Nat'l Educ. Ass'n of N.M. v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 33,065.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 33,065.,33,065.
• Citation: 365 P.3d 1
• Parties: The NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, National Education Association–Santa Fe, and Terence Mirabal, Petitioners–Appellees, v. SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Dr. Joel D. Boyd, Superintendent, Respondents–Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

365 P.3d 1

The NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, National Education Association–Santa Fe, and Terence Mirabal, Petitioners–Appellees,

v.SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Dr. Joel D. Boyd, Superintendent, Respondents–Appellants.

No. 33,065.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 19, 2015.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Clifford, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Elizabeth C. Clifford, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Walsh, Anderson, Gallegos, Green & Treviño P.C., Carol S. Helms, Elena P. Serna, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} This case requires us to interpret certain provisions of the School Personnel Act. We hold that the "harmless error" provision of NMSA 1978 Section 22–10A–28(L) (2003) applies to allow the late filing of a notice requesting a hearing on a discharge notice, under Section 22–10A–27(B). We therefore affirm the permanent writ of mandamus.

I. Background

{2} On February 26, 2013, the superintendent of the Santa Fe Public Schools (SFPS) gave Mirabal a notice of intent to discharge him from his teaching and coaching positions with SFPS. The notice informed Mirabal of his right to request a hearing and that if he did not request a hearing within five working days from the date of the notice, his discharge would become final. Mirabal was subsequently informed that, due to his failure to submit a timely request for hearing, his discharge was final. On March 7, 2013—two days after the deadline for doing so had passed—Mirabal notified the SFPS of his intent to exercise his right to a hearing before SFPS. The termination was effected and no hearing was held. Mirabal, the National Education Association of New Mexico, and National Education Association—Santa Fe (collectively, Petitioners) subsequently obtained an alternative writ of mandamus from the district court, ordering SFPS to "[c]omply with [the] mandatory non-discretionary duty to provide a discharge hearing pursuant to the School Personnel Act[,]" or file a response to the writ. SFPS filed its response to the writ, along with a motion to quash the writ and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

{3} The district court held a show cause hearing to address SFPS's reasons for its noncompliance with the writ. During that hearing, the parties addressed SFPS's response, motion to quash, and motion to dismiss. Petitioners argued that, although Mirabal departed from the five-day time period enumerated in Section 22–10A–27(B), he was entitled to a hearing applying the presumption of harmless error under Section 22–10A–28(L) to his late request. Thus, they asserted, SFPS was therefore required to demonstrate prejudice arising from his departure from Section 22–10A–27(B)'s procedures and had failed to do so. SFPS was therefore required to provide a hearing. Respondents responded by arguing that there was no mandatory duty to provide a hearing when the right to a hearing was not invoked by a request within the time prescribed by the Legislature in Section 22–10A–27(B). In addition, Respondents asserted that the requirement that a party "demonstrate prejudice" indicates there is some discretion in such a decision, and that the writ—intended for non-discretionary, ministerial duties—was therefore improper. SFPS also argued that Mirabal's untimely request resulted in prejudice in three ways: its interest in efficient timely administration was prejudiced; it suffered a monetary loss; and public policy prejudice resulted from creation of an ambiguity in discharge proceedings.

{4} The district court held that "as a matter of statutory construction," the harmless error provision of Section 22–10A–28(L) applies to this case. It reasoned that the harmless error subsection explicitly includes Section 22–10A–27(B) in its applicability, and concluded that "unless the school can demonstrate prejudice, an employee can be late in requesting a hearing and [the] school district can be late in providing a hearing unless prejudice is shown by the other side." Determining that Respondents had not demonstrated prejudice, the district court commented that the arguments Respondents made to show prejudice are "arguments that generally address the evils that befall not strictly enforcing time limits, and they are not the kind of prejudice that was envisioned by the Legislature when writing Section 22–10A–28(L)." The district court noted that the parties agreed that if the request for hearing had been timely, there would have been a mandatory duty to provide a hearing and that the only real issue in the case was whether the late filing somehow turned the duty to provide a hearing into a discretionary duty. Concluding that the statute indicated that prejudice would be determined by a "reviewing authority" and that the school is not vested with the discretion not to grant a hearing, "particularly where [it has] made no showing of prejudice," the district court issued a permanent writ and denied the motions to quash.

