National Cored Forgings Co. v. United States

Decision Date07 June 1955
Docket NumberNo. 50420.,50420.
Citation132 F. Supp. 454,132 Ct. Cl. 11
PartiesNATIONAL CORED FORGINGS CO., Inc., and Marloch Manufacturing Corporation v. The UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Claims Court

David Cobb, Washington, D. C., Cobb & Weissbrodt, Washington, D. C., on the briefs, for plaintiffs.

Bruce G. Sundlun, Washington, D. C., Warren E. Burger, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and LITTLETON, WHITAKER, MADDEN and LARAMORE, Judges.

LARAMORE, Judge.

The plaintiffs sue to recover $309,799.29 as damages for breach of their contract with the defendant, or in the alternative, for fair compensation under section 17(a) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 665, 41 U.S.C. § 117 (1946 Ed.), 41 U.S.C.A. § 117(a), for services rendered without a formal contract, and as a third alternative, the plaintiffs seek reformation of an agreement in writing on the ground of mutual mistake and of misrepresentations by the defendant and for damages for breach of the agreement as reformed.

Plaintiff National Cored Forgings Company, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as National), is successor by change of name to the Greenport Basin and Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as Greenport). Plaintiff Marloch Manufacturing Company (hereinafter referred to as Marloch) was incorporated in the State of New York in 1946, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Greenport. In the course of its dissolution in 1947, all of Marloch's assets, including the claims here asserted, were transferred to Greenport.

At the close of World War II there was a very serious housing shortage, sharply accentuated by the large number of veterans then returning to civilian life. In an effort to alleviate this shortage, Congress passed the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 207, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1821 et seq. (1946 Ed.), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1821 et seq. Section 12 of the Act provided that the powers vested in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RFC) might be used to underwrite or guarantee markets for new type building materials and prefabricated houses, but only to the extent that the Housing Expediter1 found this necessary to assure a sufficient supply for the veterans' emergency housing program. This section also contained the standards to be applied by the Housing Expediter to such underwriting or guaranty.

We are here concerned with a controversy growing out of a contract entered into pursuant to the market guarantee program established by section 12 of the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act, supra.

The facts which are not disputed may for purposes of this decision be summarized as follows: Pursuant to a directive of the Office of the Housing Expediter (hereinafter referred to as OHE) issued under section 12 of the Act, the RFC entered into a market guarantee contract with General Houses, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as General Houses), an Illinois corporation, for the production of 2,000 prefabricated housing units by the end of 1947. The contract, dated February 7, 1947, contained a provision that the RFC would purchase from General Houses, at a price to be determined in accordance with a formula contained in the contract, the prefabricated houses not otherwise sold by General Houses.

General Houses was unable to get into production under the contract, and in early March of 1947 it approached Marloch and entered into an informal arrangement whereby Marloch would manufacture the houses at its plant with its own funds, and General Houses would act as selling agent for Marloch. This arrangement was contingent upon obtaining the Government's consent.

Thereafter meetings were held with representatives of the OHE and RFC for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the Government. As a prerequisite to entering into production of the houses Marloch indicated that it desired a transfer to it of the market guarantee contract. The OHE official who had been instrumental in negotiating the market guarantee contract expressed his approval of the new arrangement. OHE stated that an assignment of the market guarantee agreement could be made, but that the detailed administrative procedure required would take several weeks and perhaps months. OHE counsel suggested an assignment of the moneys due or to become due under the contract as a satisfactory method of affording Marloch the basic protection of the market guarantee agreement. This method met with approval and Marloch was requested to, and did, begin production immediately.

Pursuant to the oral arrangements with the Government reached at the meeting, Marloch and General Houses executed an instrument in writing dated March 14, 1947, whereby Marloch agreed to produce the 2,000 houses and General Houses agreed to sell them. On March 27, 1947, Marloch and General Houses executed an assignment under which Marloch agreed to perform all of the obligations of General Houses under the market guarantee contract. In the instrument the RFC was requested, directed, and authorized to pay to Marloch any or all moneys due or to become due from RFC to General Houses pursuant to the contract, but General Houses was to remain liable to RFC under the terms of the contract to the same extent as if the assignment had not been made. This instrument was a standard RFC form assignment of moneys due which was modified and adapted by an employee of RFC and then submitted to Marloch and General Houses for execution. The terms of the March 27 instrument were accepted and approved by RFC.

