Nardoni v. McConnell

• Decision Date: 06 May 1957
• Citation: 48 Cal.2d 500,310 P.2d 644
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: August Maurice NARDONI, Brazell Nardoni, Frank Earl Alexander and Charles August Archambault, Petitioners and Appellants, v. F. Britton McCONNELL, Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, Successor to John R. Maioney, Defendant and Respondent. L. A. 24423.

Page 644

310 P.2d 644

48 Cal.2d 500

August Maurice NARDONI, Brazell Nardoni, Frank Earl Alexander and Charles August Archambault, Petitioners and Appellants, v. F. Britton McCONNELL, Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, Successor to John R. Maioney, Defendant and Respondent.

L. A. 24423.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 6, 1957.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 4, 1957.

Bernard C. Brennan, William E. Cornell, Blase A. Bonpane and Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Lee B. Stanton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SPENCE, Justice.

Petitioners appeal from a judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandate. They had sought such writ to compel the Insurance Commissioner to set aside an order revoking and suspending their licenses.

Petitioner August Maurice Nardoni was a duly licensed bail agent, insurance agent, insurance broker, and life agent. Petitioner Brazell Nardoni was a licensed bail agent and insurance agent. The operated as partners in the bail bond business in Los Angeles, and each conducted a separate business in the other insurance specialties in which he was licensed. Petitioners Frank Earl Alexander and Charles August Archambault were licensed only as bail agents and were employees of the Nardonis. Separate accusations were filed against the four, charging them with numerous unlawful acts in the bail bond business. A hearing was had before a hearing officer, who thereafter issued his proposed decision. It was adopted by the Insurance Commissioner and pursuant thereto, all licenses held by the Nardonis were revoked and those held by Alexander and Archambault were suspened for three months. Ins.Code, § 1731. A petition for reconsideration was denied.

The licensees then filed their petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court, seeking to compel the commissioner to set aside his order of revocation and suspension. An alternative writ was issued; a trial was had, and findings and judgment were entered denying the petition. The court specifically found that all the findings of the hearing officer as adopted by the commissioner (being thirty in number) were justified and supported by the weight of the evidence. The violations in part concerned petitioner's recommendations of attorneys and assistance to the attorneys in preparing petitions for habeas corpus for the release of arrestees (Calif.Admin. Code, §§ 2077-2078); solicitation and negotiation for bail with persons not authorized by the arrestees (Ibid. § 2079); arrangements with a certain police officer for obtaining information concerning arrests and jail commitments (Ibid. § 2091); and failure to set forth correct information as to the source of knowledge leading to bail bond negotiations (Ibid. § 2101). The court concluded that the facts found justified the order of the commissioner as to each of the licensees, that there was no abuse of discretion, and that the licensees had been accorded a full and fair hearing. Accordingly, judgment was entered denying the writ and petitioners have appealed.

As grounds for reversal, petitioners contend: (1) the findings of the commissioner are not supported by the evidence and the court should have so found; (2) the court improperly excluded their proffered evidence as to good character and reputation; and (3) the penalty imposed was excessive. Our review of the record, however, convinces us that these contentions cannot be sustained.

The trial court was required to exercise its independent judgment in deciding the factual issues. Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (c); Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20; Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 402, 184 P.2d 323; 2 Cal.Jur.2d § 231, p. 385. It did so and not only found expressly that the commissioner's findings were supported by the weight of the evidence but made its own findings which conformed with those of the commissioner.

The court had before it the entire record of the proceedings before the commissioner, which included the testimony of several witnesses in addition to a stipulation executed by the parties in order to expedite the hearing. The stipulation consisted of sixty pages, covering the testimony of some twenty-seven witnesses, and fifty-five exhibits were attached. It provided in part: 'Where it is stipulated that if called a person would testify to certain facts, such stipulation is in lieu of actual testimony and is to be considered admitted without objection unless an objection on specified grounds is expressly reserved for the particular testimony in writing. * * * All facts recited herein as stipulations are agreed to be true and correct, and may be used in lieu of evidence, and are to be considered proven by competent evidence.' It was also stipulated that the fifty-five exhibits were offered in evidence and were to be considered admitted without objection in the absence of a written objection upon some ground other than lack of foundation.

Petitioners challenge generally the sufficiency of the evidence to support the material findings, but with one exception hereinafter noted, they do not indicate wherein the evidence is deficient or what precise findings are attacked so that the merits of their objection may be determined. See Goldring v. Goldring, 94 Cal.App.2d 643, 645, 211 P.2d 342. However, in view of petitioners' further claim that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted over their objection at the disciplinary hearing, the record of that hearing has been examined.

Petitioners properly maintain that hearsay evidence alone is insufficient to support the revocation of a license. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 142 A.L.R. 1383; Kinney v. Sacramento etc. Retirement System, 77 Cal.App.2d 779, 782, 176 P.2d 775. However, Government Code, section 11513, subdivision (c), provides in part: 'The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. * * * Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining any direct evidence but shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.' The parties' stipulation covering the testimony of numerous witnesses sets forth essential facts which were competent, material and relevant in support of the commissioner's decision and the subsequent court findings. A brief reference to a few of the principal charges will suffice to show that petitioners' objections to the alleged hearsay evidence cannot prevail.

One of the principal violations charged against the Nardonis was based on a so-called 'arrangement' or conspiracy between the Nardonis and a certain police officer. According to the stipulated evidence, four arrestees would testify to facts tending to show that the Nardonis were receiving information from the police officer and were acting upon that information in contacting relatives of the arrestees and arranging for the prisoners' release on bail. These facts leave no doubt that the Nardonis and the police officer were working together under a prearranged plan and that the Nardonis were collecting bail fees as the result of such unlawful practices. The stipulated testimony of the same arrestees also indicates that the Nardonis recommended and arranged for the services of certain attorneys on behalf of the arrestees without authorization. In carrying out these unlawful transactions, it appears that Alexander and Archambault, as employees of the Nardonis, actively aided in the preparation of petitions for habeas corpus and other legal documents. The stipulated testimony of other arrestees shows that without their permission the Nardonis contracted heir employers, solicited bail and negotiated for certain attorneys to handle their defense upon prescribed fee payments. On still another occasion, it appears that upon the representation of August Nardoni, an indemnitor's agreement was signed by one acting in the belief that he was only witnessing a statement of an arrestee's release; that later the person so signing, when the bail was forfeited, was sued, and his automobile was attached and taken from his possession. It also appears that all four petitioners, in filing bail bond applications, falsified the source of their bail business and failed to recite their pre-arranged plan with the police officer for information leading to solicitation or negotiation of bail.

Thus it appears that there was ample competent evidence in the record from which it could reasonably be inferred that the alleged 'arrangement' constituted the basis of a number of the bail transactions effected by the Nardonis and that they falsified the required record by stating that the source of their information leading to the bail solicitation was the arrestee or his relatives rather than the police officer. Petitioners did not testify either before the...