Nagel v. State

• Decision Date: 16 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. S92A1195,S92A1195
• Citation: 262 Ga. 888,427 S.E.2d 490
• Parties: NAGEL v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 490

427 S.E.2d 490

262 Ga. 888

NAGEL v. The STATE.

No. S92A1195.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 16, 1993.

Torin D. Togut, Lisa J. Krisher, Phyllis J. Holmen, Atlanta, for appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, Dist. Atty., La Grange, Jeffery W. Hunt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Carrollton, for appellee.

Robert B. Remar, Remar & Graettinger, P.C., Atlanta, Susan C. Jamieson, Decatur, Mary S. Rauh-Ference, Steven D. Caley, Atlanta, amici curiae.

HUNT, Presiding Justice.

David L. Nagel, who had been acquitted for murder by reason of insanity, applied for release from commitment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the application for release. Nagel appeals, alleging due process violations based on the trial court's reliance on the presumption of continuing insanity. We remand to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion.

In 1981, Nagel was indicted and tried for the murders of his grandparents, Frank Emmett Marshall, Sr. and Mattie Louise Marshall. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Following Nagel's acquittal, the trial court found Nagel met the criteria for civil commitment as set forth in OCGA § 37-3-1(9.1). Thereafter, Nagel was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Resources.

In 1991, Nagel filed his application for release under OCGA § 17-7-131(f). The trial court held a hearing on that application at which medical and lay experts testifying on Nagel's behalf gave their opinions that Nagel was no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others. The trial court denied Nagel's application for release, relying on the statutory presumption of continuing insanity set forth in OCGA § 24-4-21. The trial court, finding that Nagel had not shown there had been a change in his mental status, held he continued to meet the criteria for in-patient civil commitment.

1. We look, first, to the nature of and weight to be given the presumption of insanity under OCGA § 24-4-21. That statutory provision establishes that a mental state, once proven, is presumed to continue. At the release hearing, the insanity acquittee has the burden of proving he is no longer insane. OCGA § 17-7-131(f)(2). The trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131. Loftin v. State, 180 Ga.App. 613, 615, 349 S.E.2d 777 (1986).

The presumption of continuing insanity is founded on fundamental legal principles and sound policy considerations.

A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3049, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). In Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that once the accused has pleaded insanity as a defense and a jury has found that the defendant was indeed insane at the time the crime was committed, a presumption that the insanity, established by the defendant, continues to exist is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. Id., at 364, 103 S.Ct. at 3049. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted the fact that an individual has been found guilty of a criminal act indicates dangerousness, and "this concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding." Id.

It is proper for courts to "pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments." Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at 364, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 3050 n. 13. See, also, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). As the Eleventh Circuit has observed,

A legislature might conclude that public confidence in the integrity of the insanity defense would be undermined if the legislature delegated release decisions to medical professionals. Likewise, the legislature might find that public confidence would be undermined if a successful plea of insanity were viewed as lacking probative force in decisions about continuing mental illness and public safety. It has also been suggested that a legislature may appropriately attach various consequences to an insanity defense "in order to discourage false pleas of insanity." [Cit.] The Second Circuit has cited the danger of calculated abuse of the insanity defense as a relevant consideration in designing procedures for committing an insanity acquittee. [Cit.] The state also has an interest in protecting society from the insanity acquittee's potential dangerousness. [Cit.] The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act indicates dangerousness. [Cit.] The state has an interest in invoking the judiciary's expertise in criminal matters. [Cit.]

Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1487 (11th Cir.1986).

Nagel concedes, as he must, that under Georgia law the presumption of continuing insanity has some evidentiary weight. Of course, a presumption is meaningless if it does not possess some weight of its own. It must be of sufficient substance such that, standing alone, it cannot be lightly overcome. This does not mean that the presumption of continuing insanity, weighty though it might be, is irrebuttable; " '[i]t will yield to a contrary conclusion, where the circumstances supporting such contrary conclusion exclude the presumption as a reasonable hypothesis by a preponderance of the evidence.' [Cit]." Overstreet v. Nickelsen, 170 Ga.App. 539, 543, 317 S.E.2d 583 (1984). Indeed, due process would be inconsistent "with a presumption that cannot be rebutted by any amount of uncontradicted evidence." Benham, supra, 785 F.2d at 1491.

If no amount of evidence offered at a release hearing by an insanity acquittee could rebut the presumption of insanity, the processes of proof in the due process hearing would be an empty ritual. The sole basis of argument would be an appeal to judicial discretion or mercy rather than to a process of proof.

Id.

2. Nagel argues that the statutory presumption of continuing insanity coupled with the rule that the finder of fact is not bound by the opinions of lay or expert witnesses (see Moses v. State, 167 Ga.App. 556, 560, 307 S.E.2d 35 (1983); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 181, 263 S.E.2d 916 (1980)), make it highly improbable that the fact-finder will ever make a determination of sanity. The result, argues Nagel, is the creation of a de facto irrebuttable (and, therefore, unconstitutional) presumption of insanity. We disagree for two reasons. First, the fact-finder may not disregard expert testimony in cases involving the presumption of sanity or insanity. Second, our standard of review and the findings and conclusions we require for that review, insure that the presumption under OCGA § 24-4-21 cannot be applied irrebuttably.

(a) Because of the evidentiary weight of the presumption under OCGA § 24-4-21, there is an exception to the general rule that the fact-finder is not bound by, and may reject, the opinions of expert witnesses. See Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 444, 359 S.E.2d 891 (1987); Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986); and Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982). In those cases, we held that, because the fact-finder must weigh the evidence and may not arbitrarily ignore it, overwhelming opinion evidence of a medical condition may not be summarily rejected by the fact-finder.

When proof of [sanity] is overwhelming, [judges] may not rely solely on the rebuttable presumption of [insanity]. It is a [judge's] function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of testimony. [Judges] must weigh the evidence and may not arbitrarily ignore it. Proof of [sanity] may be so clear and so overwhelming that a finding of [insanity] cannot be...