The Town consented to the adjournment, and the parties' respective counsel thereafter agreed that the hearing would be adjourned until March 20, 2006. In a letter dated March 16, 2006, the hearing officer advised the parties that the hearing was adjourned from March 20th to April 21, 2006. By letter dated April 13, 2006, the Town's attorney requested an adjournment of the hearing, and the hearing officer granted therequest by rescheduling the hearing for May 18, 2006. By letter dated May 25, 2006, the hearing officer again adjourned the hearing, this time until July 5, 2006. The hearing was conducted on July 5, 2006, and July 28, 2006, respectively. Thereafter, in a decision and order dated January 4, 2007, the hearing officer found that Nabors was guilty of all three charges. In a resolution dated May 11, 2007, approximately 15 months after Nabors's suspension from employment began, the Town adopted the recommendations of the hearing officer, and terminated Nabors's employment.

Nabors commenced this action and proceeding against, among others, the Town and Selective Insurance Co. (hereinafter Selective). As against the Town, Nabors asserted a cause of action alleging wrongful discharge and, pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75(3), to recover back pay for the period of the suspension exceeding 30 days. As against Selective, Nabors asserted a cause of action alleging wrongful cancellation of insurance coverage.

The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the Town's application to convert the action insofar as asserted against it into a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and to transfer the proceeding to this Court ( see CPLR 7804[g] ). On a prior appeal to this Court, although the conversion of the proceeding was affirmed, this Court determined that "the transfer of the converted proceeding ... was premature," and found that the record was insufficient to decide whether the Town's determination was supported by substantial evidence ( Nabors v. Town of Somers, 54 A.D.3d 833, 834, 863 N.Y.S.2d 813).

Thereafter, Nabors moved, in effect, for summary judgment on the second cause of action to recover back pay for the period of her suspension in excess of 30 days, as provided by Civil Service Law § 75(3). The Town cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action asserted against it, contending that Nabors, through her former counsel's letter of February 28, 2006, had waived her right to be paid during the interim suspension pending the hearing and determination of the charges against her. In addition, the Town asserted that the determination to terminate Nabors's employment was supported by substantial evidence and was not so severe a penalty as to shock the conscience. Selective also cross-moved to dismiss the third cause of action asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action. In an order dated March 20, 2009, the Supreme Court denied Nabors's motion, concluding that she waived her right to be paid during her suspension. The Supreme Court granted Selective's cross motion to dismiss the third cause of action asserted against it, granted the Town's separate crossmotion for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action asserted against it, in effect, severed the proceeding, and transferred the proceeding to this Court. The plaintiff challenges the determinations of the Supreme Court.

"CPLR article 78 proceedings are summary in nature and, thus, a motion for summary judgment addressed to the merits of the petition is unnecessary" ( Matter of 1300 Franklin Ave. Members, LLC v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of...