Naranjo v. Department of Revenue, 04-P-684.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-P-684.,04-P-684.
• Citation: 825 N.E.2d 1051,63 Mass. App. Ct. 260
• Parties: Marcos NARANJO, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1051

825 N.E.2d 1051

63 Mass. App. Ct. 260

Marcos NARANJO, Jr. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.

No. 04-P-684.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued January 10, 2005.

Decided April 14, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marcos Naranjo, pro se.

Romeo G. Camba, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Revenue.

Present: GREENBERG, DUFFLY, & GREEN, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

Marcos Naranjo, Jr., claims that the child support enforcement division of the Department of Revenue (DOR) undertook steps to suspend his driver's and trade licenses for failing to pay court-ordered child support to two women without first granting his timely requests for administrative review and hearing. He filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking declarations that the DOR was required by G.L. c. 119A to provide him with hearings and administrative review at various stages in the administrative process.¹ The DOR filed a motion to dismiss Naranjo's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that under G.L. c. 119A, §§ 6, 16, the Probate and Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to consider his claims. The motion was allowed and Naranjo filed this appeal.

Because we agree that Naranjo properly relied on G.L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 2, to seek declarations in Superior Court as to his right to a hearing and administrative review of the DOR's actions, we vacate the judgment dismissing his complaint.

Background. The DOR is the "IV-D agency" that under G.L. c. 119A, §§ 1, 2, is charged with enforcement of child support orders.² The DOR sent to Naranjo a form notice, bearing the date of September 21, 2002, entitled "Annual Notice of Child Support Delinquency As of 9/22/2002." The notice informed Naranjo that orders of the Probate and Family Court obligated him to pay child support to his former wife, Juana Naranjo (Juana), in the amount of $95 per week, and to Venus Rodriguez, in the amount of $75 per week. The notice also stated that his failure to make court-ordered payments had resulted in a child support arrearage in the amount of $75,782.36 for the support of his children with Juana and a child support arrearage in the amount of $77,149.75 for the support of his child with Rodriguez.³ The notice further advised that if Naranjo disputed that he owed the arrears, he could request administrative review by completing an enclosed form and mailing it to the DOR within thirty days.⁴ Naranjo completed two requests (one for each child support order) and filed them within the prescribed period, attaching affidavits he had written as support for his claim that he did not owe the stated amounts. Naranjo's request for review of payments due to Juana asserted, in essence, that (1) the child support calculation was incorrect because his divorce judgment provided for an automatic, annual adjustment to support; (2) the DOR was not a party to the proceeding and had "never entered an appearance in this case to enforce support payments"; and (3) he and Juana had an agreement regarding child support payments while he was incarcerated.⁵ In his request for review of payments due to Rodriguez, Naranjo asserted that he owed no child support to her because he was never served with a copy of the summons and complaint to establish paternity and thus no valid order of support was in effect.

The form to request administrative review limits supporting documentation to proof of payment, as does the notice of delinquency, and the DOR refused to conduct a review of Naranjo's claims because, according to the DOR, his documentation was insufficient.

Instead, on December 6, 2002, the DOR sent Naranjo a notice of noncompliance. This notice advised that, whereas Naranjo had previously been informed of his court-ordered child support obligations and no payments had been received in the twelve weeks preceding the notice of noncompliance, his failure to make the payments "will result in the suspension of [his] driver's license ... [and] any professional licenses [he] may have." The notice provided that if Naranjo disputed the action to suspend his licenses he could within thirty days request an administrative hearing, but that he would only be eligible for such a hearing if he had documents to support "the only defenses recognized by the law (G.L. c. 119A, § 16)." These defenses were described on the form as follows: (1) "You are not the individual owing the arrearage"; (2) "No child support arrearage exists"⁶; or (3) "You are complying with the terms of the child support order."⁷ If he failed within 30 days "to submit information verifying one of the defenses or conditions listed above ... DOR [would] notify the licensing authority or authorities to suspend or revoke [his] licenses."

