National Amusements, Inc. v. City of Springdale

• Decision Date: 18 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. C-800842,C-800842
• Citation: 443 N.E.2d 1016,3 Ohio App.3d 70,3 OBR 81
• Parties: , 3 O.B.R. 81 NATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGDALE et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 70

3 Ohio App.3d 70

443 N.E.2d 1016, 3 O.B.R. 81

NATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGDALE et al., Appellees. ^*

No. C-800842.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Nov. 18, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Broad power is conferred on the legislative authority to classify property for taxation, and no classification will be set aside unless it is so discriminatory as to deny equal protection of the law.

2. A classification, even though discriminating between entities subject to taxation, does not violate equal protection guarantees if there exists any state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a validating distinction from other taxable entities.

Strauss, Troy & Ruehlmann Co., L.P.A., Charles G. Atkins and Charles J. Postow, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Wood, Lamping, Slutz & Reckman, Kenneth J. Schneider, Albert H. Neman and Harold G. Korbee, Cincinnati, for appellees.

BLACK, Presiding Judge.

The question presented in this appeal is whether Springdale's ordinance imposing a three percent cinema admissions tax is facially invalid because it denies equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. We answer that question in the negative and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Defendant-appellee, city of Springdale, imposed the tax on "the amounts received from admission to any cinema" in the city, by adoption of Ordinance No. 67-1978 (enacting as of January 1, 1979, Chapter 97 of the city's codified ordinances). In the single "whereas" clause the city expressed its desire "to offset the cost of additional municipal services and to provide additional revenue," and in Section 97.02 the stated purpose of the tax was to provide revenue for general municipal purposes.

Plaintiff-appellant, National Amusements, Inc., brought suit asking that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional as violative of its equal protection rights and that enforcement be enjoined, claiming that the ordinance imposed a discriminatory tax on cinemas and not on "any other place of business, amusement or recreation in the City of Springdale." These allegations present solely the question of whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional, there being no claim of discriminatory application. The city counterclaimed, asking for a judgment declaring the ordinance valid in all respects. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court ruled in favor of the city, declaring the ordinance valid. ¹

In the first of its two assignments of error, plaintiff asserts error in granting summary judgment when there existed a genuine issue of material fact. This claim has no merit. Plaintiff's complaint, as noted, raised only the question of whether the ordinance was invalid on its face. The city conceded the ordinance had been duly adopted. There could be no factual dispute material to the issue of facial validity.

If plaintiff had presented in its complaint, or in any evidentiary documentation associated with its motion for summary judgment, any claim that other forms of entertainment existed in the city so that the application of the tax on cinemas only would be impermissibly discriminatory, a factual dispute might arise. Plaintiff made no such claim, and no factual issues were presented to the trial court. We find no error as claimed.

The second assignment claims that the court erred in holding that the ordinance was facially valid. We understand plaintiff to concede that broad powers are conferred on a legislative authority to classify property for taxation, and that no classification will be set aside unless it is so discriminatory as to deny equal protection of the law. State ex rel. Struble v. Davis (1937), 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E.2d 684 , paragraph two of the syllabus. We understand plaintiff does not assert that the taxation of cinema admission has been preempted by the state of Ohio. Plaintiff's complaint, according to our understanding, is that the ordinance sub judice makes an invalid classification because it arbitrarily singles out cinema admissions for taxation. We do not agree.

A taxing authority may discriminate between trades and activities and is not required to follow any predetermined method of classifying those which it selects for taxation, provided the classification rests "upon some ground...