Nailen v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date18 July 1988
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. H88-0024(R).
Citation690 F. Supp. 552
PartiesWilliam Edgar NAILEN, III, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nancy Caroline Horn Brock and on Behalf of the Heirs at Law of Nancy Caroline Horn Brock, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

Dennis Harmon, Colom & Colom, Columbus, Miss., William W. Smith, Hogan, Smith, Alspaugh, Samples & Pratt, P.C., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

David L. Ayers, Hassell H. Whitworth, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAN M. RUSSELL, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is before this Court on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant Ford Motor Company, Inc. (Ford), and the Court having examined said motion, together with briefs and exhibits submitted in support and response thereto, finds that for the reasons more fully set forth herein the defendant's motion is well taken and should be granted.

I. FACTS

On January 6, 1988, William Edgar Nailen, III (plaintiff), alleging himself to be the personal representative of the Estate of Nancy Caroline Horn Brock, filed his complaint against Ford Motor Company in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi. Asserting theories of negligence and strict liability in tort, the plaintiff sought $1,250,000.00 compensatory damages, $20,000.00 funeral and other expenses due the Estate, and $5,000,000.00 punitive damages.

Because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, and the amount for which the plaintiff sued, Ford properly removed this civil action to federal court on February 1, 1988. In its answer, Ford denied liability and asserted affirmative defenses claiming that the plaintiff's action should be dismissed because it is time-barred by the applicable limitations period and because the plaintiff failed to otherwise comply with Alabama's wrongful death statute.

For the purpose of this motion, the following facts appear not to be disputed by the parties.

On October 4, 1985, Nancy Brock resided in her Birmingham, Alabama home with her son, the plaintiff, her other son, Jay Nailen, and her daughter, Glennie Brock. A third son, George Nailen, was residing in Texas. As of that date, Nancy Brock was employed at the National Education Center in Birmingham, Alabama. At no time prior to October 4, 1985, had Nancy Brock resided or worked in the State of Mississippi. The same is true of her children.

The deceased was divorced from her second husband, Jon Brock, the natural father of Glennie. Jon Brock was, and is, a resident of Birmingham, Alabama. The residence of Nancy Brock's first husband, William Edgar Nailen, Jr., who is the father of the plaintiff, Jay and George, Jr., is believed to be in Birmingham. The deceased and her children have no known relatives in Mississippi.

On October 4, 1985, Nancy Brock, Jay Nailen and Glennie Brock, along with two friends of Nancy's, James H. Sullivan, Jr. and Christina Olive, were travelling from their homes in Birmingham through the State of Mississippi to Houston, Texas. Nancy Brock, Jay Nailen, Glennie Brock and James Sullivan were to visit Nancy's mother while Olive was to visit her parents. The five travellers, riding in the 1985 Ford Tempo purchased by the deceased from a dealership in Birmingham, Alabama, left Birmingham for Houston late on the afternoon in question. Olive resided in Birmingham where she was a student at the National Education Center. She has no known connection to Mississippi. James H. Sullivan, Jr., the other non-family passenger, was engaged to be married to the deceased. On October 4, 1985, he resided and worked in Birmingham, Alabama.

The group intended to drive straight through to Houston, changing drivers when needed, and avoiding extended or overnight stops. James Sullivan was at the wheel when the trip began. The group dined in Meridian, Mississippi, where Jay took over as driver. At this time Jay Nailen was just over fifteen years old, and had been driving under a learner's permit for only three to four months. Jay had never operated a motor vehicle during late night hours, or on "marathon" type trips of the kind here involved. The group left Meridian on I-59 South heading for Hattiesburg. At approximately 10:50 p.m. when the vehicle was just north of Hattiesburg, the fatal accident occurred. Nancy Brock and Christina Olive died at the scene. James Sullivan, Jay Nailen and Glennie Brock were treated at Forrest County Hospital and returned home to Birmingham within a few days.

After the accident, Nancy Brock's funeral and burial were in Birmingham, Alabama, and Jay Nailen and Glennie Brock were seen by physicians in Alabama. At all times since the accident, the plaintiff, Jay Nailen, Glennie Brock and James Sullivan, have resided in Birmingham, Alabama. Shortly after this accident, the Brock vehicle was transferred to Birmingham, Alabama, where it remains garaged in the custody of plaintiff's counsel.

On October 15, 1985, plaintiff was granted Letters of Administration by the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, to act as the Administrator of the Estate of his deceased mother, Nancy. After serving ten months as administrator, plaintiff was released and discharged when the estate was closed August 22, 1986.

II. DISCUSSION

As a federal court in Mississippi deciding a diversity action, a district court must necessarily apply Mississippi's conflict of laws rules. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4, 96 S.Ct. 167, 168, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.1988); and Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 823 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir.1987).

The parties agree that under Mississippi's conflict of laws rules the "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" test enunciated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss.1968), should be utilized in determining which state's substantive law applies in this case. The Mitchell court adopted the "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" test as it is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (Restatement). Id. at 515-16. See also, Price v. Litton Systems, Inc., 784 F.2d 600, 602 (5th Cir.1986). Under this test guidance for wrongful death actions is provided by section 175 of the Restatement, which directs that:

In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

Price, 784 F.2d at 602-03 (quoting Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 515 (emphasis added)).

The plaintiff's tort actions of negligence and strict liability are governed by section 145 of the Restatement, which provides that:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of Section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Price, 784 F.2d at 603 (quoting Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 515).

It appears that although the parties are in agreement on the applicable law, they disagree on the result. Ford argues that under the "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" analysis, Mississippi must necessarily look to Alabama for the applicable substantive law; while the plaintiff argues that although under this analysis Mississippi should look to Alabama substantive law, Alabama's conflict of laws rules are substantive and therefore under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which is adhered to in Alabama, the law of the place where the injury occurred controls. Thus, the plaintiff contends that Alabama substantive law requires the application of Mississippi substantive law.

a. Why Alabama's substantive law applies in this case.

Without reiterating all of the facts previously set forth, suffice it to say that absent the accident, all of the other contacts in this case point towards Alabama. Under Mississippi's "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" analysis (and by admission of the parties), this Court should look to Alabama for the applicable substantive law.

Alabama's wrongful death statute provides in part that:

(a) A personal representative may commence an action and recover such damages as the jury may assess in a court of competent jurisdiction within the state of Alabama, and not elsewhere, for the wrongful act, omission or negligence of any person, persons or corporation, his or their servants or agents, whereby the death of his testator or intestate was caused, provided the testator or intestate could have commenced an action for such wrongful act, omission or negligence if it had not caused death.
* * * * * *
(d) Such action must be commenced within two years from and after the death of the testator or intestate.

Ala.Code § 6-5-410(a), (d) (1975).1

When presented with this statute and a question about its proper characterization, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that:

This wrongful death action is statutory and did not exist at common law. ... The statute requires that the action must be brought within two years after the death of the testator or intestate. This two year period is part of the substantive cause of action and is not to be
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