Nat. Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co.

Decision Date15 September 2003
Docket Number No. S03A0823, No. S03A0617, No. S03A0802, No. S03A0803.
PartiesNATIONAL TAX FUNDING, L.P. v. HARPAGON COMPANY, LLC., et al. (four cases).
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Miller & Martin, Geoffrey H. Cederholm, Donna J. Nance, Kerry A. Lunz, Atlanta, for appellant.

Proctor & Chambers, Robert J. Proctor, Bradley A. Hutchins, Janet S. Todd, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Daniel M. Formby, Deputy Atty. Gen., Vernitia A. Shannon, Jo Avery, Atlanta, for appellees. SEARS, Presiding Justice.

Appellant National Tax Funding, L.P., ("NTF") appeals the trial court's ruling that as transferee of the purchaser of real property at a sale for delinquent ad valorem taxes, appellee the Harpagon Company, LLC, ("Harpagon") holds fee simple title to the property unencumbered by any competing tax liens, including those of NTF. We conclude that NTF's interest in the subject property was terminated when it failed to exercise its right of redemption following the tax sale, despite having received notice under statute that its redemption rights would soon end. Therefore, applying the "right for any reason rule," we affirm.

Along with other entities, both NTF and third-party Heartwood 11, Inc., held tax liens against certain property located in Fulton County.1 Heartwood 11 obtained writs of fieri facias from the Tax Commissioner, levied upon its liens and acquired tax deeds to the property. Heartwood 11 then quitclaimed the property to Harpagon. Thereafter, Harpagon served notice on the delinquent taxpayer and all others claiming an interest in the property, including NTF, asserting the statutory bar to the right of redemption. Harpagon then filed a petition to quiet title, and sought a declaration that it holds title to the property free and clear of NTF's tax liens. NTF responded and argued that its tax liens had never been paid and therefore remained valid.

A hearing was held before the special master, who concluded that a tax sale divests all liens except the one levied upon from the property sold, so as to give the tax sale purchaser marketable title. Accordingly, the special master found that by virtue of its transferor's tax sale purchase of the subject property, Harpagon held title to the property free and clear of NTF's tax liens. The trial court adopted the special master's findings and conclusions, entered judgment in Harpagon's favor, and these appeals follow.

1. All owners of non-exempt real and tangible personal property are subject to taxation on the property's fair market value as of January first of each year.2 In order to secure payment of these taxes when they fall delinquent, the law creates a lien which extends not only to the property giving rise to the tax obligation, but also to all other property owned by the taxpayer.3 Generally, a lien for delinquent ad valorem taxes arises at the time the taxes become due and unpaid, and "cover[s] all property in which the taxpayer has any interest from the date the lien arises until such taxes are paid."4 When taxes are not paid, the Tax Commissioner is authorized to issue a writ of fieri facias (or tax execution), which is a directive to the appropriate officer (often the sheriff) to levy upon the property, sell it and collect the unpaid taxes.5 Following a tax sale, after the payment of taxes, costs, and other expenses, any excess proceeds may be claimed by the parties entitled to receive them, including those who hold other liens against the property.6

After the tax sale, the delinquent taxpayer or any other party holding an interest in or lien on the property may redeem the property by paying to the tax sale purchaser the purchase price plus any taxes paid and interest.7 If the property is redeemed, the tax sale is essentially rescinded and a quitclaim deed is executed by the tax sale purchaser back to the owner of the property at the time of levy and sale.8 If a creditor of the original taxpayer redeems the property, the amount paid by the redeeming creditor becomes a first lien on the property. The redeeming creditor then has first priority to repayment—a "super-lien" for the redemption price—and may proceed to foreclose against the property based upon that lien.9 This right of redemption, however, may be terminated by the tax sale purchaser anytime after one year following the tax sale. After that year has run, the tax sale purchaser may "terminate, foreclose, divest, and forever bar" all rights to redeem the property by giving notice under OCGA § 48-4-40, et seq., ("the barment statutes") to all parties with redemption rights.10 The barment statutes apply to "all persons having ... any right, title or interest in, or lien upon" the subject property.11 However, until such time as the barment statutes are invoked once the one year redemption period has run, the tax sale purchaser's interest in the property is not exclusive, as the taxpayer and other lienholders retain their rights of redemption. A tax deed vests the purchaser with a defeasible (and, incidentally, taxable) fee interest in the property, but it does not entitle a purchaser to exclusive possession until the right of redemption is terminated.12

Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the tax sale of the property held to satisfy Harpagon's predecessor's tax lien divested NTF's tax lien interest from the property sold. By obtaining a tax sale deed to the property, Harpagon may have obtained a defeasible fee interest in the property, but its title was subject to encumbrance for at least one year after purchase due to the other interested parties' statutory rights of redemption.

