DeMichele v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't Motor Vehicle Div.
Decision Date | 03 June 2015 |
Docket Number | 33,778. |
Citation | 356 P.3d 523 |
Parties | Monte DeMICHELE, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of New Mexico TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Joan M. Waters, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Lewis J. Terr, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Petitioner Monte DeMichele appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for restoration of his driver's license. This Court, having reviewed the information presented at two evidentiary hearings held by the district court on this issue, concludes that the district court abused its discretion in determining that Petitioner failed to meet the “good cause” standard required for restoration pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66–5–5(D) (2011). Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand for restoration of Petitioner's license.
{2} Between 1990 and 2007, Petitioner was convicted six times of driving while intoxicated (DWI). The last of these arrests occurred on August 17, 2005. On December 9, 2005, an interlock device was placed in Petitioner's vehicle. On August 8, 2013, Petitioner requested restoration of his driver's license in accordance with Section 66–5–5(D). Two evidentiary hearings were held in this matter, on September 25, 2013, and March 19, 2014, the details of which are discussed below. At the conclusion of the first hearing, the district court postponed making a decision until Petitioner could provide six more months of interlock records. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the district court denied the petition for restoration, notwithstanding the Motor Vehicle Division's support in favor of restoration.
{3} At the first hearing on the petition for restoration, Petitioner testified as to his sobriety, his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) for the last eight years, and the fact that he has had no violations on his interlock device. Petitioner also testified that he worked with a personal counselor, completed all programs following his arrest, and changed his associations and his way of life to avoid his “triggers.” In support of his request for restoration, Petitioner submitted letters of support from a number of people, including his employer, and interlock records from December 9, 2010, until February 22, 2013.
{4} The State in its answer, and the district court at the hearing, expressed some concern over the number of refusals to retest indicated in Petitioner's interlock records. Petitioner submitted a letter from the interlock monitoring company explaining that the most common explanations for a refusal to retest are: (1) “that the driver was warming up the car in the morning, went back into their house and didn't get to retest in time”; or (2) “that they leave their vehicle running while running in somewhere to conduct an errand or other business and not having the knowledge that the interlock was requesting a test.” Petitioner testified that “sometimes [he would] leave the ignition on, depending on the customer that [he was] speaking with, because some of them walk [him] out to [his] vehicle[.]” The letter from the interlock company explained that it does “not consider a retest refusal to be suspicious, unless it is for a prolonged period of time usually exceeding [eight to ten] minutes OR that all retests from the initial test to ignition off have been ignored.” The State conceded that it did not know precisely how the refusals worked and indicated that it was satisfied with Petitioner's explanation.
{6} The hearing reconvened about six months after the first hearing. At this hearing, Petitioner submitted interlock records for the period from September 9, 2013, through February 7, 2014. The district court asked the State for any relevant information from the newly submitted interlock records, and the State indicated that there were “three indications of pass greater than zero.” However, the State explained that these occur when “the machine detects alcohol from some source, and it can be ambient in the air.” The State went on to explain:
When asked by the district court to explain the low level readings, Petitioner stated that, based on his conversation with a person at the interlock monitoring company, it could be the result of his being an insulin-dependent diabetic and that the low level readings were .00024 and .00026. The State also pointed out to the district court that the substance abuse evaluation that had been prepared at the Court's request confirmed that Petitioner is an insulin-dependent diabetic. In addition, the State pointed out that the substance abuse evaluation1 indicated that Petitioner was truthful and not dependent on alcohol. The district court again questioned Petitioner about the number of refusals in his interlock records.
{7} In addition, the district court again made remarks about the interlock device being a significant tool:
The district court then denied Petitioner's petition for restoration, stating:
I'm glad you're doing well, but I'm afraid I'm going to deny your petition. There is very little room for error. You continue to have some readings of alcohol. The reason for that is all speculation. I don't know why it's in there. I recognize that they are low readings, but they're there, and with somebody with six DWI convictions, I mean, that's a lot of DWI convictions, and you're asking me to take away the one tool that I think has really helped you not get any more DWI convictions, and I just don't see, based on the record before me, that you have established good cause that would allow me to do that. So your petition is denied.
Petitioner appeals.
DISCUSSION
State v. Maes, 1983–NMCA–073, ¶ 7, 100 N.M. 78, 665 P.2d 1169 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Armijo, 2005–NMCA–010, ¶ 27, 136 N.M. 723, 104 P.3d 1114. While we acknowledge that this is not a criminal appeal, there is a significant public interest in alleviating drunk driving such that, where this Court is being asked to reverse the district court's denial of restoration of a driver's license to a person with six DWI convictions, it would be imprudent for this Court to rely solely on the State's stipulation and to decline to conduct our own independent review of the record prior to reversing the district court.
{9} Given that “good cause” for restoration has never been addressed by a formal opinion of this Court or the New Mexico Supreme Court, we must first determine what standard of review this Court applies in reviewing the decision of the district court. To do so, we begin by looking...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n of N.M. v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 33,065.
...their plain, natural, and usual signification and import [.]" DeMichele v. State Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 2015–NMCA–095, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 523, 2015 WL 3505552 (No. 33,778, June 3, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We "[give] words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indi......
-
Cmtys. for Clean Water v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n
...intent." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); DeMichele v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't , 2015-NMCA-095, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 523 ("The plain meaning rule presumes that the words in a statutory provision have been used according to their plain, natural, and usual signification an......
-
Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't of State
...N.M. 612, 261 P.2d 645 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); DeMichele v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t. , 2015-NMCA-095, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d 523 ("[T]his Court is not bound by the [s]tate’s concession."). Here, the question of whether "natural gas" is a "chemical or reagent" is a ques......
-
Schneider v. State
...reasoned that the purpose of having an interlock device was to protect the public from unsafe drivers that had a history of alcohol abuse. Id. at 529. It concluded that in order to show good cause, the applicant must "demonstrate that he or she no longer presents a threat to public safety i......