On December 12, 2002, Naranjo sent the DOR a letter demanding "administrative and judicial review" and noting that he had previously submitted two separate requests for administrative review but that none had been conducted. He asserted that he owed no child support to the DOR. Referring to the DOR case involving Juana he said that there was no court order requiring him to make payments to the DOR and that Juana had not applied for services. Naranjo also stated in the letter that he had not been served with process in connection with the proceeding involving Rodriguez and that an appeal was pending in that action in which he claimed lack of jurisdiction and violation of due process.

On January 28, 2003, the DOR sent Naranjo a document captioned "Final Determination of Delinquency." This document informed him that — because he had failed to make child support payments after being sent a notice of noncompliance, or, if he had requested an administrative hearing, he had failed to provide documentation establishing that he is not the individual owing the arrearage, that no child support arrearage exists, or that he is in compliance with the terms of his child support order — the DOR had "notified the appropriate licensing authorities to suspend any licenses [he] may have." It further advised Naranjo that he could not contact the Registry of Motor Vehicles or the licensing board that issued his professional license because the "DOR alone is responsible for the determination to suspend [his] license for failure to pay child support." If he wished to contest this action, Naranjo was instructed that he could "file a complaint for judicial review in the court that entered [his] child support order within 45 days of the date that the licensing authority notifies [him] of the suspension of [his] license."

Naranjo commenced this action against the DOR in Superior Court on September 19, 2003. His complaint, as amended, seeks declarations that the DOR failed to conduct an administrative review in violation of G.L. c. 119A, § 6(b)(2), and failed, in violation of G.L. c. 119A, § 16(c), to provide him with a hearing prior to taking steps to have his driver's license and trade license suspended. He also sought declarations that he was deprived of procedural due process secured to him by arts. 10 and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Naranjo's complaint further demanded that his driver's and trade licenses be restored and that a preliminary injunction issue prohibiting the DOR from further enforcement action against him until he has exhausted judicial review of the cases pending in the Appeals Court.

The DOR filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that even if the court had jurisdiction, the complaint was not timely filed. On December 8, 2003, a judge of the Superior Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Discussion. 1. Subject matter jurisdiction. "Because the [DOR] filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(b)(1), the burden fell on [Naranjo] to prove jurisdictional facts." Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441 Mass. 487, 491, 806 N.E.2d 415 (2004).

Naranjo's verified complaint sets forth the facts and procedural history we have summarized above. The DOR does not deny that it did not conduct any administrative review or hearing at the various points that it sought to enforce payment of child support to both Rodriguez and Juana, and makes no claim that Naranjo's requests for administrative review or for hearing were not timely made. Rather, the DOR takes the position that administrative review was not warranted because, as the DOR notes in its brief, Naranjo "failed to support his request[s] with documentation necessary to trigger such administrative review[,]" by failing to "submi[t] the documentation listed in the instructions to the Request for Administrative Review form."

Naranjo's complaint in Superior Court does not seek judicial review of the amounts that the DOR determined he owed to Rodriguez and Juana for past due child support. As Naranjo states in his memorandum in opposition to the DOR's motion to dismiss:

"Simply put, the plaintiff is seeking a determination as to the legality of the [DOR's] enforcement actions suspending his privilege to have a driver's license and professional trade license without affording him a hearing and without first submitting a determination in response to his timely requests for administrative reviews of case numbers 90W0397PA1 [support due to Rodriguez] and 92D0259DV1 [support due to Juana]."

The question we are asked to address is whether, under G.L. c. 119A, § 6(c), judicial review of Naranjo's claims must be brought, if at all, in the Probate Court.

Ordinarily, a complaint for declaratory relief such as the one brought by Naranjo in this case is properly brought in Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 2. See G.L. c. 30A, § 7, as appearing in St.1974, c. 361, § 3 ("[u]nless an exclusive mode of review is provided by law, judicial review of any regulation ... may be had through an action for declaratory relief in...