National Broiler Council v. Voss, s. 94-15676

• Decision Date: 14 December 1994
• Docket Number: 94-15690,Nos. 94-15676,s. 94-15676
• Citation: 44 F.3d 740
• Parties: NATIONAL BROILER COUNCIL; American Meat Institute; Arkansas Poultry Federation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Henry J. VOSS, Director, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Defendant-Appellant. NATIONAL BROILER COUNCIL; American Meat Institute; Arkansas Poultry Federation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Henry J. VOSS, Director, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Defendant, and The California Poultry Industry Federation, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 740

44 F.3d 740

63 USLW 2385

NATIONAL BROILER COUNCIL; American Meat Institute;

Arkansas Poultry Federation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Henry J. VOSS, Director, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Defendant-Appellant.

NATIONAL BROILER COUNCIL; American Meat Institute;

Arkansas Poultry Federation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Henry J. VOSS, Director, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Defendant, and The California Poultry Industry Federation,

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant.

Nos. 94-15676, 94-15690.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 7, 1994.

Decided Dec. 14, 1994.

Randall B. Christison, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, CA, for defendant-appellant.

William A. Bradford, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, DC, Harry E. Hull, Jr., McDonough, Holland & Allen, Sacramento, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Harvey I. Saferstein, Irell & Manella, Los Angeles, CA, for intervenor.

Michael S. Raab, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for U.S. as amicus curiae.

Mary Ellen Fise, Washington, DC, for Consumer Federation of America as amicus curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before: GOODWIN, NORRIS and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The State of California appeals a summary judgment declaring that the labeling provision of Sec. 26661 of the California Food & Agricultural Code is pre-empted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act ("PPIA"), 21 U.S.C. Secs. 451-470, 851 F.Supp. 1461. Section The district court held that: (1) the PPIA pre-empts the labeling provision of Sec. 26661; and (2) the labeling provision was not severable from the remaining provisions of Sec. 26661. We agree with the district court that the labeling provision of Sec. 26661 is pre-empted, but disagree on the issue of severability. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment order in part and reverse in part.

                26661(a)(2) prohibits wholesalers from using the word "fresh" on labels for poultry and poultry products unless the poultry has been stored at temperatures at or above 26 degrees. 1  The PPIA regulates the distribution and sale of poultry and poultry products and contains an express pre-emption clause.  It declares that "marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements (or storage or handling requirements found by the Secretary to unduly interfere with the free flow of poultry products in commerce) in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State...."  21 U.S.C. Sec. 467e (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs, three poultry and meat trade associations, brought this action claiming, inter alia, that Sec. 26661(a)(2) is pre-empted by the PPIA
                

I

PRE-EMPTION

We affirm the district court's decision that the labeling provision of Sec. 26661 is pre-empted by the PPIA on the basis of the court's Memorandum of Decision and Order (April 8, 1994), which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

A

"Plaintiffs and the USDA argue that the California Act imposes a "labeling requirement" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 467e because it limits the use of the word "fresh" on poultry product labels. Drawing a distinction between "requirements" and "prohibitions," defendant argues that the California Act does not establish a "labeling requirement" because it does not require poultry producers affirmatively to include specified language on the label, but merely prohibits them from labeling poultry as "fresh" unless it complies with the Act."

"Defendant's interpretation of "labeling requirements" is hypertechnical and inconsistent with the language and purpose of the PPIA. ² First, the term "requirements" ordinarily includes prohibitory obligations. ³ One can be, and often is, required not to do something, and there is no practical difference between a command that requires that the opposite of an action be taken--"you are required to be quiet"--as opposed to one that prohibits the very action--"talking is prohibited." Either form of expression fairly is described as a requirement, requiring action or inaction. Here in mandatory language the California Act requires that the term "fresh" only may be placed on the label in certain circumstances."

