Nagy v. Nagy
Decision Date | 25 May 1989 |
Docket Number | No. B032200,B032200 |
Citation | 210 Cal.App.3d 1262,258 Cal.Rptr. 787 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Peter Paul NAGY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sabina Elizabeth NAGY, Defendant and Respondent. |
Jaffe & Jaffe and F. Filmore Jaffe, Beverly Hills, for plaintiff and appellant.
John M. Pitkin, Laguna Hills, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of dismissal. We affirm.
Appellant and respondent were formerly husband and wife. On September 28, 1987, appellant filed his first amended complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud.
Among the allegations of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action were the following:
Among the allegations of the fraud cause of action, which incorporated most of the allegations of the first cause of action, were the following:
Attached to the complaint was the judgment of dissolution, which awarded sole custody of Christopher to respondent. The judgment, which permanently restrained appellant from contacting or communicating with Christopher, provided that: "[appellant] waives any right to sue [respondent] or any third person for reimbursement of any monies paid in the past to [respondent] or third parties for or on behalf of the minor child, Christopher."
On November 13, 1987, respondent's demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained as to both causes of action. An order of dismissal was filed on November 18, 1987.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant contends that he successfully pled causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud and that the trial court erred in sustaining respondent's demurrer to his complaint. We disagree.
It is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and that the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof, does not concern the reviewing court. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216.) The plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief. (Ibid.) If the appellant in the instant case pled facts entitling him to relief, then the trial court erred in sustaining respondent's demurrer.
It is also well established under California law that one can sue a spouse for an intentional tort (Self v. Self (1962) 58 Cal.2d 683, 691, 26 Cal.Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65) or for a negligent tort. (Klein v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692, 693, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70.) "It is, of course, fundamental in the law of torts that any person proximately injured by the act of another, whether that act be willful or negligent, should, in the absence of statute or compelling reasons of public policy, be compensated." (Id., at pp. 694-695, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70.) Thus, the issue in this case is whether or not appellant successfully pled causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud and, if so, whether or not there is a compelling statutory or public policy reason not to allow compensation for the alleged injuries.
The elements of fraud are: (a) misrepresentation; (b) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 676, p. 778.)
Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660.) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner (i.e. factually and specifically), and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. (Ibid.)
Appellant pled that while married to appellant, respondent knowingly misrepresented to him that he was the father of her son, Christopher Adam Nagy, who was born when the parties were married. Appellant further alleged that in reliance upon respondent's misrepresentation, he developed "a very close and intimate relationship with Christopher and did and performed all acts that a father would towards a son." As a result of the misrepresentation, appellant alleged that he suffered emotional distress and that he "was damaged in an amount to be determined at the time of trial."
Fraudulent representations which work no damage cannot give rise to an action at law. (Abbot v. Stevens (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 242, 247, 284 P.2d 159.) An allegation of a definite amount of damage is essential to stating a cause of action. (Ibid.) Appellant's complaint was defective in that he did not allege a definite amount of damage.
In addition, for a viable cause of action for fraud, the pleading must show a cause and effect relationship between the fraud and damages sought; otherwise no cause of action is stated. (Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 12, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499.)
As part of the dissolution judgment, appellant waived his right to sue for "reimbursement of any monies paid ... for or on behalf of the minor child, Christopher." Furthermore, we are not aware of any law which would permit a person to recover damages for developing an intimate relationship with a child and performing all the acts of a parent. Although damages for emotional distress can be recovered in a fraud cause of action, such damages have been allowed only as an aggravation of other damages. (See Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 921, 114 Cal.Rptr. 622, 523 P.2d 662; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433, 58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173.) Since we conclude that appellant has not successfully pled other, or indeed any legally recognizable damages, damages for emotional distress alone are not recoverable.
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