Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero

• Decision Date: 13 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–0136,13–0136
• Citation: 456 S.W.3d 553
• Parties: Nabors Well Services, Ltd. f/k/a Pool Company Texas, Ltd. and Lauro Bernal Garcia, Petitioners, v. Asuncion Romero, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Aydee Romero, Deceased, and as Next Friend of Edgar Romero and Saul Romero; Esperanza Soto, Individually and as Next Friend of Esperanza Soto, Guadalupe Soto, Maria Elena Soto ; and Martin Soto, Respondents
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

456 S.W.3d 553

Nabors Well Services, Ltd. f/k/a Pool Company Texas, Ltd. and Lauro Bernal Garcia, Petitioners

v.Asuncion Romero, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Aydee Romero, Deceased, and as Next Friend of Edgar Romero and Saul Romero; Esperanza Soto, Individually and as Next Friend of Esperanza Soto, Guadalupe Soto, Maria Elena Soto ; and Martin Soto, Respondents

No. 13–0136

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 9, 2014

OPINION DELIVERED: February 13, 2015

Mauro Fernando Ruiz, Ruiz Law Firm, McAllen, TX, for Respondent Martin Soto.

Richard J. Plezia, Richard J. Plezia & Associates, Houston, TX, Peter M. Kelly, Kelly, Durham & Pittard, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Jeffrey R. Vaughan, Clark, Love & Hutson, Houston, TX, for Respondent Asuncion Romero.

Anna Meredith Baker, Amy Warr, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, Austin, TX, Roger D. Townsend, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend, Houston, TX, David Wayne Lauritzen, W. Bruce Williams, Cotton Bledsoe Tighe & Dawson PC, Midland, TX, for Petitioner Nabors Well Services, Ltd.

John Blaise Gsanger, The Edwards Law Firm, Corpus Christi, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Trial Lawyers Association.

Scott Alan James, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Houston, TX, for Amicus Curiae Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.

Ruth G. Malinas, Plunkett & Griesenbeck, Inc., San Antonio, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Defense Counsel.

Opinion

Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the Court.

For more than forty years evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt has been inadmissible in car-accident cases. That rule, which this Court first announced in 1974, offered plaintiffs safe harbor from the harshness of an all-or-nothing scheme that barred recovery for even the slightest contributory negligence. Moreover, the Court reasoned that although a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt may exacerbate his injuries, it cannot cause a car accident, and therefore should not affect a plaintiff's recovery.

In 1985 the Legislature jumped in to statutorily prohibit evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts in all civil cases. It repealed that law in 2003, leaving our rule to again stand alone. But much has changed in the past four decades. The Legislature has overhauled Texas's system for apportioning fault in negligence cases—a plaintiff's negligence can now be apportioned alongside a defendant's without entirely barring the plaintiff's recovery. And unlike in 1974, seat belts are now required by law and have become an unquestioned part of daily life for the vast majority of drivers and passengers.

These changes have rendered our prohibition on seat-belt evidence an anachronism. The rule may have been appropriate in its time, but today it is a vestige of a bygone legal system and an oddity in light of modern societal norms. Today we overrule it and hold that relevant evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts is admissible for the purpose of apportioning responsibility in civil lawsuits.

I

This case arises from a collision between a Nabors Well Services, Ltd. transport truck and a Chevrolet Suburban with eight occupants—three adults and five children. Both vehicles were traveling southbound on two-lane U.S. Highway 285 in rural West Texas. As the transport truck slowed to make a left turn into a Nabors facility, Martin Soto, the Suburban's driver, pulled into the opposing traffic lane and attempted to pass the transport truck. As Soto passed, the transport truck began its left turn and clipped the Suburban, which careened off the highway and rolled multiple times. The evidence is disputed as to whether the transport truck used a turn signal and for how long and whether Soto could have passed the transport truck within the legal passing zone.

Aydee Romero, an adult passenger, was killed in the accident. Martin, his wife Esperanza Soto, and all five children—Esperanza, Guadalupe, and Marielena Soto, and Edgar and Saul Romero—suffered injuries. There is conflicting evidence as to which occupants were belted and which were ejected from the Suburban. A responding state trooper wrote in his report that all occupants were unrestrained except Marielena and the elder Esperanza. But both of them, along with the younger Esperanza, testified they did not use seat belts, while Martin and Guadalupe testified they wore theirs. Guadalupe testified all occupants were ejected except for Martin and Edgar, but Edgar testified he was ejected. And an EMS report stated one of the family members reported at the scene that seven of eight occupants were ejected.

