National Coalit. for Students with Disabi. v. Bush

• Citation: 173 F.Supp.2d 1272
• Decision Date: 27 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 4:00CV442-RH.,4:00CV442-RH.
• Parties: NATIONAL COALITION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jeb BUSH, etc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

173 F.Supp.2d 1272

NATIONAL COALITION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jeb BUSH, etc., et al., Defendants.

No. 4:00CV442-RH.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

November 27, 2001.

Bruce Alexander Minnick, John Alexander Minnick, Bruce A Minnick PA, Michael J. Beattie, National Coalition Students with Disabilities, Fairfax, VA, Thomas Robert Moore, Tom R. Moore PA, Tallahassee, FL, for National Coalition for Students with Disabilities Education and Legal Defense Fund, Erica Tracy, Suzanne Clark, and Derron Frazier.

George N. Meros, Jr., Gray Harris & Robinson PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Jeb Bush.

Alvin F. Linsay, III, Walter James Harvey, Steel Hector & Davis, Miami, FL, for Katherine Harris and Clay Roberts.

ORDER ON ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES

HINKLE, District Judge.

In this action under the National Voter Registration Act, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, under which two of the defendants agreed to a meaningful but comparatively minor portion of the relief plaintiffs had sought, and the issue of attorney's fees was explicitly left open. With the concurrence of those two defendants, a final judgment was entered, under which they were ordered to abide by the Settlement Agreement, jurisdiction was retained to enforce the Settlement Agreement, and the issue of attorney's fees was left open.

In accordance with the Local Rule bifurcating attorney's fee proceedings into separate stages of liability and amount, plaintiffs now have moved for a determination that they are entitled to an award of fees, under the National Voter Registration Act's "prevailing party" attorney's fee provision. Because plaintiffs obtained a court order that altered their legal relationship with two defendants in a meaningful way, I grant the motion, as against those two defendants. That the relief obtained was comparatively minor is a factor that will be considered in determining the amount of fees to be awarded but does not bar the recovery of fees altogether.

Background

Plaintiffs are disabled individuals and an association that represents them. They filed a class action complaint on November 27, 2000, in the midst of the 2000 presidential election litigation frenzy. Plaintiffs alleged that three named plaintiffs did not register or vote in that election as a result of violations of the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg, which addresses, among other things, registration of voters with disabilities. Plaintiffs named as defendants Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Secretary of State Katherine Harris, Director of the Division of Elections Clay Roberts, and various "John Doe" defendants.

Plaintiffs sought to block certification of the November 2000 Florida election for President, to compel a new special election for President at which disabled persons who did not vote on November 7 would be allowed to vote, to require defendants and other Florida authorities to make specified changes in Florida voter registration procedures, and, more generally, to require defendants and others "to undertake immediate affirmative steps to come into compliance with all provisions of the NVRA, immediately." Complaint (document 6) at 28 ¶ C. Plaintiffs moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order blocking certification or other action to confirm the results of the 2000 presidential election until plaintiffs were allowed to vote. The motion was denied.

Plaintiffs then filed an amended class action complaint reiterating plaintiffs' claims under the NVRA and adding a count, presumably under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging other constitutional and statutory violations. The amended complaint still sought the same relief as well as a $2,500 monetary award for each class member payable from the defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs failed to file a timely motion for class certification, and the action proceeded solely as an individual action.

On April 30, 2001, Governor Bush filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 1, 2001, Ms. Harris and Mr. Roberts filed a motion for summary judgment. They asserted among other things, that plaintiffs had failed to give defendants advance notice and an opportunity to cure as required by the NVRA as a condition precedent to the filing of a lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-9(b)(1) & (2).

On May 3, 2001, prior to any response by plaintiffs to the motions for summary judgment or any ruling thereon, plaintiffs filed a "Request for Court Approval of Settlement," with an attached Settlement Agreement signed by counsel for all parties. The Settlement Agreement required the Florida Department of State Division of Elections (which was under the supervision of Mr. Roberts and ultimately Ms. Harris) to provide certain information and training to other Florida public entities regarding the requirements of the NVRA. The Settlement Agreement noted that plaintiffs intended to seek an award of attorney's fees and costs and reserved to defendants the right to contest any such award. The Settlement Agreement included no admission of liability, required mutual releases of all claims, and called for dismissal with prejudice of all claims other than plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees and costs.

By Order To Show Cause docketed May 7, 2001, I directed the parties to show cause why defendants' pending motions for summary judgment should not be denied as moot and to show cause why judgment should not be entered (1) requiring the parties to abide by the Settlement Agreement, (2) dismissing with prejudice all claims except plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees and costs, and (3) reserving jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.

Inexplicably, plaintiffs responded to the Order To Show Cause by requesting further relief, over and above that called for by the Settlement Agreement, including appointment of the plaintiff association as the court's "monitor" to oversee compliance with the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs also sought to preserve their claim for monetary relief, asserting that that claim had not been relinquished, despite the clear language of the Settlement Agreement to the contrary.

Ms. Harris and Mr. Roberts responded to the Order To Show Cause by stating that their motion for summary judgment was indeed moot and that dismissal of the action was appropriate. They took no issue with the terms of the court's proposed judgment, as set forth in the Order To Show Cause. Governor Bush responded to the Order To Show Cause by stating that the court's proposed judgment "accurately reflects the parties' [Settlement] Agreement." (Document 108 at 2.)

By order entered May 30, 2001, over plaintiffs' objections but with the consent of (or at least without objection from) the defendants, I directed the clerk to enter judgment in precisely the form proposed in the Order To Show Cause. The order of May 30, 2001, stated:

1. Defendants' motions for summary judgment (documents 90 and 95) are denied as moot.

2. The clerk shall enter judgment providing as follows:

The parties shall abide by their settlement agreement. All claims are dismissed with prejudice except plaintiffs' claims for an award of attorney's fees and costs. The court reserves jurisdiction to enforce the order requiring the parties to abide by their settlement agreement and to consider an award of attorney's fees and costs.

3. The clerk shall close the file.

Order of May 30, 2001 (document 106) at 3-4. The clerk entered judgment accordingly. (Document 107.)¹

Plaintiffs now have filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs. In accordance with Local Rule 54.1, which bifurcates attorney's fee proceedings into the issues of liability and amount, plaintiffs' motion presents only the issue of liability for attorney's fees, not the issue of amount.

Merits

In cases arising under the National Voter Registration Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c), as in cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain other civil rights statutes, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court "may" award the "prevailing party" a reasonable attorney's fee. Although these attorney's fee provisions speak in discretionary terms, a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to an award of fees, unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968); Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.1980).

Whether plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" in the case at bar depends upon first, whether the parties' voluntary Settlement Agreement, coupled with the judgment requiring the parties to abide by the agreement and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, is sufficient to render plaintiffs prevailing parties, even though the court resolved no contested issue and made no ruling in plaintiffs' favor, and second, if so, whether the comparatively minor relief obtained by the plaintiffs through the Settlement Agreement is sufficient to render them prevailing parties. Ms. Harris and Mr. Roberts also raise a third issue: whether fees should be denied because of plaintiffs' alleged failure to provide defendants with advance notice and an opportunity to cure as required by the NVRA as a condition precedent to the filing of a lawsuit to enforce the NVRA's provisions. This order addresses each of these issues in turn.

I

The first issue is whether the Settlement Agreement, coupled with the judgment requiring the parties to abide by and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement, is sufficient to establish "prevailing party" status. The leading case on this issue is now Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Before addressing that decision, however, some background is in order.

Prior to Buckhannon, the law seemed clear that a plaintiff "prevailed" and thus could...