NATHAN GOFF v. MELINDA LYNNE
| Decision Date | 17 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-09-00656-CV,01-09-00656-CV |
| Parties | NATHAN GOFF CORRICK, Appellant v. MELINDA LYNNE CORRICK, Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
This is an appeal of a property division in a divorce case. In two issues, appellant Nathan Goff Corrick contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community estate and ordering Nathan to make installment payments "as alimony" to effectuate a 55%-45% property division in favor of appellee Melinda Lynne Corrick. In particular, Nathan argues that the trial court's decision to deduct an approximately $80,000 projected tax liability from Melinda's share of the community estate was unsupported by the evidence, as was the trial court's decision to order him to make installment payments "as alimony" to equalize the property division.
The record does not support including a contingent tax liability as part of the division of the community estate. We therefore reverse the portions of the divorce decree pertaining to the trial court's division of the community estate, including the court-ordered installment payments, and we remand for further proceedings regarding division of the community estate.
Melinda and Nathan divorced after 27 years of marriage. At the time of their divorce, they had no minor children. After the separation, Melinda moved in with her elderly and infirm parents. She had primarily been a homemaker for the duration of the marriage, working only occasionally throughout the marriage to supplement the family's income. She had medical problems that impacted her physical and mental health. She testified that she had chronic back and neck pain, that she had undergone surgery for her medical conditions, that she required daily pain medication, and that she suffered from depression. She had a high-schooleducation, and she testified that she was unable to get a job. She testified that she had only approximately $400 or $500 remaining from the money she withdrew from the couple's joint checking account before they separated. Although Melinda repeatedly testified that she had no money, she also repeatedly said that she wanted to buy a house near her parents' home.
On cross-examination, Melinda was asked if she would rather take a lump-sum settlement from Nathan's pension plan or receive the money when he retires. She testified that she did not know and that she would like to discuss the matter with her attorney. She was not asked if she would prefer a lump-sum payment from Nathan's retirement savings account. She did not offer any testimony or evidence regarding whether she intended to take her share of the retirement savings account in a single distribution.
Nathan worked as a nuclear operations specialist. He had worked for his employer for 21 years and intended to continue to work there. Nathan earned a base salary of approximately $90,000, and with his bonuses he earned in excess of $100,000 per year. Nathan conceded that it would be financially difficult for Melinda to establish her own household, and he testified that he thought a lump-sum settlement would be in her best interest.
The largest community assets, as valued by the court, were Nathan's retirement savings account (worth approximately $267,000), the marital home (worth approximately $133,000), and Nathan's pension plan (worth approximately $75,000). Both Nathan and Melinda proposed awarding her the larger share of the retirement savings account. There was no specific testimony or evidence about tax consequences of dividing the community estate or any potential tax liability on a distribution from the retirement savings account; however, Nathan acknowledged generally that Melinda would be liable for taxes upon withdrawal.
The trial court granted the divorce on grounds of insupportability. The trial court awarded the house to Nathan, divided the pension plan equally, and divided the retirement savings account, awarding $23,956 to Nathan and $243,138 to Melinda. In addition, in its inventory the trial court reduced the value of property awarded to Melinda by $80,235, reflecting the court's calculation of the tax liability that would be incurred upon Melinda's withdrawal of her share of the retirement savings account, based on a 33% tax rate applied to the entire amount. Finally, under a subheading entitled, "Additional Orders for Property Division," the trial court ordered that Nathan pay Melinda a total of $23,753, for 15.8 months at $1,500 per month, "as alimony."
The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were listed in the following categories: (1) Findings of Fact—Divorce; (2) Findings of Fact—Division of the Marital Estate; (3) Division of the Marital Estate—Factors Considered in Just and Right Division; (4) Findings of Fact as Conclusions of Law; (5) Conclusions of Law—Divorce; and (6) Conclusions of Law—Division of Marital Estate. As to division of the community estate, the trial court found that Melinda had not been gainfully employed for over 10 years, had medical problems that prevented her from working, was in poor physical and mental health, had only a high school education, had no immediate prospects for employment, and had no skills or education—other than a high school diploma—that would facilitate gainful employment. The trial court found that Nathan earned more than $100,000 per year, was currently employed, and continued to accrue retirement benefits. The trial court considered the following factors in determining that a just and right division of the marital estate should disproportionately favor Melinda:
Nothing in the divorce decree, the trial court's statements in open court, or the findings of fact and conclusions of law mentions spousal maintenance. Nathan requested additional findings of fact pertaining to spousal maintenance and the valuation of the contingent tax liability that the trial court credited to Melinda. The trial court declined to file any additional findings of fact or conclusions of law.
In two issues, Nathan contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering alimony and in dividing the property of the martial estate because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support its findings.
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's division of community property of the marital estate. Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (spousal maintenance); Alsenz v. Alsenz, 101 S.W.3d 648, 654-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (division of property). A court of appeals presumes that the trial court properly exercised its discretion, Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981), and will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court has acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or without sufficient supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
In an appeal from a bench trial, the court of appeals reviews de novo a trial court's conclusions of law and will uphold them on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Hailey v. Hailey, 176 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). However, when, as here, the appellate record includes the reporter's record, the trial court's factual findings, whether express or implied, are not conclusive and may be challenged for sufficiency of the evidence supporting them. Tucker v. Tucker, 908 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Therefore, under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds for asserting error: they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d at 396. Because of the overlap between the abuse-of-discretion and sufficiency-of-the-evidence standards of review, this court engages in a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Stamper v. Knox, 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
With regard to the question of whether the trial court had sufficient information, we utilize the traditional sufficiency review. See id. When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, the court determines whether the evidence would enable reasonable people to reach the judgment being reviewed. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). The court of appeals considers favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregards contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id. When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, the appellate court considers and weighs all the evidence that was before the...
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