Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 19 February 1935 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 24424 |
| Citation | 41 P.2d 645,1935 OK 161,170 Okla. 593 |
| Parties | NATIONAL FIRE INS. CO. v. PATTERSON |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Deed--"Deed" Defined.
The word "deed" in its common usage and acceptation means a conveyance of real estate, and a deed of conveyance is a writing signed by the grantor whereby the title to real property is transferred from one to the other.
2. Same--"Executed" Includes Signing.
The term "executed," when applied to a deed, includes the signing thereof.
3. Appeal and Error--Review--Conclusiveness of Findings in Law Action Tried to Court.
Where an action at law is tried by the court without a jury, the appellate court is precluded from weighing the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not the court's findings were justified thereby, unless there is no evidence whatever to support the findings. First National Bank v. Melton & Holmes, 156 Okla. 63, 9 P.2d 703.
Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; George T. Arnett, Judge.
Action by J. M. Patterson against the National Fire Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Rittenhouse, Webster & Rittenhouse, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
D. A. Stovell, of Hugo, for defendant in error.
¶1 It appears from the record that the plaintiff, Patterson, procured from the National Fire Insurance Company the issuance of a $1,000 policy of fire insurance covering the period of time from the 8th day of September, 1930, to the 8th day of September, 1933, and covering a certain dwelling house located on lot 2, block 3, of Terry's addition to Hugo, Okl. The property had been insured for many years prior thereto.
¶2 It appears that in 1923 the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of said above-described property, and that he conveyed the same to one A. A. Reynolds; that thereafter A. A. Reynolds conveyed said property to Mrs. M. S. Patterson, the wife of the plaintiff. In 1925 Mrs. Patterson executed a deed to J. M. Patterson, which said deed was never placed of record and was lost. In 1928 the plaintiff sold the said property to one C. R. Pole, placing a deed and contract in escrow in the National Bank of Commerce at Hugo, Okl. By the terms of this contract the deed was to be delivered to Pole upon payment of the stipulated price. This price was to be paid at the rate of $10 per month, and, upon default in said payments, the deed was to be delivered back to the plaintiff, Patterson. Pole subsequently became delinquent in the payments under this contract, and the plaintiff demanded a forfeiture of the contract and a withdrawal of the deed.
¶3 On September 28, 1930, the building covered by the policy was destroyed by fire, and, upon refusal by the insurance company to pay under said policy, this suit was instituted.
¶4 The defendant, the National Fire Insurance Company, set up as a defense the proposition that Patterson was not the unconditional and sole owner of said property, and was not entitled to recover under said policy for the reason that the policy was void and inoperative under the following clause therein: "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto shall be void * * * if the interest of the insured by other than unconditional and sole ownership or if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple; * * * or if any change, other than by the death of an insured, take place in the interest, title or possession of the subject of insurance (except change of occupants, without increase of hazard), whether by legal process or judgment, or by voluntary act of the insured or otherwise. * * *"
¶5 The trial court found that the plaintiff, J. M. Patterson, was the sole and unconditional owner of said property at the time of the issuance of said policy and at the time of said fire which destroyed the same, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $1,000. The defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, and the defendant comes to this court upon five assignments of error, which amount to the contention that the judgment of the court is not sustained by the evidence and is contrary to the law because the plaintiff was not the sole and unconditional owner of the insured property either at the time of insurance or of loss.
¶6 The defendant, National Fire Insurance Company, contends: First, that J. M. Patterson was not the sole and unconditional owner of the property, because legal title to the same was vested in M. S. Patterson, and that there is no evidence to support the findings of the court that J. M. Patterson took title to the property by virtue of the deed executed by Mrs. Patterson. Second, because equitable title to the property was in C. R. Pole by reason of the contract and deed in escrow.
¶7 As to the first proposition, it is the contention of the defendant that there was no evidence upon which to base the findings of the trial court to the effect that the deed from Mrs. Patterson to Mr. Patterson vested title in him, for the reason that there is no evidence that this deed was signed and acknowledged.
¶8 We cannot agree with this contention. The undisputed testimony is that Mrs. Patterson "executed a deed" to Mr. Patterson covering this property.
¶9 The term "execute" includes the signing of an instrument.
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... ... First Nat ... Bank, 75 Okl. 159, 183 P. 56, and National Fire Ins ... Co. v. Patterson, 170 Okl. 593, 41 P.2d 645. Therein it ... ...
- National Fire Ins. Co. v. Patterson