Nadat v. Allstate Insurance Co.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2018
• Docket Number: FBTCV176063379
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Ayesha Nadat v. Allstate Insurance Company

Ayesha Nadat v. Allstate Insurance Company

No. FBTCV176063379

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

February 15, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Kamp, Michael P., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #109

KAMP J.

The motion before the court is the defendant’s motion to strike count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below the motion is granted.

FACTS

On May 15, 2017, the plaintiff, Ayesha Nadat, filed a two-count amended complaint against the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company. In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On or about July 11, 2015, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by Denzil L Hines (tortfeasor). At the time of the accident, both the plaintiff and the tortfeasor were insured by the defendant. The plaintiff brought an action against the tortfeasor which was subsequently decided by binding arbitration, wherein the plaintiff was awarded the sum of $31,991.86. As a result, in count one of her amended complaint, the plaintiff seeks to recover under the defendant’s underinsured motorist coverage per her policy. In count two, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant, as the real party in interest with regard to the aforementioned arbitration, is bound by the arbitration award and is therefore collaterally estopped from contesting the amount of damages.

On September 5, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that it was not a party to the alleged arbitration and therefore it cannot be bound by the arbitrator’s award. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion on November 7, 2017. On November 17, 2017, the defendant filed a reply. The court heard oral argument at short calendar on November 20, 2017.

DISCUSSION

" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016).

In its memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to the issue of the amount of damages awarded by the arbitrator and therefore, count two must be stricken as legally insufficient. Specifically, the defendant contends that it cannot be bound by the arbitrator’s award because it was not a party to the alleged arbitration that settled the underlying action; it did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue of the amount of damages; and it was not the real party in interest to the alleged arbitration, despite the plaintiff’s claims to the contrary. During oral argument, the defendant further contended that its status as the tortfeasor’s insurer in the underlying action does not mean that its interests in that matter are exactly aligned with its interests in the present matter. Rather, the defendant maintains that had there been an underinsured motorist claim in the underlying action, there would have been two separate counsel appointed in order to sufficiently defend its differing interests.

In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendant is properly bound by the arbitrator’s award because it was the carrier which provided a defense to the tortfeasor in the underlying action and therefore, its interests were sufficiently represented and it had timely notice of that action in accordance with the reasoning set forth in Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997). The plaintiff further contends that the defendant is in contractual privity with the tortfeasor by virtue of providing such tortfeasor with insurance coverage and, as a result, may be collaterally estopped from re-litigating the damages awarded through arbitration. In sum, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable because the defendant’s interests in both the underlying action and the present action are exactly the same, namely, to limit damages. In its reply, the defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to cite to any decision holding that an underinsured motorist insurance company can be estopped from re-litigating damages where the same insurance company provided coverage to the tortfeasor in the underlying action, and further maintains that it was not fully represented in the arbitration such that collateral estoppel would be appropriate.

" [C]ollateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 240 Conn. 812. " [P]rivity is a difficult concept to define precisely ... There is no prevailing definition of privity to be followed automatically in every case. It is not a matter of form or rigid labels; rather it is a matter of substance. In determining whether privity exists, [the court employs] an analysis that focuses on the functional relationships of the parties. Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts. Rather, it is, in essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that [the doctrines of preclusion] should be applied only when there exists such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights so as to justify preclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Charlotte Hungerford Hospital v. Creed, 144 Conn.App. 100, 117-18, 72 A.3d 1175 (2013); see also Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, 137 Conn.App. 540, 561, 49 A.3d 770 (2012) (sharing of same legal right is key consideration in determining existence of privity). In sum, " the ‘crowning consideration’ in collateral estoppel cases and the basic requirement of privity [is] that the interest of the party to be precluded must have been sufficiently represented in the prior action so that the application of collateral estoppel is not inequitable." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 818.

In Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 240 Conn 800, our Supreme Court addressed whether, in an action by the insured to recover damages under his uninsured/underinsured motorist provision, the insurer is bound by the judgment obtained by the insured in his prior action against the tortfeasor. Finding that the tortfeasor and the insurer did not share the same legal right, and therefore were not in privity for purposes of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court noted: " The substance of the cause of action in the first trial was an action in tort; specifically, whether [the tortfeasor] was liable to the plaintiff for the negligent operation of his motor vehicle. An action to...