Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.

Decision Date30 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 82S01-0409-CV-428.,82S01-0409-CV-428.
Citation844 N.E.2d 481
PartiesFrank NAGY, on behalf of himself, his children, Weston Nagy and Jordan Nagy, and those similarly situated, and Sonia Brackett, on behalf of herself, her children, Cory Brashear and Cameron Brackett, and those similarly situated, Appellants (Petitioners below), v. EVANSVILLE-VANDERBURGH SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee (Respondent below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Jacquelyn Bowie Suess, Kenneth J. Falk, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, for Appellants.

Patrick A. Shoulders, Robert L. Burkhart, Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP, Evansville, for Appellee.

Lisa F. Tanselle, Indianapolis, for Amicus Curiae Indiana School Boards Association.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 82A01-0308-CV-299.

RUCKER, Justice.

The question presented is whether the mandatory $20 student services fee imposed on students enrolled in a school corporation violates Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. We conclude it does.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. For the 2002-2003 school year, the Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation ("EVSC") imposed a $20 student services fee on all students in grades Kindergarten through Twelve.1 EVSC acknowledges that the fee was imposed as part of an attempt to balance its budget, which had a $2.3 million deficit in 2002 and a predicted $5.5 million deficit for 2003. The fee, along with state funds and local property tax receipts, was deposited in EVSC's general fund and was used to pay for, among other things, a coordinator of student services, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, elementary school counselors, a police liaison program, and activities such as athletics, drama, and music. The $20 fee is charged to every student including students who qualify for the free or reduced school lunches and textbook programs. If the fee is not paid, a notice is sent to the student's parents notifying them that if payment is not received by a date certain the matter would be referred to a law firm for collection and attorney fees of up to $100 would be charged to the parent regardless of whether legal action is taken.

Frank Nagy and Sonja Brackett are residents of Evansville whose children are enrolled in public schools under EVSC's jurisdiction. EVSC charged Nagy and Brackett a $20 fee for each of their children enrolled for the 2002-2003 academic year. The Brackett children qualify for the reduced or free school lunch and textbook programs.

In October 2002, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Nagy filed a class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint was later amended to add Sonja Brackett.2 Among other things the complaint alleged that the imposition of the fee violated Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, as well as the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. EVSC responded with a motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, which the trial court initially granted. In the meantime the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After conducting a hearing the trial court reconsidered its earlier ruling and granted summary judgment in favor of Brackett, on grounds that a fee imposed upon students who qualify for the reduced or free school lunch and textbook programs violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of EVSC on Plaintiffs' Indiana Constitutional claim. The Plaintiffs appealed and EVSC cross-appealed.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the $20 fee violates Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution because it is used to pay for what amounts to tuition. Because the court found the fee in violation of the Indiana Constitution, it did not reach the federal due process claim.3 See Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We agree that the student services fee is inconsistent with Article 8, Section 1, but for reasons slightly different than those expressed by the Court of Appeals. Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the judgment of the trial court.

II. Discussion
A. Rules of Constitutional Construction

Article 8, Section 1 provides: "Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all." Ind. Const. Art. 8, § 1. Generally, questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by examining the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind.1998). As we have explained, our standard of review of state constitutional claims requires:

a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it. Furthermore, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision. In order to give life to their intended meaning, we examine the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. In construing the constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place.

McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 986 (Ind.2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

B. Context of the Historical Development of Common Schools

Exploring the framers' understanding of tuition and its application to the case before us, the Court of Appeals set forth the historical framework of Article 8, Section 1. The Court determined that "the evil to be addressed by what became Article 8 of our Constitution was a lack of education and the subsequent problem of illiteracy among Indiana's citizens." Nagy, 808 N.E.2d at 1227-28. From this, the Court held "that, to have any forceful meaning at all, Article 8, Section 1 must be interpreted to mean that not only must Indiana public schools not charge for `tuition' in the sense of the services of a teacher or instruction, but also must not charge for those functions and services which are by their very nature essential to teaching or `tuition.'" Id. at 1230. Accordingly the Court of Appeals determined that imposition of the $20 student services fee at issue in this case runs afoul of Article 8, Section 1. The Court also called into question the continued validity of Indiana's public textbook scheme. Id. at 1230 n. 10.

We are of the view that the holding expressed by our colleagues sweeps a little too broadly. The idea that tuition includes "those functions and services which are by their very nature essential to teaching" is certainly descriptive of what is meant by a "free" school system. See, e.g., Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 467 S.E.2d 150, 159 (1995) (citations omitted) ("[W]hatever items are deemed necessary to accomplish the goals of a school system and are in fact an `integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education' must be provided free of charge to all students in order to comply with the constitutional mandate of a `free school' system."); Paulson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist., 93 Idaho 469, 463 P.2d 935, 939 (1970) (holding that schools may not charge for such items as textbooks, school building maintenance and teachers' salaries because "the common schools are to be `free' as our constitution requires"). Indeed a number of jurisdictions contain provisions in their state constitutions for free public schools.4 However, unlike constitutions in a number of states, the framers of Indiana's constitution were careful not to provide for a free school system.5 Rather, at most the framers provided that tuition would be free, or more precisely "tuition shall be without charge." This is a subtle distinction, but a significant one that we believe the framers made intentionally. A free public school system implies a level of educational subsidization that the framers at least did not endorse and at most rejected outright.

1. The Free Common School Debate

At least one pair of commentators has noted, "The crusade for free, common schools . . . is one of the best known episodes in American educational history. . . ." Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The `Virtues' of the Past: Education in the First Hundred Years of the New Republic 16, Working Paper 9958, National Bureau of Economic Research (September 2003). Caleb Mills, a professor at what was later to become Wabash College, and often referred to as the "father of the Indiana common school system," see Scott Walter, `Awakening the Public Mind': The Dissemination of the Common School Idea in Indiana, 1787-1852, in Hoosier Schools: Past and Present 1, 1, 8-9 (William J. Reese ed., 1998), addressed the Indiana General Assembly six times between 1846 and 1852 with appeals for the creation of free common schools. Among other things, Mills argued for a quality education open to all Indiana children "without distinction of rank or color" and that "our common schools should be free as the atmosphere we breathe." Caleb Mills, An Address to the Legislature of...

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