Nalubega v. Cambridge Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-10124-JGD |
| Parties | ANGELIC NALUBEGA, Plaintiff, v. CAMBRIDGE HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff, Angelic Nalubega ("Nalubega"), has brought this action against the defendant, Cambridge Housing Authority ("CHA"), seeking to reverse CHA's decision to terminate Nalubega from the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. CHA terminated Nalubega's Section 8 housing voucher in 2011, after it determined that she had allowed her boyfriend, Jason Monteiro ("Monteiro") to live in her apartment and to engage in drug dealing from the apartment. By her complaint, Nalubega has asserted a claim for relief in the nature of certiorari, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, § 4, alleging that the defendant committed errors of law in connection with its decision to terminate her Section 8 benefits, and that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record (Count I). In addition, Nalubega has asserted a claim againstCHA, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by which she alleges that the defendant's actions in connection with the termination proceedings deprived her of her constitutional right to procedural due process (Count II).
The matter is presently before the court on "Plaintiff Angelic Nalubega's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 29) and on the "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 30). By their motions, each of the parties is seeking summary judgment in its favor on both Counts of Nalubega's complaint. After careful consideration of the record and a thorough review of the parties' extensive and deftly presented arguments, this court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that CHA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Nalubega's claims. Therefore, and for all the reasons detailed below, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
As described above, this litigation arose as a result of CHA's decision to terminate Nalubega's participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (the "Section 8 Program"). The Section 8 Program was established by Congress pursuant to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 in order to provide housing assistance to low-income families.2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D. Mass. 2002). The Program is generally administeredby State or local public housing authorities ("PHAs"). 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). To participate in a Section 8 Program, low-income families seeking assistance may apply to a PHA. Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 39. Once approved, eligible participants are awarded subsidies, in the form of vouchers, which the participants may then use to rent an eligible housing unit in the private rental market. Id. (DF ¶ 1). "A Section 8 family conveys its voucher together with the family's previously determined rent contribution - generally about 30% of its income - to the landlord, who in turn forwards the voucher to the PHA for the remainder of the rent." Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 39. The PHA then receives reimbursement from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Id.
Families participating in the Section 8 Program must comply with the obligations listed in the HUD regulations set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. Significantly, those regulations include obligations relating to the use and occupancy of the housing unit and obligations to refrain from engaging in certain criminal activity. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(h), 982.551(l). With respect to use and occupancy, the regulations provide in relevant part as follows:
24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2) (emphasis added). With respect to the family's obligation to refrain from criminal activity, the regulations provide:
(l) Crime by household members. The members of the household may not engage in drug-related criminal activity or violent criminal activity or other criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of other residents and persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises (see § 982.553)....
The regulations further authorize PHAs administering the Section 8 Program to terminate assistance to a family that violates any of its obligations under the Program. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i). As described below, the parties dispute whether these regulations supported CHA's decision to terminate Nalubega's Section 8 benefits.
The defendant, CHA, is a Massachusetts PHA, which administers the Section 8 Program at the local level. (DF ¶ 1; PF ¶ 2). In that capacity, CHA is responsible for processing applications, making determinations as to eligibility, and enforcing the requirements of Section 8. (DF ¶ 1). It is also responsible for making decisions to terminate participants from the Program, and for handling appeals from such decisions. (PF ¶ 4).
Under the applicable HUD regulations, CHA is required to adopt "a written administrative plan that establishes local policies for administration of the [Section 8Program] in accordance with HUD requirements" and regulations. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a)-(b). Although CHA has recently rewritten its administrative plan, it is undisputed that its 1998 Administrative Plan (the "1998 Plan") was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to Nalubega's claims, and is the relevant Plan for purposes of this litigation. (See PF ¶¶ 8-10, 13-14; DR ¶¶ 8-10, 13-14). It is also undisputed that under the 1998 Plan, CHA was authorized to terminate a family's participation in the Program based on the family's failure to comply with its obligations under 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. (PF ¶ 10). Thus, pursuant to the 1998 Plan, CHA could terminate the family's participation if any member of the household engaged in drug-related criminal activity. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(l). Moreover, CHA was authorized to terminate a family's participation in the Section 8 Program if anyone other than members of the assisted family was residing in the unit. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2). It is undisputed, however, that the 1998 Plan contained no specific limitation on an overnight guest's length of stay at a Section 8 housing unit. (PF ¶ 11; DR ¶ 11). Therefore, it did not specify when a participant's guest became an occupant of the unit for purposes of Section 8.
The 1998 Plan included a section entitled "Appeal Procedure" under which any participant who considered himself or herself to have been aggrieved by any conduct of CHA was entitled to an informal hearing before a Conference Panel made up of three members, including a public housing tenant, a CHA employee, and a member of the CHA Board of Commissioners, who would also serve as the Chairman of the ConferencePanel. (See PF ¶ 12; DR ¶ 12; Pl. Ex. 4 at 22-24). Because the Conference Panel hearings were intended to be conducted informally, the Plan provided that they were not subject to any formal rules of evidence. (Pl. Ex. 4 at 24). Nevertheless, the grieving party was entitled to be represented by counsel or another individual of that party's choice, and to present oral and written evidence at the hearing. (Id.).
The responsibility of the Conference Panel hearing an appeal was "to determine, in light of the information that is available . . . , whether the [underlying] decision of the [CHA] staff is reasonable and supportable, and in conformity with [the] plan and other applicable law." (Id. at 22). In addition, the Conference Panel was required to issue a written decision "which shall contain a statement of evidence relied on and the reasons supporting its decision." (Id.). As detailed below, Nalubega appealed the CHA staff's decision to terminate her participation in the Section 8 Program pursuant to these procedures. As issue is whether CHA provided her adequate due process in connection with that appeal.
Nalubega qualified for low-income rental assistance and began participating in CHA's Section 8 Program in June 2008. (PF ¶¶ 15-16; DR ¶ 15). Using the voucher she received from CHA, Nalubega rented a one-bedroom apartment located at 12 Harding Street in Cambridge, Massachusetts. (PF ¶ 17; DR ¶ 17). In October 2008, while she was living at 12 Harding Street, the plaintiff discovered that she was pregnant with Monteiro's child. (Nalubega Aff. ¶ 7). It is undisputed that Monteiro was not listed onNalubega's lease as a fellow tenant or occupant of the apartment, and was not an authorized member of Nalubega's family for purposes of the Section 8 Program. (See DF ¶¶ 3, 12; PR ¶ 12; Pl. Mem. (Docket No. 29-1) at 8).
In June 2011, CHA terminated Nalubega's participation in the Program. (PF ¶ 18). The defendant's decision was based upon information that it received about a police raid that occurred at Nalubega's apartment in February 2009 and led to drug-related charges against Monteiro and the plaintiff. The following describes the relevant details of that incident.
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