National Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Yeo

• Decision Date: 26 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-0753.,03-0753.
• Citation: 171 S.W.3d 863
• Parties: NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitioners, v. Joscelin YEO, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

171 S.W.3d 863

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, et al., Petitioners, v. Joscelin YEO, Respondent.

No. 03-0753.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued January 4, 2005.

Decided August 26, 2005.

Susan Bradshaw, University of Texas at Austin, Legal Affairs, John F. Morehead,

Asst Atty. Gen., Robert B. O'Keefe, Greg Abbott, Atty. Gen., Barry Ross McBee, Rafael Edward Cruz, Jeffrey S. Boyd, Thompson & Knight, Robert B. O'Keefe, Don Wayne Cruse Jr., Asst. Solicitor Gen., Edward D. Burbach, Austin, Kevin Scott Mullen, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP, Dallas, Catherine Christine Cobb Worth, Austin, for University of Texas.

Jose E. De La Fuente, Mark Ryan Trachtenberg and Charles G. Orr, Haynes & Boone, LLP, Houston, W. Wade Porter, Allensworth & Porter, LLP, Austin, Linda J. Salfrank and Jonathan F. Duncan, Spencer Fane Britt & Browns, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for National Collegiate Athletic.

Diane M. Henson, Henson Law Firm, Karl Bayer, Law Office of Karl Bayer, Robert Green Hargrove, Austin, for respondent.

Warren W. Harris, Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP, Houston, Amicus Curiae for American Council on Education.

Justice HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice JEFFERSON, Justice O'NEILL, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice BRISTER, Justice MEDINA, Justice GREEN and Justice JOHNSON joined.

Construing the Texas Constitution's guarantee of due course of law,¹ we held twenty years ago in Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, like "the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions" construing other constitutional guarantees of due process, that "students do not possess a constitutionally protected interest in their participation in extracurricular activities."² We have endorsed the rule in Stamos twice since.³ Respondent nevertheless contends that because of her unique situation as "the most decorated athlete in the history of the Republic of Singapore", to disqualify her from participating in an intercollegiate swimming competition would deprive her of protected property and liberty interests in her reputation and existing and future financial opportunities in violation of the Texas Constitution. The lower courts agreed, distinguishing this case from Stamos.⁴ We conclude that the rule in Stamos applies and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that respondent take nothing.

When Coach Michael Walker recruited Joscelin Yeo, a high school student in the Republic of Singapore, to enroll at the University of California at Berkeley, she had already achieved fame in her country as a swimmer. At Berkeley, she won numerous All-American awards and was a member of a world-record-setting relay team in 1999.

Before the 2000-2001 school year, Walker left Berkeley for the University of Texas at Austin ("UT-Austin"). He was helping coach the Singapore Olympic team, of which Yeo was a member, and she went with him to UT-Austin. Berkeley and UT-Austin are both members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), which prescribes rules for determining the eligibility of student athletes to engage in competition. A member that violates these rules is subject to sanctions. NCAA rules generally prohibit a student who transfers from one four-year member institution to another from participating in intercollegiate athletic competitions for one full academic year,⁵ but this restriction may be waived under certain circumstances if the former institution does not object.⁶ Berkeley refused to waive the restriction, and thus Yeo was ineligible to compete at UT-Austin for an academic year.

As permitted by NCAA rules, Yeo did not enroll in classes for the fall semester of 2000 in order to compete in the Olympics.⁷ In compliance with the one-year restriction, she did not participate in intercollegiate events during that semester or the spring semester, when she was enrolled in classes. UT-Austin mistakenly believed that Yeo's first semester had counted toward satisfying the restriction and that she was free to engage in competition beginning the fall semester of 2001. After Yeo competed in four events, Berkeley complained to the NCAA. UT-Austin confessed its error and agreed that Yeo would sit out the remainder of the semester, but the NCAA required that she not participate in the first four events the following spring, to match the four events in which she had been disqualified. Yeo did not know of UT-Austin's discussions with the NCAA and simply did as UT-Austin told her.

