Nash v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company

• Decision Date: 27 June 1879
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Bennett H. Nash & another v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company

127 Mass. 91

Bennett H. Nash & another v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

June 27, 1879

Argued November 19, 1878 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Suffolk. Bill in equity, filed December 3, 1877, alleging that the plaintiffs were owners of a parcel of land fronting on Merchants' Row in Boston; that there was a passageway about seventy-two feet long and about eight feet and one inch wide throughout its entire length leading from State Street to this parcel of land and bounded northerly by it, and westerly by land formerly of Andrew J. Allen and now owned by the defendant; that the plaintiffs owned in fee one undivided third of the soil of this passageway, and had the right to have the whole of it lie open and unincumbered for their use as a carriage-way and foot-way to their land; that the defendant had obstructed this passageway by making excavations therein, and placing stone steps opening and leading to its land, and had erected barriers near these openings, so that the plaintiffs could not pass along the passageway, as they had a right to do; that the defendant refused to remove these obstructions, and prevented the plaintiffs from so doing; that the plaintiffs were contemplating alterations in the building on their land for purposes which would require the use of the entire width of the passageway for passing and repassing; that they could not improve, use or lease their land so profitably and advantageously as they otherwise might, and that they would suffer an irreparable damage if the defendant was permitted to continue the obstructions.

The prayer of the bill was for an injunction to restrain the defendant from maintaining the excavations and obstructions, and to require it to restore the passageway so that the plaintiffs could pass without obstruction over the entire length and width thereof; and for further relief.

The answer admitted that the plaintiffs had a reasonable right of way over the passageway, but denied that such right of way was obstructed, and also denied that the plaintiffs had a right to have the way open and unobstructed throughout its entire area; averred that the stone steps and barriers set forth in the bill had been there for many years, and that the defendant had a right so to maintain them; and alleged that the plaintiffs had a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.

The case was heard before Ames, J., who reported it for the determination of the full court, in substance as follows:

In 1769, John Jeffries and Ann Jeffries his wife, who then owned the plaintiffs' estate, Thomas H. Peck, who then owned the land on the east side of the passageway, and William Maxwell, who then owned the defendant's estate, executed an indenture, reciting that they were seised in fee of a passageway leading from King Street [now State Street] to the land of Jeffries and his wife, "which passageway measures nine feet in the front on King Street, and continues the same width as high up as the northeast corner of said Maxwell's dwelling-house, and measures at the upper end six feet four inches;" and also reciting that the parties had agreed "that the said passageway, measuring as aforesaid, shall always lie open and unincumbered for passing and repassing and transporting goods of all kinds to and from their respective houses;" and each party covenanted that he "will not incumber or stop up the same, but that the same shall lie open" for the use of their respective estates, and quitclaimed to the others a right of way in said passageway "according to the measurement aforesaid."

In 1826, Pliny Cutler, in pursuance of an order of this court, conveyed to Andrew J. Allen the right, title and interest of the minor children of Beza Tucker in a narrow strip of the westerly side of the passageway, thirty-six feet long, eight inches wide at the north end, and seven and a half inches wide at the south end thereof, bounding it easterly on the passageway, and containing the following clause: "The line adjoining said passageway and the easterly side of said strip is to run in such a direction as to leave the passageway aforesaid at least eight feet wide in every part."

On the same day, Andrew J. Allen by deed reciting the existence of a passageway "seventy-two feet in length and of an equal width" leading from State Street to an estate fronting on Merchants' Row, belonging to the minor children of Beza Tucker deceased, "which said passageway has been kept open for a long time for the benefit of the owners and occupants of the stores situate on the estate aforesaid, and of those adjoining said passageway on each side thereof, and by them used in common," and referring for a more particular description to the indenture of 1769; and reciting that it was thought by those having an interest in the passageway that it should be made more equal in width, and also reciting the conveyance to Allen above set forth, of the strip at the southerly end of the passageway on the westerly side, conveyed to said minor children a strip of land at the northerly end of the passageway thirty-six feet long, twenty inches wide at the northerly end, and ten inches wide at the southerly end, "running in such direction on the line adjoining the land of the said Allen as to leave a passageway in no place less than eight feet wide, which said strip is to be kept open and unincumbered and held in the same proportions and used for the same purposes by the owners of the estates adjoining the same as the other parts of said passageway heretofore have been."

In June 1867, the heirs of Allen conveyed to the defendant the lot on the westerly side of the passageway, bounding it easterly by the passageway, and all their rights in the passageway "which is bounded south by State Street eight feet one inch, west by the estate hereinabove described, north by estate of the heirs of Beza Tucker, and east by land now or late of John Tucker; subject, however, always to the legal rights of other parties in said way;" and referring to all of the deeds above set forth.

Early in November 1867, the defendant obstructed the passageway in two places, by excavations from three to four feet wide, and five to six feet deep, and by descending stone steps leading to rooms on the defendant's estate, with barriers on two sides of the openings, forming obstructions of a permanent and continuous character.

On November 8, 1867, Josiah P. Cooke and another, trustees, who then owned the plaintiffs' estate, gave a written notice to the defendant that they were entitled to all the rights in the passageway secured to John and Ann Jeffries by the indenture of 1769, except as modified by the deed from Cutler to Allen and forbidding the defendant to incumber or dig up the passageway, and requiring it to remove all obstructions.

In May 1877, Cooke and another, trustees, conveyed their estate to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs afterwards, and before bringing this bill, requested the defendant to remove the obstructions in the passageway.

It was agreed, for the purposes of the case only, that the plaintiffs had the rights of John and Ann Jeffries as modified by the deed of Cutler, and that the defendant had the rights of Maxwell as modified by the deed of Allen.

In addition to the facts above stated, the plaintiffs offered evidence to show that the obstructions in the passageway injured their estate, and interfered with the use of the passageway for certain classes of goods, and thus prevented the letting of the building on the estate for certain purposes.

The defendant contended that, under the deeds above set forth, the plaintiffs were not necessarily entitled to have the whole passageway kept open throughout its entire length and breadth, but only to a reasonable and convenient way within the limits of the passageway; and that they had never been interfered with in the exercise of such a convenient right of way; and that the plaintiffs, under the circumstances of the case, could not maintain a bill for an injunction without having first brought an action at law to establish their legal rights, and obtained judgment in their favor therein. It appeared that such an action at law was now pending.

The judge found and ruled, on the deeds and evidence above stated, that the plaintiffs had a clear right to the use free from any obstruction, of the whole width of the passageway, of not less than eight feet in width, throughout its whole length and breadth; that the same had been and was obstructed and occupied by the defendant without right, by obstructions of a permanent and continuous character, and that such obstructions were and would be an irreparable injury, for...