Nadrich, In re

• Decision Date: 25 January 1988
• Citation: 44 Cal.3d 271,747 P.2d 1146,243 Cal.Rptr. 218
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 747 P.2d 1146 In re Jeffrey NADRICH on Disbarment. L.A. 32324.

Page 218

243 Cal.Rptr. 218

44 Cal.3d 271, 747 P.2d 1146

In re Jeffrey NADRICH on Disbarment.

L.A. 32324.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1988.

As Modified March 3, 1988.

Larry Scissors, and Michael Kennedy, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Herbert M. Rosenthal, Truitt A. Richey, Jr., Magdalene Y. O'Rourke and Ellen R. Peck for respondent.

BY THE COURT: ^*

We review the recommendation of the Review Department of the State Bar Court that petitioner Jeffrey Nadrich be disbarred from the practice of law in the State of California. (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6101, 6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 951.) The recommendation is based on petitioner's 1982 conviction for possessing, with intent to distribute, approximately 30 grams of lysergic acid diethylamide (L.S.D.), and using interstate commerce to distribute that substance. After reviewing the record and petitioner's objections, we conclude that a less severe form of discipline will sufficiently protect the public and profession and better recognize the mitigating factors amply established in this case.

In January 1983 we placed petitioner on interim suspension, to commence on February 3, 1983, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceeding. We referred the matter to respondent State Bar for a hearing to be held after petitioner's release from incarceration.

In July 1986 a panel of the State Bar Court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the matter. After listening to ten witnesses and receiving considerable documentary evidence, the three-member panel unanimously recommended that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, suspension stayed, with one year of actual suspension followed by four years of probation. In May 1987 the review department adopted the hearing panel's findings of fact almost verbatim, but rejected the panel's disciplinary recommendation. Instead, by a vote of seven to five, the review department recommended petitioner be disbarred.

In his petition in this court petitioner acknowledges his guilt, accepts full responsibility for his actions, and recognizes that his conduct warrants discipline to protect both the profession and the public. He contends, however, that the penalty of disbarment is unduly severe in light of the many mitigating circumstances.

We adopt the findings of the hearing panel and review department as follows:

Petitioner received his law degree in 1975 and was admitted to practice in 1976. He worked briefly for another attorney, then opened his own office. He also earned a California real estate broker's license.

In September 1976 petitioner sustained multiple injuries in an automobile accident. The injuries left him with continual severe pain in his lower back and thighs. His doctors prescribed Percodan for the pain, and the drug gave petitioner almost complete relief. Unfortunately, Percodan--a synthetic opiate--is addicting. During the next two years, as petitioner continued taking Percodan under his doctors' prescriptions, he became wholly reliant on and addicted to the drug.

In early 1979 petitioner's doctors refused to prescribe any more Percodan, but failed to offer petitioner any assistance or treatment to help him overcome his addiction. This breach of medical duty left petitioner, who had become addicted quite legally, with no lawful way to satisfy his addiction. ¹

As a result, petitioner began purchasing and using illegal drugs, including opium and heroin. He stopped practicing law, and gradually sank into a state of isolation and emotional despair. On at least one occasion he nearly died from a drug overdose. In this impaired and addicted state, petitioner began selling drugs to subsidize his own drug use.

In October 1981, a drug dealer turned government informant named Michael M. approached petitioner about purchasing two grams of L.S.D. Petitioner arranged the sale at a price of $4,000, $400 of which represented his commission; he used the $400 to buy drugs for his own use. In January 1982, Michael M. again approached petitioner and asked to purchase 30 grams of L.S.D. Petitioner arranged the sale at a price of $60,000, $6,000 of which was to be his commission. He obtained the L.S.D. and flew from California to New Jersey to deliver it. He was arrested on his arrival in New Jersey.

In January 1982, petitioner was charged with a variety of federal offenses arising out of the drug transaction. In March 1982 petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)), and to using interstate commerce to distribute a controlled substance (18 U.S.C. § 1952). He was sentenced to a term of seven years. After spending three years in the federal prison system and four months in a halfway house, he was paroled in August 1985.