Marloch completed its first houses in May of 1947, and by June its plant was geared to produce at the rate of 20 units per day. It had no orders to fill because General Houses had not been able to obtain orders.

Marloch became compelled to seek additional financing. The bank to which it went indicated a willingness to make a loan directly to Greenport, Marloch's parent company, upon the collateral of the market guarantee contract. Marloch consulted legal counsel as to the procedures for transferring the contract from it to Greenport, and was apprised that the assignment of March 27 might have been ineffective to give Marloch the market guarantee protection it thought it had obtained.

Marloch then sought a meeting with the Government officials in charge of the market guarantee program. At a meeting held in July of 1947, OHE gave consideration to transferring the General Houses' market guarantee contract to plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter, however, the Government representative took the position that Marloch did not have a contract with the Government, and despite Marloch's urgings, this position was consistently maintained. Marloch discontinued production and liquidated the prefabricated housing enterprise.

Claims were then filed against the OHE and the RFC under section 17 of the Contract Settlement Act, supra. The claims were denied whereupon they were appealed to the Appeal Board of the Office of Contract Settlement. The Board granted a motion of OHE to dismiss the appeal as to it because OHE was not a "contracting agency" within the definition of section 3(g) of the Contract Settlement Act, supra, 41 U.S.C.A. § 103(g), and held that Marloch had not proceeded "without a formal contract" within the meaning of section 17(a) of the Act. National Cored Forgings Co., Inc. v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 5 App.Bd. OCS No. 353.

Plaintiff thereafter timely filed a petition in this court on November 20, 1951.

On the same day that the petition was filed in this court, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting there the same claims here involved, against the RFC alone, in its corporate capacity and in its own behalf. Plaintiffs and the RFC have filed a stipulation for stay of proceedings in the District Court until final action has been taken by this court.

On January 18, 1952, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' petition on the ground that since plaintiffs had pending in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia another suit seeking the same relief on the same claim, this court had no jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1500 (1946 Ed.), quoted infra. After oral argument, the motion to dismiss was overruled by an order dated May 6, 1952. Defendant then filed an answer to the petition in which it asserted as special defenses (1) the failure of the petition to state a cause of action, (2) the lack of jurisdiction in this court on the ground relied on in its motion to dismiss, and (3) that under the provisions of section 13(b) (2) of the Contract Settlement Act, 41 U.S.C.A. § 113(b) (2), this court had no jurisdiction over suits where the RFC was the contracting agency. Defendant also set forth as an affirmative defense that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Contract Settlement Act since the petition showed that plaintiffs had not met the requirements of section 17(a) of the Act.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the special defenses on the ground that they were insufficient. Defendant then filed an answer to plaintiffs' motion to strike and a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On September 30, 1953, this court rendered a decision overruling defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and striking the defenses of failure of the petition to state a cause of action under the general jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction in this court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1500 (1946 Ed.), and remanded the case for a hearing. National Cored Forgings Co., Inc., v. United States, 115 F.Supp. 469, 126 Ct.Cl. 250.

In striking defendant's defense under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, this court followed First National Steamship Company v. United States, 90 Ct.Cl. 632. In that case the petitioner had a suit pending in the District Court against the Fleet Corporation in its corporate capacity and was suing the United States in this court on the same...

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    ...of Claims holds otherwise, contrary to defendant's claims. Cases like British American, 89 Ct. Cl. 428 (1939), and National Cored Forgings, 132 F. Supp. 454 (Ct. Cl. 1955), did not discuss the sequence of filings in dismissing suits involving claims that were also involved in district court......
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