2. The nature of Harpagon's title changed, however, once it gave notice under the barment statutes to all interested parties that their rights of redemption would expire and be barred as of one year after the tax sale purchase of the property, and all interested parties elected not to redeem the property within the redemption period. "The effect of expiration [of the redemption period] and bar of the right of redemption is to vest the purchaser with an absolute and unconditional title to the land, provided such title was owned by the [original owner], and the tax sale was valid."13 Hence, after expiration of the redemption period, Harpagon held indefeasible fee simple title to the property.

3. The question remains, however, whether Harpagon's title to the property remained encumbered by NTF's tax lien after NTF's failure to redeem the property during the redemption period even though it received notice under the barment statutes. NTF argues that its tax lien remains in place and is enforceable until the tax obligation is paid. In making this argument, NTF relies upon OCGA § 48-2-56(a), which states that except as otherwise provided, liens for all taxes arise at the time the taxes become due, and "shall cover all property in which the taxpayer has an interest from the date the lien arises until such taxes are paid." What NTF overlooks, however, is that after the barment statutes were invoked and the redemption period expired, the taxpayer no longer had any interest in the subject property. As explained above, the delinquent taxpayer, as well as all lienholders, could redeem the property from Harpagon until it gave notice under the barment statutes and the redemption period expired. Harpagon's valid notice and invocation of the barment statutes, however, "terminated, foreclosed, divested, and forever barred" all parties from redeeming the property. At that point, the taxpayer no longer had an interest in the property.14 Because NTF's tax lien covers only "property in which the taxpayer has [an] interest,"15 once the taxpayer's right of redemption terminated, NTF's lien was divested from and could no longer be enforced against the property.16

As explained above, following a tax sale, the holder of a competing tax lien has two options—it may either file a claim to collect against any proceeds from the sale, or it may assert its rights following the tax sale via a statutory claim for redemption, in which case it obtains a first priority lien on the property, which it may then enforce by levy and sale. With these two options, the legislature has ensured that holders of competing tax liens can take adequate steps to protect their interest in property sold at a tax sale to another lienholder. What a competing tax lienholder...

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63 cases
  • Com. v. DiNicola
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • January 19, 2005
    ...582 (2002) ("we are obliged to uphold the trial court's ruling if legally correct for any reason"); National Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235, 240 (2003) ("even though the trial court's ruling was based upon an insufficient analysis, it was nonetheless correct a......
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
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    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 2015
    ...the lower court, even if it is based on erroneous reason, so long as it is right for any reason. See Nat. Tax Funding L.P. v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 277 Ga. 41, 45(4), 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003). ...
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4 books & journal articles
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 59-1, September 2007
    • Invalid date
    ...but also to all other property owned by the taxpayer.'" Id. at 249, 633 S.E.2d at 631 (quoting Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 42, 586 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2003)). 244. Id. at 250, 633 S.E.2d at 631. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the language of th......
  • Real Property - Linda S. Finley
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 56-1, September 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...App. 670, 544 S.E.2d 464 (2001), are also overruled by TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003)). 127. 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003). 128. Id. at 41, 586 S.E.2d at 237. 129. Id. at 41-42, 586 S.E.2d at 237. 130. Id. at 42, 586 S.E.2d at 235. 131. Id. 1......
  • Real Property
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 68-1, September 2016
    • Invalid date
    ...§ 48-4-5 (2006)).223. Id. at 322, 779 S.E.2d at 440.224. Id. at 322-23, 779 S.E.2d at 440.225. Id.226. Id. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440.227. 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003).228. DLT List, LLC, 335 Ga. App. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440. 229. Id. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440.230. Id.231. Id.232. Id.......
  • Real Property - Linda S. Finley
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 60-1, September 2008
    • Invalid date
    ...227. Id. at 903-04, 655 S.E.2d at 587-89. 228. Id. at 904, 655 S.E.2d at 587. 229. Id. 230. Id. (quoting Nat'l Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 44, 586 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2003)); See also Linda S. Finley, Real Property, 56 MERCER L. REV. 395, 410-13 (2004). 231. Agio, 282 Ga. at 904, ......

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