Naeseth v. Hommedal
| Decision Date | 26 November 1909 |
| Docket Number | 16,289 - (84) |
| Citation | 123 N.W. 287,109 Minn. 153 |
| Parties | O. K. NAESETH v. SEVERT S. HOMMEDAL |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Goodhue county by the guardian of Ingeborg Hommedal, an incompetent person, to cancel a deed alleged to have been obtained through undue influence. After the death of the incompetent, her administrator was substituted in place of the guardian. The case was tried before Williston, J., who found in favor of plaintiff. Defendant's motion to amend the findings was denied. From an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, he appealed. Affirmed.
Deed -- Undue Influence -- Evidence.
Action to set aside a deed executed by the defendant's mother to him upon the ground that she was incompetent to make it and that its execution was secured by his undue influence. Held that the finding of the trial court that the execution of the deed was so obtained is sustained by the evidence.
Eckholdt & Eckholdt and P. S. Aslakson, for appellant.
Mohn & Mohn, for respondent.
On November 22, 1904, Ingeborg Hommedal was the owner of a farm containing one hundred acres, which was of the value of $6,500, and on that day she made a deed thereof to her son, the defendant herein. This action was brought by the guardian of her person and estate in the district court of the county of Goodhue to set aside the deed, upon the grounds that she was mentally incompetent to make the deed and that its execution was obtained by the fraud and undue influence of the defendant. She died intestate pending the action, and the administrator of her estate was substituted as plaintiff herein. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, and findings of fact made, and as a conclusion of law therefrom judgment was ordered for the plaintiff, setting aside the deed. Thereupon the defendant moved the court to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law, by striking out several material findings, substituting therefor those proposed by the defendant, and changing the conclusion of law accordingly. The motion was denied. A motion for a new trial was then made by the defendant, and the court made its order denying the motion, from which the defendant appealed.
The defendant's assignments of error are numerous, but in legal effect they present only two general questions for our consideration. Are the findings of fact which are necessary for the support of the trial court's conclusion of law justified by the evidence? Did the court make any reversible errors in its rulings as to the admission of evidence? If the facts found are supported by the evidence, then the defendant's motion to amend the findings was properly denied, no matter whether the reason assigned therefor was right or not; but, if they are not so sustained, then it was error to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial, and the order appealed from must be reversed.
The findings of fact here material are to the effect following On November 22, 1904, Ingeborg Hommedal was the owner of the farm described in the complaint, which was then of the value of $6,500. She owned no other property, except some household goods and other personal property not exceeding $200 in value. She was then a widow, seventy-nine years old, with only two children, the defendant and another son, Torbjorn S. Hommedal. She then was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, in feeble health, and by reason of her age and bodily infirmity her mind had become and was weakened. She was in such condition as to be easily influenced and deceived by those about her. She was unable to read, write, or understand the English language, and was to a large extent dependent upon the defendant in the management of herself and her property, all of which the defendant well know. The defendant acted as her adviser, was apparently kind to her, had her confidence, and she relied upon him in her business and affairs, and a relation of confidence and trust existed between them. He was her agent, and she was dependent upon him. On the day named the defendant, by the exercise of undue influence over her, obtained from her a warranty deed to himself for which she received no consideration. She did not, by reason of her mental condition, understand the nature or effect of such transaction. She had no independent advice in the making of the deed, but was wholly dependent on the defendant. The deed recited that it was made in consideration of $4,000. ...
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