Nash v. State
| Citation | 253 Miss. 715,178 So.2d 867 |
| Decision Date | 11 October 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 43265,43265 |
| Parties | I. V. NASH v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
J. K. Henry, Union, for appellant.
Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by J. R. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Appellant, I. V. Nash, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Scott County on a charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to serve a term of twenty years in the state penitentiary. From this judgment he appeals to this Court.
The indictment upon which appellant was tried charged him with killing Donald Oscar Gilmore by culpable negligence.
Appellant assigns as error on the part of the trial court three grounds. They are: (1) the verdict is contrary to the overwhelming weight of law and evidence, and the verdict is not supported by any law or evidence; (2) the court erred in refusing the requested directed verdict; and (3) the court erred in allowing the introduction of testimony of witness Millard Sistrunck.
The proof on behalf of the state in this case is sufficient to show that on October 26, 1963 Donald Oscar Gilmore was killed as a result of being struck by an automobile driven by appellant. The incident occurred about one-half mile from Sebastapol in Scott County, between the hours of six-thirty and seven o'clock in the evening. At the time Gilmore was struck, he was standing on the left side of his car attempting to repair its voltage regulator. His car was parked on the left side of Highway 21, off the paved portion of the highway, and was headed in a northward direction. The proof further shows that at the time appellant struck deceased with his automobile, he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was driving his car at an excessive rate of speed. It shows that the right front fender of appellant's car struck the car of deceased on its left front with such force that it proceeded in a southward direction, striking deceased and instantly killing him. Appellant did not stop his car, and after running some distance in the bar pit on the side of the road, he managed to drive back upon the highway, and left the scene of the accident. He abandoned the car about one-half mile from the scene of the accident, and was later apprehended by the officers near the home of his father. We are of the opinion that there was sufficient competent evidence on behalf of the state to justify the trial court in denying the motion for a directed verdict. We are also of the opinion that there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the conviction, but that the trial court was in error in overruling the objecting of appellant to testimony of Mr. Millard Sistrunck.
One of the elements of negligence the state attempted to prove was that appellant was driving his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed and in a reckless manner. To support testimony along this line the state introduced the witness Millard Sistrunck. Over the objection of the appellant, this witness was allowed to testify that he saw appellant about noon on the day of the accident; that at that time appellant was driving the automobile involved in the accident and turned it around in the witness's driveway; and that he left there slinging gravel and going as fact as the car would run. He was also allowed to testify that he saw appellant again at about three o'clock in the afternoon before the accident; that at that time appellant had three other Negroes in the car with him; that he drove his car through Sebastapol three times; and that on each occasion he was driving fast, and when he came to a curve would try to see how much rubber he could burn off the tires.
The state acknowledges that the assignment of error relative to this testimony is serious, but contends the error was not properly preserved by appellant. First it says that the objection to the evidence was not specific enough to be availed of for the first time on appeal. We find no merit in this contention. Appellant objected to this testimony several times, and asked for a continuing...
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Bartlett v. State
...at a relatively remote point is admissible. Commonwealth v. Honeycutt, 227 Pa.Super. 265, 323 A.2d 775, 778-779. Cf. Nash v. State, 253 Miss. 715, 178 So.2d 867, 869. In the present case, the record discloses no evidence which would indicate that the Bartlett vehicle maintained a fairly con......
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Norman v. State
...of the objection or else the objection is waived. Stringer v. State, 279 So.2d 156 (Miss.1973). This is not contrary to Nash v. State, 253 Miss. 715, 178 So.2d 867 (1965), where the court said that the several general objections raised by defense counsel and the request for a 'continuing ob......
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