Nance v. Cook
| Decision Date | 21 February 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-3779,5-3779 |
| Citation | 240 Ark. 336,399 S.W.2d 262 |
| Parties | B. J. NANCE et al., Appellants, v. Mrs. Katherine A. COOK et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Keith, Clegg & Eckert, Magnolia, for appellants.
Chambers & Chambers, Magnolia, for appellees.
In this case it is contended that appellants allowed saltwater to flow from their oil operations onto appellees' land, causing injury thereto. One of the principal issues involved is whether appellees' claim for damages is barred by the three years statute of limitations.
Appellees are the heirs of John C. Cook who died in 1951 seised of the 170 acres of land here involved. Appellants are B. J. Nance and A. W. Langston, partners, d/b/a L. & N. Drilling Co., engaged in exploring for oil and gas.
On February 1, 1962 appellees filed a complaint in circuit court alleging, in substance: appellants had been drilling oil wells near their land for several years; they have been producing saltwater and allow it to 'seep and drain' onto appellees' land, causing damage thereto; this condition began about five years ago, and it has continued up to the present, and; appellants have 'negligently, knowingly, and intentionally, allowed the saltwater to seep and flow upon said lands, causing damage thereto.' The prayer was for $9,000 actual damages and $2,500 punitive damages. Appellants entered a general denial, and pleaded the statute of limitations.
After a rather extended hearing the matter was submitted to the jury upon instructions by the court (some requested by appellants and by appellees), and the jury awarded to appellees $2,500 actual damages and $2,500 punitive damages.
On appeal appellants do not challenge any of the instructions or the amounts of the judgments. For a reversal they rely on the four separate points hereafter separately discussed.
One. It is first insisted the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellants' motion for a summary judgment based on limitations. We do not reach the merits of this point because of what is said below, and for the reason that the record does not disclose what disposition the court made of said motion.
Two. Here it is argued there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict because the undisputed evidence shows the action is barred by the statute of limitations. We are unable to agree. While it is true the testimony is not entirely clear as to just when the statute began running against appellees' claim, yet we are unwilling to say there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding on this point.
It is in effect conceded by the parties that if appellees' cause of action matured prior to February 1, 1959, then this case must be reversed.
In the case of Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thurman, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 this Court was confronted with much the same issue which is here considered, and under a similar factual situation. In that case we quoted with approval the language set out below as taken from H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okl. 382, 101 P.2d 1050:
"It seems well settled that in an action for damages for permanent injury to real estate caused by continuing salt water pollution the limitation begins to run at the time when it becomes obvious that a permanent injury has been suffered."
In the case of Tennessee Gas Transportation Co. v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336, the Court said:
'Where there is a direct invasion of one's property of a permanent character, and the original invasion and its continuance are necessarily injurious, the damage is original, and may be at once fully compensated * * * in such case the statute begins to run from the date of the invasion.'
The testimony in the case under consideration concerning the issue of when it became obvious to appellees that their land was permanently damaged, is lengthy and...
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...it must be shown that there was a wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others on the part of the tortfeasor. Nance v. Cook, 240 Ark. 336, 399 S.W.2d 262. According to one text a recovery of exemplary or punitive damages in an action based on a fraudulent sale, generally speaking, w......
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...to when the statute began to run is the one set out in Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thurman, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 and Nance v. Cook, 240 Ark. 336, 399 S.W.2d 262. In the Sunray case we approved the following 682 and International Shoe Company v. Gibbs, 183 Ark. 512, 36 S.W.2d 961. It is the......