The Soto and Romero families sued Nabors and its truck driver. At trial, Nabors sought to offer expert testimony from a biomechanical engineer, James Funk, Ph.D., that seven of the eight Suburban occupants were unbelted (all except Martin, the driver), that five of those seven were ejected from the vehicle, and that the failure to use seat belts caused the passengers' injuries and the one fatality. Nabors also hoped to introduce evidence of a citation issued to Soto for driving without properly restraining the child passengers as well as testimony from the plaintiffs as to who was unbelted and who was ejected.

Following our precedent in Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.1974), the trial court excluded all evidence of nonuse of seat belts. Additionally, the trial court separately excluded portions of Dr. Funk's testimony on Robinson grounds, specifically, that Dr. Funk was unqualified to opine that the failure to use seat belts caused the unbelted occupants' injuries. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995). The trial court emphasized that even if it had allowed seat-belt evidence, it would have excluded Dr. Funk's injury-causation testimony under Robinson . The jury found Nabors 51% and Soto 49% responsible for the accident, and awarded the Soto and Romero families collectively just over $2.3 million.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment based solely on the Carnation prohibition on seat-belt evidence. The court of appeals did not separately consider whether the trial court properly excluded Dr. Funk's injury-causation testimony under Robinson . We granted review to consider the current viability of Carnation in light of the Legislature's repeal of its statutory ban on seat-belt evidence.

II

A

Texas's earliest cases on the admissibility of seat-belt evidence first appeared in the late 1960s. They culminated in this Court's 1974 decision in Carnation to severely limit admissibility of seat-belt evidence. The context within which these cases arose is instructive. First, there was no law requiring seat-belt use; in fact, a federal mandate that seat belts be installed as standard equipment on all new passenger vehicles was barely in its infancy. Brian T. Bagley, The Seat Belt Defense in Texas, 35 St. Mary's L.J. 707, 717 (2004). And second, Texas courts operated under an unforgiving all-or-nothing rule in negligence cases that entirely barred a plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff himself was negligent in any way. Parrot t v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex.1969).

The first court of appeals to address the issue was quick to point out that no statute required seat-belt use and no Texas authority supported a common-law duty to use seat belts. See Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 340–41 (Tex.Civ.App.–Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). And in lieu of forging a new path, some courts of appeals were able to dispose of the issue on the ground that defendants had no evidence the failure to use seat belts caused the plaintiffs' injuries. See United Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1970, writ dism'd) ; Nieman, 418 S.W.2d at 341. Others grappled with the evidentiary difficulties of admitting seat-belt evidence. See Red Top Taxi Co. v. Snow, 452 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Tex.Civ.App.–Corpus Christi 1970, no writ) (holding evidence of nonuse of seat belts irrelevant to “the liability issues involving the [plaintiff's] alleged contributory negligence”); Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declining to decide whether a common-law duty to use a seat belt exists, but suggesting if so it “should be considered in connection with damages rather than liability”). At least one court seized the opportunity to declare there was no common-law duty to use a seat belt and that the omission was not actionable negligence because the plaintiff could not reasonably foresee the effects of a failure to use a seat belt. See Quinius v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). By the time this Court weighed in, all courts of appeals that reached the issue had either decided a failure to use seat belts was not actionable negligence or left the issue undecided. None supported admitting seat-belt evidence with the aim of reducing or negating a plaintiff's recovery.

This Court first encountered the issue in Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, in which the driver of a linen truck, Kerby, was ejected through the open sliding door of his truck after colliding with an ACC bus. 503 S.W.2d 526, 526 (Tex.1973). The jury found Kerby negligent and 35% responsible for his injuries. Id. at 527. The trial court accordingly reduced Kerby's recovery by 35%, but the court of appeals tossed his award entirely because under the law at the time his contributory negligence barred any recovery whatsoever. Id.

This Court reversed both lower courts and restored Kerby's recovery in full, reasoning that “[c]ontributory negligence must have the causal connection with the accident that but for the conduct the accident would not have happened.” Id. at 528. Accordingly, “negligence that merely increases or adds to the extent of the loss or injury occasioned by another's negligence is not such contributory negligence as will defeat recovery.” Id. In so holding, the Court drew “a sharp distinction between...