National Aid Life Ass'n v. Murphy
Decision Date | 01 December 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 11558.,11558. |
Citation | 78 S.W.2d 223 |
Parties | NATIONAL AID LIFE ASS'N v. MURPHY. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Snyder, Owen & Lybrand, of Oklahoma City, Okl., and Taylor & Irwin and W. J. Rutledge, Jr., all of Dallas, for appellant.
Crane & Crane, of Dallas, for appellee.
Mrs. Mattie E. Murphy, widow, sued the National Aid Life Association, a benefit association conducted on the assessment plan, referred to herein as the Oklahoma Association, to recover the amount due upon a benefit certificate issued by said association to Ernest C. Murphy, deceased husband of plaintiff. The case was tried to a jury, and resulted in judgment for plaintiff for the full amount of the policy and interest, from which the association appealed, and plaintiff filed cross-assignments of error, based on the action of the court in striking out on exception her plea for penalty and attorney fee.
The material facts are these: During September, 1930, Ernest C. Murphy became a member of the Citizens' Mutual Life & Accident Association, conducted on the assessment plan, designated the Texas Association; its certificate or policy issued to Mr. Murphy was in the sum of $5,000, payable on his death to his wife, plaintiff herein. The affairs of the Texas Association were placed in the hands of T. K. Irwin, receiver, who, on May 25, 1931, entered into a written contract with the Oklahoma Association, by the terms of which said association became obligated to take over the membership of the Texas Association, consisting of approximately 4,500 members in good standing (including Ernest C. Murphy), representing effective life insurance amounting to about $65,900,000. The pertinent provisions of the absorption contract are these:
It is obvious that the absorption contract was entered into for the benefit of the creditors, and members in good standing, of the Texas Association, including Ernest C. Murphy; the appointing court approved the arrangement, and the same was also approved by the commissioners of insurance of the states of Oklahoma and Texas.
In pursuance of the agreement, the Oklahoma Association wrote Ernest C. Murphy June 4, 1931, inclosing the benefit certificate sued upon, also a receipt therefor to be executed by the insured. The letter, transmitting the certificate and receipt, called attention to the consummation of the contract with the receiver, stating that: About ten days later, a follow-up letter was mailed to Murphy, urging him to execute the receipt and remit the special contingent assessment mentioned.
The pertinent provisions of the receipt transmitted with the letter are these: The record discloses that, within the 30-day period prescribed, the receipt or memorandum of ratification was executed, delivered, and the special assessment was paid, in the manner and under the circumstances hereinafter set out. * * *"
The certificate of membership or policy sued upon contains a provision that defendant insists is a warranty, the alleged violation of which constitutes its chief defense; this provision reads: "This certificate is issued upon the warranty by the applicant that all statements and answers to questions made in application for the same are true, said application being by reference made a material part of this contract, and this certificate is not effective unless delivered into the manual possession of the applicant, while he is still in good health."
The receipt or memorandum of ratification was executed and delivered and the special assessment was paid, in the manner and under the circumstances following: When the first letter, above mentioned, was received by the Murphys, they were without sufficient funds to pay the assessment, but, on receipt of the follow-up letter, Mr. Murphy directed Mrs. Murphy to arrange with Mr. E. Rothschild of Dallas for a loan of $10 to pay the assessment, which he agreed to do; Mrs. Murphy also requested Rothschild to sign Mr. Murphy's name to the receipt, and deliver same, together with the money, to defendant at its office in the Fidelity Union Building, Dallas, in charge of Mr. B. F. Allen, defendant's state agent; later the same day, Rothschild delivered the document and paid the money to Mr. Allen. After the transaction with Mr. Rothschild, as above stated, Mrs. Murphy returned home, told Mr. Murphy what she had done, to which he assented.
The evidence warrants the conclusion that Mr. Murphy had enjoyed good health for a number of years preceding an attack of influenza in February or March, 1931; the influenza, however, left him with a bad heart affliction, and about May 21, 1931, his condition was pronounced serious by a heart specialist, who expressed the opinion that insured could not live very long. Insured ceased regular work three or four months prior to his death, which occurred June 21, 1931, but continued to be up and around; on Wednesday preceding his death Sunday morning, he drove 30 miles in the country, and the night before his death ate supper with his family about 6 p. m., had company until about 10 p. m., dying suddenly early next morning. Additional pertinent facts will be mentioned in their proper connections during the discussion.
Defendant filed a general denial, and specially pleaded that, under the facts, no binding contract was ever consummated, in that (a) its offer to insured was never accepted in the manner and form stipulated in the contract with the receiver; (b) insured not being in good health at the time, the stipulation of the contract (certificate) that it was not to become effective,...
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