National Bank of Georgia v. Merritt
| Decision Date | 10 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,48488,Nos. 48487,s. 48487,2 |
| Parties | NATIONAL BANK OF GEORGIA v. Larry H. MERRITT et al. NATIONAL BANK OF GEORGIA v. Jerry MERRITT |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
One who has not, within the 30 days allowed for answering or objecting to Requests for Admissions under Code Ann. § 81A-136, answered, nor objected to, nor moved for and obtained an extension of time for responding to the said Requests, shall be deemed to have admitted the Requests subject only to such remedy as may be afforded him on motion under Code Ann. § 81A-136(b).
The National Bank of Georgia sued Jerry Merritt on his promissory note, and then on February 27, 1973 filed and served Requests for Admission of Facts under Code Ann. § 81A-136 including admissions that $7,535.25 was owed as principal and $1,130.25 as attorney fees on the note. No answer or objections being made by Merritt for approximately two months the Bank moved for summary judgment. Two weeks after the Bank's motion, answers to the requests were filed denying certain items asked to be admitted. The record contains no showing of excusable neglect or of any attempt to obtain an extension of time for answering. The trial judge over the Bank's protest allowed the tardy answers to become part of the record, and denied the summary judgment motion. The Bank's appeal from that ruling is our appeal No. 48488.
The companion appeal presents similar facts. The Bank sued L. H. Merritt and another on a promissory note; Merritt was properly requested to admit a principal amount due of $9,869.44 and attorney fees of $1,480.35. These requests for admissions were filed January 24, 1973, and no response was made by Merritt until answers containing some denials were filed April 27, 1973 after the Bank's motion for summary judgment in the case. The trial judge over the Bank's protest allowed the answers and denied the Bank's motion. The Bank's appeal is our case No. 48487.
Schwall & Heuett, Stanley M. Lefco, Atlanta, for appellant.
Arthur P. Tranakos, Martin S. Jackel, Atlanta, for appellees.
In both appeals, the basic question before the court is whether these tardy answers were properly admitted into the record. We hold that they were not, and that defendant in each case by not responding had admitted the facts as stated in the requests prior to the Bank's summary judgment motions.
1. The plaintiff-appellant Bank contends that the judge erred in allowing the answers into the record when they were not timely filed and no extension of time had been requested before the initial 30 days ran out. Hobbs v. New England Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 513, 93 S.E.2d 653, is inapposite for two reasons. It related to answers to interrogatories-not requests for admissions, and it predated the 1972 amendment to the CPA.
Prior to the 1972 amendment, the CPA provided that the party submitting a request should designate in the request a period, not less than 10 days, in which a response to the request was to be made. This matter is now dealt with in the rule itself (Code Ann. § 81A-136) rather than by a designation in the request. The amendment also removed the provision that the court could change the time for answering on 'motion and notice'; and presently, 'an ex parte application now is proper if it is made before the expiration of the period prescribed by the rule.' 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2257, p. 719 (1970).
The Wright and Miller analysis is that the court has power to allow additional time for answering even after the time fixed by the rule has expired, but once items have been admitted by failure to answer, 'it would seem that the test now stated in Rule 36b for withdrawal of admissions is tailored more precisely to the purposes of Rule 36 generally, and that the admission that otherwise would result from a failure to make timely answer should be avoided when to do so will aid in the presentation of the merits of the action and will not prejudice the party who made the request.' Id. We interpret that to mean that when 30 days have expired without answer or objection, then the requests are admitted subject only to requestee's opportunity under Code Ann. § 81A-136(b) on motion to have his admissions 'withdrawn' if he shows that such action will aid in the presentation of the merits and if the other party fails to show that he will be prejudiced. This 'withdrawal' of admissions upon a proper showing is a new remedy allowed to defaulting requestees. That, however,...
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