"Second, the language of several provisions of the PPIA indicates that Congress did not intend a distinction between "requirements" and "prohibitions." For example, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 459, entitled "Compliance by all establishments," provides that "[n]o establishment ... shall process any poultry or poultry product except in compliance with the requirements of this chapter." Similarly "Third, a construction of the term "requirements" to exclude prohibitory enactments would nullify the PPIA's pre-emption clause. Under defendant's interpretation, so long as a state used prohibitory phrasing, state labeling regulations would not be pre-empted even if in direct conflict with affirmative federal requirements under the PPIA. ⁵ A narrow interpretation of "requirements," to exclude prohibitions, entirely defeats the pre-emption clause and would leave labeling regulation within the power of the states. Yet according to the legislative history of the pre-emption clause, one of its key purposes was to ensure national uniformity in labeling:

                Sec. 467e gives the states concurrent jurisdiction with the USDA to prevent the distribution of adulterated or misbranded articles "consistent with the requirements under this chapter."   Surely Congress did not intend to allow official establishments and states, in performing the tasks delegated to them under the PPIA, to heed only the affirmative, but not the prohibitory, portions of the statute.  Given this use of the term "requirements" elsewhere in the PPIA (including another clause of Sec. 467e), the word "requirements," as used in the pre-emption clause, should be construed to include prohibitory enactments.  See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, ----, 112 S.Ct. 515, 519, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991);  Mississippi Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir.1993). 4  "
                

States would be precluded from imposing additional or different labeling ... requirements for federally inspected products.

Both industry and consumers would benefit from ... greater uniformity of labeling requirements....

H.R.Rep. No. 1333, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3426, 3442."

"Finally, there is little force to defendant's argument that in other legislative schemes Congress expressly has pre-empted both requirements and prohibitions and thus by negative inference only intended here to pre-empt requirements. Defendant particularly relies on the pre-emption provision in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1331-1340 (the "Smoking Act"), which pre-empts any "requirement or prohibition" inconsistent with the Smoking Act. Id. Sec. 1334(b). But this same argument has been convincingly rejected in the context of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), which has a pre-emption clause similar to that in the PPIA. See Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir.1993) (" '[n]o requirements or prohibitions' is just another way of saying a '[s]tate shall not impose ... any requirements.' Not even the most dedicated hair-splitter "For all of these reasons, the court concludes that the term "requirements" in the PPIA pre-emption clause unambiguously includes prohibitory enactments. It follows that the California Act imposes a "labeling requirement" within the meaning of Sec. 467e."

could distinguish these statements."); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.) ("Although the words employed in Sec. 136v(b) of FIFRA are different from those in ... the ... Smoking Act, their effect is the same."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 60, 126 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993); see also Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir.) (as to the Medical Device Amendments of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "MDA"): "It would be anomalous to interpret the MDA differently from the [Smoking Act] solely on the basis that while they both employ 'requirement,' the MDA omits 'prohibition.' "), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 86, 126 L.Ed.2d 54 (1993). Congress uses a variety of similar formulations when enacting broad pre-emption clauses, and there is no indication in the PPIA, or in the other statutes with similar pre-emption clauses, that Congress intends substantive differences to flow from minor wording changes in these various clauses. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 678 (Federal Meat and Inspection Act) ("addition[al]" or "different" state "requirements"); 7 U.S.C. Sec. 136v(b) (FIFRA) (same); 21 U.S.C. Sec. 360k(a) (the MDA) (same); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4846 (Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1973) (pre-empting state laws which "provide for a requirement, prohibition or standard which differs from" federal law); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392(d) (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) (pre-empting state provisions "not identical to the Federal standard")."

B

"If the California Act imposes a "labeling requirement" within the meaning of Sec. 467e, it is at least "in addition to ... those [labeling requirements] made under the PPIA." 21 U.S.C. Sec. 467e. No party disputes the fact that plaintiffs' members can label poultry products that have been chilled between 1 and 25 degrees Fahrenheit as "fresh" and comply with all federal labeling requirements but not comply with the California Act. Nevertheless, defendant contends that "in addition to" has a meaning in this context other than its normal meaning and thus that the California Act is not pre-empted by the "in addition to" language of the PPIA."

"Defendant first argues that "in addition to" should be distinguished from "identical to," which is the language used in the pre-emption clause in the...