National Bank of Jacksonville v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 October 1896
• Citation: 38 Fla. 305,20 So. 931
• Parties: NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

20 So. 931

38 Fla. 305

NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE v. WILLIAMS et al.

Florida Supreme Court

October 20, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Suwannee county; John F. White, Judge.

Action by the National Bank of Jacksonville against Theodore Williams and others. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Every part of chapter 3747, Laws Fla. 1887 (being an act to protect mechanics, artisans, laborers, and material men, and to provide for the speedy collection of moneys due them for wages or material furnished), which was not included in the Revised Statutes of the state of Florida, which went into effect and operation June 13, 1892, or which was not recognized or continued in force by reference therein, was expressly repealed by the act adopting such Revised Statutes.

2. The provisions of chapter 3747, Laws Fla. 1887 (by which, under certain conditions, a lien was created, or attempted to be created, in favor of laborers upon sawmills, upon the interest of the owner having the absolute title to said mills where the labor was performed upon a contract with a party in possession, holding a less interest than such absolute title), not being included in the provisions of the Revised Statutes (sections 1727-1741) which cover the same subject-matter, are thereby repealed.

3. The lien in favor of a laborer upon sawmills, provided by the act (chapter 3747, Laws Fla. 1887), did not confer a substantive right upon the laborer, and forms no part of the obligation of the contract of employment. The right of the laborer to be paid for his services is not given by the act. The act merely provides the remedy,--the means by which the right may be made available.

4. A remedy that the legislature has created in derogation of the common law it can take away. No one can have a vested right in a particular remedy. Such a remedy forms no part of the essence of the contract, and, until perfected by proceedings whereby rights in the property sought to be subjected have become vested, is entirely within the control of the lawmaking power, in whose edict it originated.

5. The saving clause of the act adopting the Revised Statutes, to the effect that the repeal of any statute by said revision shall not affect any right accrued before such appeal, where it used the word 'right,' means a substantive right as distinguished from a remedy. It was not the intention of the legislature that the remedies by which such rights are given effect when omitted from such revision should remain in force.

6. Under the Revised Statutes, the lien of laborers upon sawmills, under chapter 3747, Laws Fla. 1887, in so far as it affects the limited interest of the party in possession, and with whom the contract of employment is made, is preserved and may still be enforced against such limited interest.

7. An equitable title of a party in possession of property under a contract of purchase, and which, upon the performance of the conditions of the contract of purchase, would ripen and mature into a good legal title, is subject to a statutory laborer's lien, and is liable to be sold thereunder.

8. Without deciding whether, under our general statutory policy the owner of the absolute interest in property can, under any circumstances, be estopped from setting up his ownership of the property against a lien thereon arising from a contract of a party in possession having less than the absolute interest, held, that such estoppel in pais cannot be invoked by laborers upon a sawmill against an owner who is not interested in the operation of such sawmill or in its output is guilty of no fraud or deceit upon the lien claimants, and who knew nothing of their employment, or that any labor had been performed by them, and such labor in no respect increases the value of the property upon which the lien is claimed.

COUNSEL A. J. Henry and J. C. Cooper, for appellant.

J. N. Stripling, for appellees.

OPINION

LIDDON, J.

