Nash v. Mulle

• Decision Date: 19 January 1993
• Citation: 846 S.W.2d 803
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Parties: Helen Matlock NASH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Charles MULLE, Defendant/Appellee.

Page 803

846 S.W.2d 803

Helen Matlock NASH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Charles MULLE, Defendant/Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

Jan. 19, 1993.

Phillip Robinson, Philip E. Smith, Nashville, for plaintiff/appellant.

John J. Hollins, Robert L. Jackson, Nashville, for defendant/appellee.

OPINION

DAUGHTREY, Justice.

This child support case presents two principal issues on appeal: (1) the extent to which Tennessee's Child Support Guidelines apply to an obligor's net monthly income in excess of $6,250.00, and (2) the extent to which a trust fund established during the child's minority for her later college education is permitted under Tennessee law. We conclude that the trial judge is not limited to the ordinary schedule in calculating the amount of support to be paid by a wealthy non-custodial parent, and we uphold the use of a trust fund under the circumstances presented here, even though the benefits will be realized after the child reaches the age of majority. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Juvenile Court for the recalculation of an award in accordance with this opinion.

The essential facts in this case are not in dispute. What is contested is the extent of the child support obligation of Charles Mulle, who fathered Melissa Alice Matlock as the result of an extramarital affair with the appellant, Helen Nash, in 1981 but has since had nothing to do with mother or child. After an order was entered establishing his paternity in 1984, the Juvenile Court also ordered him to pay $200.00 each month in child support, in addition to other specified expenses. In 1990, Helen Nash filed this action seeking an increase in the amount of his payments because of Charles Mulle's dramatically increased income. ¹ The Juvenile Court then ordered Mulle to pay $3,092.62 per month, with $1,780.17 reserved for a trust fund established for Melissa's college education. The Court of Appeals reversed, limiting the award to $1,312.00 per month, or exactly 21 percent of $6,250.00, the top monthly income to which the child support guidelines explicitly apply. The Court of Appeals also disallowed the trust, finding that it improperly extended the parental duty of support beyond the age of majority. Because the facts are not disputed, we review de novo the questions of law presented on appeal.

Child support in Tennessee is statutorily governed by T.C.A. Sec. 36-5-101. Section 36-5-101(e)(1) provides that "[i]n making its determination concerning the amount of support of any minor child ... of the parties, the court shall apply as a rebuttable presumption the child support guidelines as provided in this subsection." The General Assembly adopted the child support guidelines promulgated by the Tennessee Department of Human Services in order to maintain compliance with the Family Support Act of 1988, codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C. ² While they add a measure of consistency to child support awards statewide, the guidelines provide more than simple percentages to be applied against the net incomes of non-custodial parents. They also embody "the rules promulgated by the Department of Human Services in compliance with [the] requirements [of the Family Support Act of 1988]." ³ Hence, the purposes, premises, guidelines for compliance, and criteria for deviation from the guidelines carry what amounts to a legislative mandate.

I.

The first issue presented concerns the proper measure of child support to be awarded in this case in view of the fact that Charles Mulle's monthly income exceeds $6,250.00. The guidelines apply in all cases awarding financial support to a custodial parent for the maintenance of a child, whether or not the child is a welfare recipient, and whether or not the child's parents are married. The guidelines are based, however, on several goals; they make many assumptions; and they permit deviation in circumstances that do not always comport with the assumptions. In studying the goals, premises, and criteria for deviation, we are convinced that the guidelines permit a monthly award greater than $1,312.00 without a specific showing of need by the custodial parent.

One major goal expressed in the guidelines is "[t]o ensure that when parents live separately, the economic impact on the child(ren) is minimized and to the extent that either parent enjoys a higher standard of living, the child(ren) share(s) in that higher standard." Tenn.Comp.R. and Regs. ch. 1240-2-4-.02(2)(e). This goal becomes significant when, as here, one parent has vastly greater financial resources than the other. It reminds us that Tennessee does not define a child's needs literally, but rather requires an award to reflect both parents' financial circumstances. This goal is consistent with our long-established common law rule, which requires that a parent must provide support "in a manner commensurate with his means and station in life." Evans v. Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, 119, 140 S.W. 745, 747 (1911).

