Naiden v. Epps

• Decision Date: 30 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93CA0007,93CA0007
• Citation: 867 P.2d 215
• Parties: Era NAIDEN and Neil Naiden, Petitioners, v. Penny A. EPPS and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 215

867 P.2d 215

Era NAIDEN and Neil Naiden, Petitioners, v. Penny A. EPPS and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

No. 93CA0007.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. I.

Dec. 30, 1993.

Cruz & Associates, Amado L. Cruz, Denver, for petitioners.

Thomas D. Hacker, Denver, for respondent Penny A. Epps.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., James C. Klein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Indus. Claim Appeals Office.

Opinion by Judge CRISWELL.

Petitioners, Era and Neil Naiden (the employers), challenge the constitutionality of a portion of the Workers' Compensation Act applied by the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel in determining that Penny A. Epps (claimant) was entitled to disability benefits because she performed full-time domestic work. We uphold the constitutionality of the statute, § 8-40-302(4), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.), and, therefore, affirm the Panel's order.

Claimant injured her back while performing duties as a domestic worker in the employers' home. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that claimant was a full-time employee and, hence, awarded claimant disability benefits which were increased because of the employers' uninsured status. The Panel affirmed, noting its lack of jurisdiction over the constitutional issue.

The employers contend that § 8-40-302(4) violates equal protection guarantees by arbitrarily distinguishing between employers who employ domestic workers for 40 hours or more per week from those who employ such workers for a lesser period of time. We perceive no constitutional defect.

Section 8-40-203, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) contains the general definition of an "employer" under the Act, i.e., "[e]very person ... who has one or more persons engaged in the same ... employment ... in service under any contract of hire, express or implied."

However, § 8-40-302, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) limits the scope of this term in several ways. Section 8-40-302(4), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) provides that the Act is not intended to apply to "employers of persons who do domestic work," if such an employer has no other employees and if the employment is not within the course of the trade, business, or profession of the employers. This limitation upon the scope of the term does not apply, however, if the domestic worker is employed "on a full-time basis." And, for this purpose, a "full-time" worker is one who performs services "for forty hours or more a week or on five days a week."

Thus, an employer who employs a domestic worker for 40 or more hours or five or more days per week must secure disability compensation for those workers, while an employer of a domestic worker less regularly employed need not do so. And, it is this distinction which the employers here argue is improper.

In determining whether § 8-40-302(4) is constitutional, we begin with the presumption that it is valid. Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13 (Colo.App.1992). The burden is on the party challenging the classification to prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Higgs v. Western Landscaping & Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 804 P.2d 161 (Colo.1991).

Further, because there is no suspect classification or fundamental right created by § 8-40-302(4), that statute must be upheld unless it creates an arbitrary classification which is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Dawson v. P.E.R.A., 664 P.2d 702 (Colo.1983).

Moreover, equal protection is not violated merely because imperfect classifications are embodied in laws, even if the classification results in some inequality. Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982). Further, if a general classification has a rational basis, the location of the precise boundary to be drawn to separate those within that classification from those without is a subject for legislators, not for judges. Firelock, Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo.1989) (establishing $50,000 as amount for claims below which arbitration is required is not violative of equal protection); Bushnell v. Sapp, 194 Colo. 273, 571 P.2d 1100 (1977) (legislative threshold of $500 loss before lawsuit may be instituted not constitutionally discriminatory).

Here, the...