Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.
| Citation | 870 N.E.2d 12 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A05-0609-CV-488.,82A05-0609-CV-488. |
| Parties | Frank NAGY, on behalf of himself, his Children, Weston Nagy and Jordan Nagy, and those similarly situated, and Sonja Brackett, on behalf of herself, her children, Cory Brashear and Cameron Brackett, and those similarly situated, Appellants-Cross/Appellees, v. EVANSVILLE-VANDERBURGH SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellee-Cross/Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Jacquelyn Bowie Suess, Kenneth J. Falk, ACLU of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Patrick A. Shoulders, Robert L. Burkart, Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Frank Nagy, on behalf of himself and his children Weston and Jordan Nagy, and those similarly situated ("the Nagys"), and Sonja Brackett, on behalf of herself and her children Cory Brashear and Cameron Brackett, and those similarly situated ("the Bracketts") (collectively "the Parents"), challenge the trial court's denial of their request for attorney fees upon remand. Appellee/Cross-Appellant, the Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation ("the EVSC"), cross-appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that the EVSC's practices constitute a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We reverse and remand.
This is the second time this matter has been before us. As noted in our earlier opinion, the relevant facts are substantially undisputed. For the 2002-2003 school year, the EVSC imposed a $20 fee on all students in grades Kindergarten through twelve. The EVSC made no attempt to hide the fact that the fee was imposed as part of an attempt to balance its budget. The money generated by the fee, along with state funds and local property tax receipts, was deposited into the EVSC's general fund. The fee was charged to every student, including students who qualified for the free or reduced school lunch and textbook programs.
During the period relevant to this appeal, Frank Nagy and Sonja Brackett were residents of Evansville whose children were enrolled in public schools under the EVSC's jurisdiction. The EVSC charged Nagy the $20 fee for each of his children enrolled for the 2002-2003 academic year and charged Bracket the $20 fee for each of her children enrolled even though they qualified for the reduced or free school lunch and textbook programs.
On October 4, 2002, Nagy, on behalf of himself, his children, and others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This initial complaint alleged only a violation of the Indiana Constitution. On October 18, the complaint was amended to add Sonja Brackett, on behalf of herself, her children, and those similarly situated as a subclass to the original action. The Bracket subclass joined in the claim that the fee violated the Indiana Constitution, but added a claim that the fee, as applied to the members of the subclass, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon cross-motions, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Brackett on grounds that imposing a fee upon students who qualify for the reduced or free school lunch and textbook programs violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the EVSC on the Parents' claim that the fee was in violation of Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The Plaintiffs appealed and the EVSC cross-appealed.
Upon appeal, a divided panel of this court reversed the judgment of the trial court with regard to the Indiana constitutional claim. See Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1221, 1235 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) ("Nagy I"). We construed Article 8, Section 1 broadly and held that the fee violated that provision of the Indiana Constitution because the fee was used to pay for what amounted to tuition.1 Id. Because we held that the fee was in violation of the Indiana Constitution, we did not address the due process claim. Id. Our Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating our opinion.
Upon transfer, our Supreme Court, although not going so far as we had with regard to the definition of "tuition," concluded that the fee charged by the EVSC did constitute "tuition" and that charging the fee therefore violated Article 8, Section 1. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481, 482 (Ind.2006) ("Nagy II"). Applying this holding to the facts before it, the court concluded:
In a footnote to its opinion, the court wrote, "EVSC invites this Court to `consider the federal substantive due process claim' because of its importance." Id. at 483 n. 3. However, because the court decided the case upon the issue of the Indiana Constitution, the court declined the invitation to address the federal claim. Id. The court then remanded the cause for further proceedings. Id. at 493.
Upon remand, the Parents filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, with accompanying documentation in support thereof, on May 30, 2006. The Parents based their claim for attorney fees on 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In July of 2006, both the Parents and the EVSC filed briefs with the trial court explaining how each thought the case should proceed upon remand. On September 11, 2006, the trial court entered its Decision of Trial Court on Remand, which states in relevant part:
"The very programs, services, and activities for which EVSC charged a fee for the academic year 2002-2003 were already a part of a publicly-funded education in the state of Indiana. This mandatory fee was imposed generally on all students, whether the student availed herself of a service or participated in a program or activity. Therefore, collection of that activity fee was in violation of Ind. Const. Art. 8, § 1 and contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in this case on appeal. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind.2006).
Therefore, the EVSC shall promptly notify all persons who paid the activity fee: (a) that they are entitled to a refund of the fee, and (b) how to collect that refund. Each fee payor shall be allowed a reasonable period of time within which to apply for the refund. The refund shall be due and payable regardless of whether the student did or did not participate in a program or consumed any services which may have been contemplated by the fee. After the reasonable period of time has expired, the EVSC shall promptly pay the refund to those persons who properly submitted their claim within the period, and are determined to be entitled to receive the refund.
The EVSC may charge individual students a reasonable fee for their voluntary participation in or consumption of a specific activity, service or program that is outside of or expand[s] upon those deemed by the legislature or the State Board [of Education] as a part of a public education.
The EVSC may not charge this fee to any student who qualifies for the free reduced school lunches and/or textbook programs.
Any future mandatory fees charged by the EVSC must be activity, service or program specific, and not a general fee imposed generally on all students. Only those students who voluntarily avail themselves of a fee-qualifying activity, service or participated in a fee-qualifying program or activity may be charged a reasonable fee.
The [Parents'] Motion To Lift Stay of Judgment is granted. The [EVSC]'s Motion To Decertify Class is denied.
In one way or another, both sides have prevailed in some respects. The [Parents] prevailed on their particular claim that the 2002-2003 activity fee was unconstitutional, but did not prevail upon their claim that no activity fee could be charged. The [EVSC] did not prevail on its claim that the 2002-2003 activity fee was permissible, but did prevail on its claim that certain educationally related expenses may be assessed against students and their parents. [added in a footnote: Those other than legislatively-mandated curriculum requirements.] In addition, these issues were utterly unclear in Indiana prior to the Supreme Court decision in this case. Some might say even greater clarity is needed. In any event, the court declines to award attorney fees and expenses for the reasons herein stated." App. at 18. (emphasis supplied).
In response to the denial of their request for attorney fees, the Parents filed a notice of appeal, initiating the appeal currently before this court.2
The Parents claim that they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The relevant portion of Section 1988 states:
The...
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