Upon his incarceration petitioner acknowledged responsibility for his actions and set out to rebuild his life. He went through a difficult period of abrupt opiate withdrawal. After arriving at Terminal Island federal prison in June 1982, he entered that facility's drug abuse program and began psychological therapy. He continued both activities throughout his one-year stay at Terminal Island. When transferred to the federal prison camp at Lompoc in May 1983, petitioner became an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.), founded a chapter of Narcotics Anonymous (N.A.), participated in weekly alcohol and drug awareness seminars, and continued both individual and group psychotherapy. He remained active in all these activities throughout his two years at Lompoc.

Petitioner's self-improvement campaign has continued, and indeed intensified, during the more than two years since his release. He remains deeply involved in A.A. and N.A., and spends many of his nonworking hours helping others who have drug and alcohol problems. He has become an active member of two additional groups--The Lawyer's Forum of Southern California and The Other Bar--that help lawyers and judges cope with drug and alcohol problems. He has also become a leader and public representative of the Alcohol Action Program of Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles, and a member of A.A.'s Committee for Cooperation With the Professional Community.

Finally, petitioner has continued to receive individual psychotherapy since his release, and his therapist reports his prognosis is "excellent." He has abstained from all drug use since January 1982, an abstention that has been verified by regular drug tests during the entire period. He presently works as a legal assistant for several attorneys in his area.

By all indications, petitioner has travelled a long way up the road to recovery. Both the hearing panel and review department found that he was "contrite and remorseful for his misdeeds," and that his extensive involvement in recovery-oriented organizations was "reflective of his own established rehabilitation, of his desire to aid in his own recovery, to make amends for his past conduct, and to become the best person he possibly can be."

While we give great weight both to the review department's disciplinary recommendation (In re Severo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 493, 500, 224 Cal.Rptr. 106, 714 P.2d 1244) and the hearing panel's factual findings (In re Kreamer (1975) 14 Cal.3d 524, 532, fn. 5, 121 Cal.Rptr. 600, 535 P.2d 728), we exercise our independent judgment in determining the appropriate discipline to be imposed (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 550, 237 Cal.Rptr. 168, 736 P.2d 754; In re Chira (1986) 42 Cal.3d 904, 909, 231 Cal.Rptr. 560, 727 P.2d 753). This is particularly appropriate when, as here, the review department and the hearing panel disagreed, and the review board itself was closely divided. ² Petitioner, however, bears the burden of showing the review department's recommendation is erroneous or unlawful. (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6083, subd. (c); Trousil v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 341, 211 Cal.Rptr. 525, 695 P.2d 1066.)

The crimes of which petitioner was convicted are no doubt serious, and warrant disbarment in the absence of compelling mitigating circumstances. (Bus. & Prof.Code § 6101; see, e.g., In re Giddens (1981) 30 Cal.3d 110, 116, 177 Cal.Rptr. 673, 635 P.2d 166 [attorney disbarred for conspiring to distribute amphetamines].) However, the primary purpose of attorney discipline is not the punishment of the attorney; it is the protection of the public, the profession, and the courts. ( In re Severo, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 500, 224 Cal.Rptr. 106, 714 P.2d 1244.) Accordingly, we must consider any applicable mitigating or aggravating circumstances (Tarver v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 122, 133, 207 Cal.Rptr. 302, 688 P.2d 911), and recognize any factors "which at once afford some explanation of [petitioner's] conduct, allow further assessment of his character in the light of his post-conviction behavior and all in all have a significant mitigating effect on the charges now before us." ( In re Kreamer, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 531, 121 Cal.Rptr. 600, 535 P.2d 728.)

Many such mitigating factors are present here. Petitioner had no prior disciplinary record in his brief period of practice. (Chefsky v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 116, 132, fn. 10, 202 Cal.Rptr. 349, 680 P.2d 82; Bradpiece v. State Bar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 747, 111 Cal.Rptr. 905, 518 P.2d 337.) He withdrew from the active practice of law prior to committing his criminal acts (Demain v. State Bar (1970) 3 Cal.3d 381, 387, 90 Cal.Rptr. 420, 475 P.2d 652), and his offenses were neither committed in his capacity as an attorney nor in any way related to his practice of law ( In re Kreamer, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 531, 121 Cal.Rptr. 600, 535 P.2d 728).

Petitioner's drug addiction was the result not of illicit drug use, but of legitimate medical treatment. His involvement with illegal drugs began because that treatment was abruptly cut off. He did not sell drugs because of a simple desire for personal enrichment. (In re Higbie (1...