II. Discussion

A. Statutory Interpretation

{5} We apply a de novo standard of review when interpreting the School Personnel Act. Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ., 2006–NMSC–015, ¶ 6, 139 N.M. 330, 132 P.3d 587 ; N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2007–NMSC–053, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105 (stating "statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo"). Our first step in this case is an analysis of whether Section 22–10A–28(L), the harmless error provision, applies to the procedures enumerated in Section 22–10A–27(B).

{6} When interpreting a statute, we attempt to discern the intent of the Legislature. Starko, Inc. v. N.M. Human Servs. Dep't, 2014–NMSC–033, ¶ 18, 333 P.3d 947, Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010–NMSC–009, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 ("It is the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate and promote the [L]egislature's accomplishment of its purpose.") (first alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we employ the plain meaning rule. Truong, 2010–NMSC–009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73. "[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Truong, 2010–NMSC–009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, we "presume[ ] that the words in a statutory provision have been used according to their plain, natural, and usual signification and import [.]" DeMichele v. State Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 2015–NMCA–095, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 523, 2015 WL 3505552 (No. 33,778, June 3, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We "[give] words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended." Starko, 2014–NMSC–033, ¶ 46, 333 P.3d 947 (Vigil, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), and do not "read into a statute language which is not there, especially when it makes sense as it is written." Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles, 2010–NMSC–004, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 512, 226 P.3d 611 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). All parts of a statute must be read together to accurately reflect legislative intent, and courts must "read the statute in its entirety and construe each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole." Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996–NMSC–038, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350.

{7} Sections 22–10A–27 and –28 encompass the scope of the right to, and procedures for, discharge hearings and their appeals under the School Personnel Act. Section 22–10A–28 generally governs appeals from discharge hearings provided in Section 22–10A–27. Construing these statutes in pari materia, we have already noted that Sections 22–10A–27 and –28 govern both pre-and post termination procedures for the discharge of school employees. West v. San Jon Bd. of Educ., 2003–NMCA–130, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 498, 79 P.3d 842. They embody the due process rights of school employees who have a protected property right in receiving notice and a hearing prior to their termination. Id.; Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 1994–NMSC–096, ¶ 39, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511. The requirement of a pre-discharge hearing contained in Section 22–10A–27 is intended for the protection of the school employee's rights. Bd. of Educ. v. Singleton, 1985–NMCA–112, ¶ 17, 103 N.M. 722, 712 P.2d 1384. The hearing is mandatory once requested. See id. ¶ 18. SFPS does not disagree. After the school employee exercises his or her right to a pre-discharge hearing under Section 22–10A–27(B), Subsection (C) requires the school board to notify the employee of a hearing to be held between twenty and forty days after the notice of election, with not less than ten days notice provided prior to the hearing. The time specified for conducting a hearing is also mandatory, Bd. of Educ., 1985–NMCA–112, ¶ 20, 103 N.M. 722, 712 P.2d 1384, to the extent that failure to hold a timely hearing constitutes reversible error. Id. ¶ 19. As the district court properly found, nothing in Section 27 to 22–10A–27 indicates discretion in granting or scheduling a hearing following the employee's late submission of an election.

{8} Section 22–10A–28(L) —the harmless error provision—provides that "[u]nless a party can demonstrate prejudice arising from a departure from the procedures established in this section and in Section 22–10–17 NMSA 1978..., such departure shall be presumed to be harmless[.]" The explicit application of harmless error to Section 22–10A–27's provision for requesting a discharge hearing unambiguously expresses the Legislature's intent that failure to comply with the five-day time limit is deemed harmless error, absent a showing of prejudice.

State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994–NMSC–023, ¶ 32, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 ("[T]he [L]egislature is presumed not to have used any surplus words in a statute; each word is to be given meaning."). Respondents argue that the harmless error...