UT-Austin then added three swimming events at the beginning of its spring semester schedule. After Yeo had sat out those events and a fourth one, UT-Austin allowed her to rejoin the swim team, but Berkeley again complained, arguing that the added events could not be used to satisfy the one-year restriction. NCAA staff agreed and on March 6 issued a decision that Yeo not participate in the next three regularly scheduled events, including the 2002 NCAA women's swimming and diving championship on March 22. UT-Austin immediately appealed the staff decision to the NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee ("the SARC"), and a telephonic hearing was scheduled for the next day. For the first time, UT-Austin told Yeo of the problem and advised her simply to plea for sympathy. She did, but at the conclusion of the hearing, the SARC upheld the staff decision.

At UT-Austin's suggestion, Yeo then obtained legal counsel, who persuaded Berkeley on March 15 to waive Yeo's one-year restriction, something it had refused to do before. Counsel moved the SARC to reconsider, especially in light of this development, but it refused.

On March 20, Yeo sued UT-Austin and its vice president for institutional relations and legal affairs, Patricia Ohlendorf, to enjoin them from disqualifying her from competing in the championship meet two days later and for a declaration that UT-Austin had denied her procedural due process as guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. That same day, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order granting Yeo the injunctive relief requested. On March 21, the NCAA intervened in the action, but Yeo moved to strike the intervention, and after a hearing later that day, the trial court granted Yeo's motion. The next morning, the NCAA sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals, and UT-Austin appealed from the temporary restraining order. That afternoon, the court of appeals denied the petition for mandamus⁸ and dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.⁹ Yeo competed in the championship meet.

In November 2002, after a trial to the bench, the trial court rendered judgment for Yeo, declaring that UT-Austin had denied Yeo procedural due process guaranteed by the Texas Constitution, thereby depriving her of protected liberty and property interests. The court permanently enjoined UT-Austin from declaring Yeo ineligible in the future without affording her due process and from punishing her for participating in past competitions, including the 2002 women's championship. The trial court also awarded Yeo $164,755.50 in attorney fees through an appeal to this Court.

The NCAA appealed from the order striking its intervention, and UT-Austin appealed from the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.¹⁰ We granted the NCAA's and UT-Austin's petitions for review.¹¹

Since the championship meet in March 2002, Yeo has, of course, moved on. When briefs were filed in this case, we were told that Yeo had graduated from UT-Austin, received a Rhodes Scholarship, and ended her college swimming career. But none of the parties argues that the case has become moot, because the injunction prevents the NCAA from imposing retroactive sanctions under its "Restitution Rule".¹² We agree that the case is not moot.¹³

We first consider whether Yeo has an interest protected by due course of law under article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. In so doing, we look as usual to cases construing the federal constitutional guarantee of due process as persuasive authority.¹⁴ The parties have not identified any difference between the state and federal guarantees material to the issues in this case.

Yeo does not challenge our holding in Stamos that a student has no interest in participating in extracurricular activities that is protected by the Texas Constitution's guarantee of due course of law.¹⁵ Nor does she dispute that under NCAA rules, she was ineligible to participate in the 2002 NCAA women's swimming and diving championship. Yeo argues that she was entitled to notice and a meaningful hearing before NCAA rules were applied to her because of her unique reputation and earning potential. Had she been disqualified from competing in the championship meet, she contends, people would have suspected that it was for her own misconduct and not for UT-Austin's mistakes in attempting to comply with NCAA rules. Yeo acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has held that reputation alone is not a protected liberty or property interest.¹⁶ But it is the degree of her interests, Yeo contends, and not merely their character, that bring them within constitutional protection. A student-athlete with a lesser reputation or less certain of her earning potential, she concedes, would not have the same rights. The court of appeals agreed:

In connection with the permanent injunction, the trial court made several material findings of fact that are essentially unchallenged: (1) Yeo had already established a world-class reputation and her "good name, outstanding reputation, high standing in her community, her unblemished integrity and honor are particularly important in the Republic of Singapore and in light of her cultural background"; (2) if NCAA rules did not prohibit athletes from accepting professional compensation while competing in NCAA sanctioned events, Yeo "would be immediately eligible to capitalize on her public persona by entering into lucrative endorsement and marketing opportunities as well as being eligible for prize...