Nat'l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead
Citation | 250 Ill. 584,95 N.E. 973 |
Parties | NATIONAL SAFE DEPOSIT CO. v. STEAD, Atty. Gen., et al. |
Decision Date | 04 October 1911 |
Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Richard S. Tuthill, Judge.
Bill by the National Safe Deposit Company pany against William H. Stead and others. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.George Packard, Vincent J. Walsh, and John J. Peckham (Orville Peckham, of counsel), for appellant.
W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and Walter K. Lincoln (Charles E. Woodward, of counsel), for appellees.
This was a bill in chancery filed by the National Safe Deposit Company, the appellant, against William H. Stead, Attorney General, Andrew Russel, State Treasurer, and Walter K. Lincoln, inheritance tax attorney, the appellees, in the circuit court of Cook county, to restrain said officers from enforcing against the appellant, and all other corporations, firms, and individuals similarly situated and who are engaged in the business of renting safety deposit boxes and safes for hire, the provisions of section 9 of an act entitled ‘An act to tax gifts, legacies, inheritances, transfers, appointments and interests in certain cases and to provide for the collection of the same, and repealing certain acts therein named,’ approved June 14, 1909, in force July 1, 1909 (Hurd's St. 1909, p. 1897), on the ground that said section of the act is unconstitutional and void. A general demurrer was interposed to the bill and sustained, and the bill was dismissed for want of equity, and the record has been brought to this court by the complainant by appeal for further review.
Section 9 reads as follows:
The sole object in filing this bill was to test the constitutionality of said section 9 of the inheritance tax law of 1909. The allegations of the bill are, in substance, as follows: That appellant was in 1881 incorporated under the laws of this state for the express purpose of providing a suitable building or buildings with vaults and safes, with a special regard to protection against loss by fire, robbery or otherwise, and to carry on the business of safety deposit and storage, and has ever since been engaged in carrying out such purposes; that it has succeeded in building up a large and profitable business, consisting chiefly of renting for hire safe deposit boxes or safes specially constructed for that purpose in its vaults for the safe keeping of money, securities, and valuables, one provision in the contract between appellant and each box renter being that no one except the renter or his deputy, to be designated in writing on the books of the company, or, in case of death, his legal representatives, shall have access to the box or safe; that appellant now has in its vaults 13,291 safes or safe deposit boxes, of which 9,702 are under contracts of rental; that of the latter number 4,104 are rented to and held jointly by more than one individual, each of whom has access to the box of which he is a joint renter and the right to keep property therein, and 316 are rented to and held by business copartnerships, and that the demand for joint rentals is constantly increasing. The bill further alleged that in the ordinary course of business the safes and boxes can be opened only by the use of two keys, one of which is held by the lessee and the other by appellant, and that it requires the joint act of the customer and appellant to secure access to the contents of a box or safe; that appellant retains no means of access to the box or safe by itself alone, nor does it possess any knowledge or information, or means of knowledge or information, as to the ownershipof the contents of the box or safe; that the appellant never by its own act opens a box or safe rented to a customer unless the lessee loses his key or abandons the box or safe; that, in case of the loss of the key, appellant, in the presence of the lessee, drills out the lock on the safe or box and replaces it with a new lock and key, and in case of the abandonment of a box or safe by a renter, evidenced by his failure to renew the lease or pay the rent, appellant by the contract of leasing reserves, and sometimes exercises, the right, after reasonable notice to the lessee to withdraw the contents of the box and surrender the key, to open the box by drilling out the lock, to withdraw the contents, and hold them subject to the order and disposition of the renter. The bill further alleged that upon the death of the lessee of a box or safe, and before letters of administration have been issued, appellant permits the next of kin having the key to open the box, in the presence of appellant's agents, for the purpose only of ascertaining whether decedent has left a will in the box, which, if found, is deposited in the probate court by appellant, and in some instances where the next of kin have represented that they could not find the key to the box the lock has been drilled out and changed, at their request and in their presence, in order to look for such will, but in neither case does appellant permit the removal of anything other than the will from the box. The bill further alleged that appellees claim that under the provisions of section 9 of the inheritance tax law of 1909 they have the right to compel appellant and similar institutions to deny to the personal representatives of deceased box renters, and to the survivor or survivors of joint box renters, and to surviving partners of copartnership box renters, control over and liberty to remove the contents of the safe deposit boxes, or any part thereof, unless notice of the time and place of the intended removal is served upon the State Treasurer and Attorney General at least 10 days prior to such removal, and unless the State Treasurer and Attorney General consent, in writing to such removal, or a sufficient portion or amount of such contents be retained by appellant to pay tax and interest which may thereafter be assessed, on account of the taking possession of the contents of such box by the personal representatives of the decedent, or by the survivor or survivors among joint box holders, or by the surviving partners of the decedent if the box was held in the name of a copartnership; that appellees also claim the right to examine the contents of any such safe deposit box at the time of the removal or taking possession of the contents by the person legally entitled thereto, all of which claims appellant insists are in conflict with the terms and obligations imposed upon it by its contracts with box renters and with the constitutional rights of box renters and their legal...
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