The guidelines are currently structured to require payment by the non-custodial parent of a certain percentage of his or her net income, depending upon the number of children covered by the support order (21 percent for one child, 32 percent for two children, etc.). The statute promulgating the use of the guidelines creates a "rebuttable presumption" that the scheduled percentages will produce the appropriate amounts to be awarded as monthly child support. ⁴ However, they are subject to deviation upward or downward when the assumptions on which they are based do not pertain to a particular situation. For example, one assumption on which the percentages are based is that the "children are living primarily with one parent but stay overnight with the other parent as often as every other weekend ..., two weeks in the summer and two weeks during holidays...." ⁵ The criteria for deviation provide that when this level of visitation does not occur, child support should be adjusted upward to provide for the additional support required of the custodial parent. ⁶ Additionally, "[e]xtraordinary educational expenses and extraordinary medical expenses not covered by insurance" are given as reasons for deviation. ⁷ The guidelines thus recognize that "unique case circumstances will require a court determination on a case-by-case basis." ⁸

Among the "unique cases" specifically anticipated in the guidelines are those cases in which the income of the parent paying support exceeds $6,250.00 per month. ⁹ In the criteria for deviation the guidelines provide that among the "cases where guidelines are neither appropriate nor equitable" are those in which "the net income of the obligor exceeds $6,250 per month." ¹⁰ In the present case, the Juvenile Court calculated Charles Mulle's net monthly income to be $14,726.98, a figure well above the $6,250.00 figure justifying deviation from the guidelines. Yet the total award of $3,092 ordered by the trial judge is exactly 21 percent of Mulle's monthly income.

Obviously, to treat the monthly income figure of $6,250.00 as a cap and automatically to limit the award to 21 percent of that amount for a child whose non-custodial parent makes over $6,250.00 may be "neither appropriate nor equitable." Such an automatic limit fails to take into consideration the extremely high standard of living of a parent such as Charles Mulle, and thus fails to reflect one of the primary goals of the guidelines, i.e., to allow the child of a well-to-do parent to share in that very high standard of living. On the other hand, automatic application of the 21 percent multiplier to every dollar in excess of $6,250.00 would be equally unfair.

We conclude that the courts below found themselves at such polar extremes in this case due to a misreading of the criteria for deviation in the guidelines. The Juvenile Court placed the burden "on Mr. Mulle to convince the Court of the inequity or inappropriateness of the guidelines in this case," i.e., to prove that the court should award less than 21 percent of his income in excess of $6,250.00. That court ultimately found that Mulle had shown no "extraordinary burden" on his budget or other reason justifying deviation downward from the presumptive award of 21 percent, and awarded that amount. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that "to obtain support larger than 21% of $6,250.00 for one child, the [custodial parent] has the burden of showing such need." Thus, to receive more than $1,312.00 per month for the child, Helen Nash would have to demonstrate exactly why the additional money was required. Rather than adopting either of these diametrically opposed approaches, we conclude that the trial court should retain the discretion to determine--as the guidelines provide, "on a case-by-case basis"--the appropriate amount of child support to be paid when an obligor's net income exceeds $6,250.00 per month, balancing both the child's need and the parents' means.

The guidelines' very latitude reflects this need for an exercise of discretion. Twenty-one percent of an enormous monthly income may provide far more money than most reasonable, wealthy parents would allot for the support of one child. However, it would also be unfair to require a custodial parent to prove a specific need before the court will increase an award beyond $1,312.00. At such high income levels, parents are unlikely to be able to "itemize" the cost of living. Moreover, most parents living within their means would not be able to present lists of expenditures made in the mere anticipation of more child support. Until the guidelines more specifically address support awards for the children of high-income parents, we are content to rely on the judgment of the trial courts within the bounds provided them by those guidelines. In this case, although the child support award may be appropriate, we think it expedient to remand this case to the Juvenile Court, thus providing the trial...