Napier v. State
| Decision Date | 02 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. S03A0007, No. S03A0009. |
| Citation | 276 Ga. 769,583 S.E.2d 825 |
| Parties | NAPIER v. The STATE. Halley v. The State. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jackson & Schiavone, George T. Jackson, Steven L. Sparger, Savannah, for appellants.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., Benjamin B. Reed, Asst. Dist. Atty., Savannah; Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Jill M. Zubler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee. SEARS, Presiding Justice.
Appellants Jack Wayne Napier and James Neal Halley appeal their convictions for murder, concealing the death of another and auto theft.1 Among other things, appellants urge the trial court erred by forbidding voir dire questioning regarding appellants' status as prison escapees and in charging the jury on certain statutory presumptions regarding venue. Because the issue of appellants' escape from prison was relevant to the subject matter of the State's prosecution, the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting them from raising that issue during voir dire. Having reviewed the transcript, however, we conclude it is highly improbable that this error contributed to the jury's verdicts. Therefore, it was harmless. Regarding the trial court's jury charge on venue, we conclude it was not improperly burden-shifting. Nonetheless, for reasons explained below, we believe trial courts would do well to refrain from quoting certain portions of OCGA § 17-2-2 when charging juries on venue, and we set forth preferred alternative charges herein. Finding no merit to appellants' other contentions, we affirm.
The record shows that in June 2000, appellants escaped from a Kentucky prison. Several weeks later, they were at a highway rest stop in Virginia when they met the victim, Tommy Chittum, and his girlfriend, Cynthia Duncan. The foursome spent several days together in Virginia, shoplifting, doing drugs, and drinking alcohol. Appellants and Chittum then left Virginia in Chittum's van for a trip to Florida. Stopping in Fayetteville, North Carolina, around mid-day, the victim telephoned his landlord in Virginia. That evening, Chittum stopped by the roadside near Savannah to use the bathroom, and was strangled by appellant Napier. Appellants then loaded Chittum's body into the van and drove to a convenience store in Chatham County, where an off-duty police officer observed them unload the victim's body and carry it into the woods. An autopsy later revealed ligature marks on the front of the victim's neck that were consistent in size and shape with a shoelace that was found in the van. Police also discovered the victim's Harley-Davidson motorcycle in the van.
After appellants' arrests, appellant Napier told a cellmate, Norman, the details about the crime, and explained that when the victim made the phone call in Fayetteville, appellants feared he had decided to return to Virginia and would leave appellants abandoned by the roadside. Napier told Norman that he had strangled the victim with a shoelace. Napier also told Norman that before he strangled the victim, he had seen a sign that read "Welcome to Savannah."
1. The evidence of record, construed most favorably to the jury's verdicts, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they were convicted.2
2. Our Georgia Constitution requires that venue in all criminal cases must be laid in the county in which the crime was committed.3 Although they concede the trial court properly charged the jury that the State carries the burden of proving the material allegation of venue beyond a reasonable doubt,4 appellants contend the trial court gave additional instructions regarding venue that improperly imposed a burden on appellants to disprove that venue was properly laid. At trial, as explained above, the State submitted evidence that the victim was killed after appellants had entered the city limits of Savannah. Appellant Napier, however, testified that the victim was killed by a third party and was already dead when appellants entered Georgia. Thus, there was conflicting evidence on the question of where the murder was committed. After charging that venue is a jurisdictional prerequisite and must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt as to each crime alleged, the trial court charged the jury that:
As admitted by appellants, these charges were taken verbatim from OCGA § 17-2-2(c) and (h).
In criminal prosecutions, due process of law prohibits jury charges that could be interpreted by reasonable jurors as creating either: (1) a conclusive presumption regarding an essential element or a material allegation of the State's case, or (2) a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion on an essential element or material allegation to the defendant.8 Appellants argue the trial court's jury charges regarding venue suffer from the latter infirmity.
We disagree with appellants' contention, although we concede the trial court's charges on venue were taken from poorly drafted legislation. Rather than creating burden-shifting presumptions regarding venue, Code section 17-2-2 was intended by the legislature to provide means by which a jury can ensure that the constitutional mandate of establishing venue beyond a reasonable doubt has been satisfied in cases such as this one, where the State has brought forth evidence to establish venue and the defendant has introduced evidence intended to counter that showing.9 We note that OCGA § 17-2-2(c) and (h) instruct juries to "consider"—rather than "presume"—whether, in certain factual scenarios, venue has been properly laid. In normal usage, "consider" means to contemplate, think about, or reflect upon,10 and thus we do not believe the statute requires any compulsory or permissive presumptions to be drawn regarding whether venue in a particular forum is proper.11
Nonetheless, in order to more clearly effectuate the intention of OCGA 17-2-2, and to alleviate the type of concerns raised by appellants, we will take this opportunity to instruct that in future cases, the better practice will be for trial courts, when charging juries, to refrain from quoting OCGA § 17-2-2(c) and (h) verbatim. Instead, trial courts should instruct as follows:
As for this particular case, we are satisfied that the trial court's charge did not raise any improper burden-shifting presumptions regarding venue. Whenever this Court considers a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, we evaluate the jury charge as a whole.12 In this case, in addition to the charge quoted above, the trial court instructed that venue is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as to each crime charged, and even went so far as to instruct the jury to determine whether venue was properly laid before considering the criminal charges set forth in the indictment. The trial court also charged that the presumption of innocence remained with appellants throughout trial; that the burden of proof rested upon the State to prove every material allegation and essential element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt; that no burden of proof is ever placed upon or shifted to the appellants; and that all jury instructions should be considered collectively as a "package." Accordingly, we reject appellants' claim that the trial court's jury charge was burden-shifting with regard to venue.
Finally, we conclude that the State established venue beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Napier stated to his cellmate that he had committed the murder after having entered the Savannah city limits. Appellants were seen unloading the victim's dead body from their van while in Chatham County. After appellants drove away from the scene, observers ran to the body and discovered it was still warm and showed no signs of decay, indicating that death had only recently occurred. Before unloading the body from the van, appellants were stopped in Chatham County by an off-duty policeman who, despite speaking with appellants through an open van window while the body remained unseen inside, reported that he noticed no foul smell or odor, also indicating a recent death. While appellant Napier claimed the victim was killed outside Chatham County, the weight and credibility to be given that testimony were solely within the jury's province, and the jurors were free to reject or accept any portion of it.13 Accordingly, based upon the evidence of record, ...
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