The facts of this case which are necessary to be stated in passing upon the present appeal are as follows: On February 1, 1892, the appellant, the complainant below, was the owner and in possession of a certain parcel of land in Suwannee county, described in its bill of complaint, together with a certain steam sawmill and machinery located thereon. On said date the appellant entered into an executory written contract with a firm called Edge & Edwards, whereby it agreed to sell said property to said firm for $6,000, of which amount $500 was to be paid, and was paid, in cash, and the balance, of $5,500, was to be paid in monthly installments of $250, with interest. It was provided, in substance, by said contract, that, in case of the failure of said Edge & Edwards to pay any of said installments for 15 days after the maturity thereof, the contract of purchase should, at the option of the appellant, be forfeited and terminated, and that Edge & Edwards should forfeit all payments which in the meantime should have been made by them on the purchase price, and the appellant should have the right to re-enter and take possession of the same. Edge & Edwards immediately took possession in their own name, and for their own benefit operated the sawmill in the manufacture of lumber until about June 13, 1892. About said last-named date, Edge & Edwards having made default in the payment of two installments, the appellant exercised the option provided by said contract, and repossessed itself of the property. Afterwards, June 27, 1892, Edge & Edwards, acquiescing in such action of the appellant, executed to it a deed releasing and conveying the property to appellant. During the time that the property was in possession of Edge & Edwards, between February 1, 1892, and June 13, 1892, they employed various persons as laborers for the operation of said sawmill, and became indebted to said persons in various amounts which were due and unpaid. The appellant filed its bill of complaint in the court below, alleging in detail the facts above summarized, and (further summarizing the bill) that the said laborers who, together with Edge & Edwards, were made parties defendant to said bill of complaint, claimed liens for the respective amounts due them, under chapter 3747, Laws Fla. 1887, and were taking steps for the purpose of enforcing said liens upon appellant's property; that, if not enjoined, the defendants will proceed to sell said property for the satisfaction of their liens; that defendants are wholly insolvent; and that such a sale would be a cloud upon complainant's title. The bill prayed for an injunction against defendants' proceeding to enforce the liens, and a temporary injunction was granted.

The defendants who claimed the lien answered the bill of complaint. No question was made as to the sufficiency of the allegations of the bill to authorize a court of equity to grant the relief prayed for. Considering the allegations of the answer, it is alleged therein that, at the time of performing the labor in the operation of the sawmill, the appellees found Edge & Edwards in full management, possession, and control of the sawmill and lot of land upon which it stood, and openly and notoriously claiming and exercising acts of ownership over the same; and that defendants, at the time of performing the labor, honestly supposed Edge & Edwards to be the owners of the same, having no notice or knowledge to the contrary; that the written contract of sale of appellant to Edge & Edwards had not been recorded; that they relied upon the lien given by law as a security for the payment of their wages, and still claimed the benefit of said lien. Testimony was taken by both parties, and, on final hearing, the relief prayed for in the bill was denied, and the bill dismissed, from which the complainant in said bill (the appellant here) appealed.

From the proof taken, it appears that the appellant did not know except from a statement of the intention of Edge & Edwards to do so, that the sawmill was being operated, and only knew from a general knowledge that labor was necessary to operate the same; that any laborers were being employed by Edge & Edwards, or performing any labor for them. It had no knowledge of the persons performing such labor, or of anything being due such persons for the same. Neither appellant nor Edge & Edwards had posted any notice, as provided for in section 2 of chapter 3747 (Acts 1887, pp. 126, 127), stating what portion of the property, if any, is exempt from the lien of laborers. The bill of complaint admits that the laborer defendants acquired, by the performance of their labor, a lien upon whatever interest the defendants Edge & Edwards had in said property, but denies that they thereby acquired any lien upon the interest of appellant. The appellees claim a lien under section 2 of chapter 3747, supra, which reads as follows: 'That any person or persons who shall perform any labor upon, or for the benefit of, any railroad, canal, telegraph or telephone company, wharf, mill, distillery or other manufactory, whether in the construction, repairing or operating thereof, shall have a lien of superior dignity upon such railroad, canal, telegraph or telephone lines, appurtenances and properties thereof, wharf, mill, distillery or other manufactory, together with the owner's, lessee's or operator's interest in the lot or land upon which they stand, together with all franchises, machinery and equipments, to the extent of the value of any labor performed thereon or therefor, whether such labor was performed for the owner or his agents, or for a contractor or subcontractor, or a lessee or operator: provided, that said lien shall only apply to the interest of the lessee or operator of sawmills, unless the lessor, by virtue of a lease,...