Nadeau v. Maryland Casualty Co.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 25781.,25781. |
| Citation | 212 N.W. 595,170 Minn. 326 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | NADEAU v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. |
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; E. A. Montgomery, Judge.
Action by Norris M. Nadeau against the Maryland Casualty Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order for judgment based on defendant's alternative motion, plaintiff appeals. Order reversed.
Edward Cohen and J. J. Truax, both of Minneapolis, for appellant.
Kingman, Cross, Morley & Cant, and Edwin D. Ford, Jr., all of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Action to recover on a policy of personal accident insurance; it being conceded that plaintiff is wholly and possibly permanently disabled. The defense is a compromise, resulting in a formal release for consideration. After a verdict for plaintiff, defendant's alternative motion resulted in an order for judgment. Plaintiff appeals.
The injury which caused plaintiff's disability occurred May 14, 1923. Both he and his then employer were subject to the compensation law. He received compensation and treatment accordingly from the compensation insurer. For a period he also received the benefits provided for by the policy upon which this suit is brought. In September, 1923, plaintiff seemed to be making a good recovery. He had made one journey to his former home in Oregon. Returning, he concluded that his cure would be expedited if he could go back to and remain in Oregon for a further time. He had already procured an advance on his compensation. Seeking more funds, he approached Mr. French, the adjuster for defendant, for an advance on his policy. He was told that Mr. French could not make an advance but that he could make a settlement.
At no time has plaintiff had the services of a physician of his own choosing. For a time he had undergone treatment at Rochester. In August he had returned to Minneapolis, and from that time on was in charge of Dr. Voyer, who treated him for the employer's insurer. The jury was instructed that Dr. Voyer was not the representative of defendant but there is testimony by Mr. French, its adjuster, that Dr. Voyer had made examinations for defendant and was one of "our staff." When settlement was proposed, Mr. French sent plaintiff to Dr. Voyer for examination and report. Mr. French told plaintiff, so the latter says, to tell Dr. Voyer that he, French, sent plaintiff to him for that purpose. Plaintiff went to Dr. Voyer and reported to French that the Doctor has said "there is nothing wrong with you only bruises, around through my back, and in just a little time you will probably be well"; and that he would be able to go to work in from two to four months. Plaintiff claims to have told French "identically" what the Doctor had said to him.
Plaintiff did not bring from Dr. Voyer to French any written report of the examination. His testimony is that French phoned the Doctor for his statement but, failing to get what he wanted, said, "I guess we can't do anything to-day." Thereupon it developed that shortly before plaintiff had been examined by a Dr. Geist, representing the Industrial Commission. He happened to have Dr. Geist's report with him. It certified that an examination of plaintiff on August 30, 1923, had resulted in the following findings:
Plaintiff says he gave that report to Mr. French and that the following conversation ensued: French: "Do you understand this here?" Plaintiff: "No, I don't understand them big words there; that is one thing I don't understand." French: "Well, I will tell you, you give me this paper, I will give you this money to-day and fix this up, and I will get Dr. Voyer's testimony or report to-morrow, and it will be just the same." Within five minutes, according to plaintiff, the settlement was consummated. Plaintiff claims to have been nervous and that he "didn't know half" what he was doing. For $673.65 he formally released defendant from further liability. He got only about $300 more than the benefits then due him. Under this policy plaintiff would be entitled, were it not for the release, to $25 per week during total disability.
1. In order for plaintiff to prevail it is necessary that the release be set aside. That process is equitable and in matters of contract equity prevents one from taking knowing and unconscionable advantage of another's mistake for the purpose of enriching himself at the other's expense. It is but "obvious justice that mistake by one party, and knowledge of the mistake by the other, will justify relief as fully as mutual mistake." Williston on Contracts, § 1497. Equity is slow to grant relief from mistake of law even when it is mutual, but even with unilateral mistake of law relief may be had by the innocent party if his mistake is accompanied by inequitable conduct on the part of his adversary, as where the latter knowingly has sought advantage from it for his own unconscionable enrichment. "All the cases which deny a remedy for mere mistake of law on one side are careful to add the qualification that there must be no improper conduct on the other." Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35, 50, 35 N. E. 958, 960. These authorities were considered somewhat in Peterson v. First National Bank of Ceylon, 162 Minn. 369, 203 N. W. 53, 42 A. L. R. 1185. We think there is room for the application of that principle to the facts of this case.
Mr. French is a member of the bar, who for some fourteen years has been an adjuster for defendant. He is a man of experience and by the jury could have been held to know the serious potentialities of any sacroiliac injury. Plaintiff, who seems to...
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