National Farmers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Norwood

• Citation: 363 P.2d 681,147 Colo. 283
• Decision Date: 24 July 1961
• Docket Number: No. 19312,19312
• Parties: NATIONAL FARMERS UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Rocky Mountain Empire Insurance Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Gloria Marguerite NORWOOD, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 681

363 P.2d 681

147 Colo. 283

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Rocky

Mountain Empire Insurance Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Gloria Marguerite NORWOOD, Defendant in Error.

No. 19312.

Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department.

July 24, 1961.

Lowell White, Walter A. Steele, Denver, for plaintiff in error Nat. Farmers Union Life Ins. Co.

Charles E. Grover, Richard B. Harvey, Denver, for plaintiff in error Rocky Mountain Empire Ins. Co.

Samuel Chutkow, Noah A. Atler, Edward I. Haligman, Denver, Thompson & Ozman, Yuma, for defendant in error.

McWILLIAMS, Justice.

George Norwood, age 37, husband of the plaintiff, father of four children, died on January 25, 1957 at St. Joseph's Hospital in Denver, Colorado from gunshot wounds in the head and chest. The present litigation stems from his untimely death. The ultimate question to be resolved is whether this death was accidental, suicidal, or homicidal and the immediate question is whether the record as made in the trial court poses only a controverted issue of fact to be resolved by the jury or presents a matter of law which should have been resolved by the court.

At the time of his death George Norwood, as the assured, held a policy of life insurance with National Farmers Union Life Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Farmers Union) in the principal sum of $5,000, said policy also containing a so-called double indemnity provision applicable in the event of accidental death. George Norwood also had in force at the time of his death an accident insurance policy with Rocky Mountain Empire Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Rocky Mountain), which provided for payment of $2,500 upon the accidental death of the assured. Gloria Norwood, the surviving widow, was sole beneficiary under both policies.

On September 16, 1957 Gloria Norwood brought suit against Farmers Union, alleging that Farmers Union not only owed her $5,000, representing the principal sum called for by the policy, but also owed the additional sum of $5,000, under the following provision of the insurance policy:

'If the Insured hereunder, while this Policy is in full force and effect, suffers loss of life independent of all other causes than the direct result of bodily injury which was affected solely through accidental means, as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body or internal injuries revealed by an autopsy, and the date of occurrence of such injury is not more than ninety (90) days prior to the date of death, the Company will, upon receipt of due proof of such loss, subject to all the provisions of this Policy and to the conditions hereof, pay to the Beneficiary or Beneficiaries hereunder an amount equal to the sum Insured under this Policy, as defined on its face, such payment to be in addition to any amount which may otherwise be due.'

Claim was also made under this policy for certain dividend deposits and premium refunds allegedly due.

In a separate complaint filed September 16, 1957 Gloria Norwood sued Rocky Mountain, alleging that under its policy Rocky Mountain owed $2,500, its policy insuring against loss of life resulting 'directly and exclusively of all other causes from Accidental Bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy and Occurring Within Ninety Days After The Date of Such Injury.'

By its answer Farmers Union admitted that the sum of $6,586.99 was due and owing plaintiff, such sum representing the principal amount called for by the policy and dividends then on deposit plus premium refunds, which it allegedly had theretofore tendered to plaintiff and which had been refused. It denied that an additional $5,000 was due and owing under the double indemnity clause and in support thereof alleged that its policy with the assured also provided:

'* * * 4. This Additional Benefit shall not apply if the Insured's death * * * (b) results directly or indirectly from any of the following causes: * * * (2) Self destruction, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat, or any intentionally self-inflicted injury.'

As an affirmative defense it was averred that George Norwood on January 24, 1957 intentionally shot himself twice in the chest and once in the head and that his death resulted from intentionally self-inflicted wounds and not from accidental means.

The answer of Rocky Mountain parallels that of Farmers Union and in essence alleges that the death of George Norwood was not 'accidental' but was suicidal and as such specifically excluded by the policy.

These separate actions were consolidated for trial. Upon trial it was stipulated that the two policies above referred to were in full force and effect as of the date of the death of George Norwood and that notice of death and claims were filed within the time provided by the policies. It was further stipulated that 'the decedent, George Norwood, came to his death on the 25th of January, 1957, in Denver, Colorado, while a resident of the County of Yuma, State of Colorado, as a result of gunshot wounds suffered on the 24th of January, 1957, on his farm in the County of Yuma, State of Colorado.'

Pursuant to C.R.S. '53, 66-8-6 and 24 plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the State of Colorado Standard Certificate of Death. Over vigorous objection this certificate was received in evidence and read to the jury. In this certificate the declarant, who was the chief deputy coroner for the City and County of Denver, in response to 'Describe How Injury Occurred' wrote: 'Accidentally shot while hunting alone.' At this stage of the proceedings plaintiff rested. Motions to dismiss interposed by each defendant were denied. Thereafter defendants called some four witnesses and plaintiff in rebuttal also called four. The testimony of these witnesses will be analyzed in considerable detail later. Suffice it to say that at the conclusion of the evidence defendants' motions for a directed verdict were denied and the case was submitted to the jury, which returned verdicts for the plaintiff against each defendant. Judgments were entered for plaintiff against Farmers Union in the amount of $11,586.99 and against Rocky Mountain for $2,500. Motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts were denied, and defendants are here by writ of error seeking reversal of these judgments.

Defendants' first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants at the conclusion of all the evidence. The position of the defending insurance companies is that the undisputed evidence, and particularly the undisputed physical facts attendant upon the death of George Norwood, show conclusively that he died as a result of intentionally (not accidentally) self-inflicted wounds.

We are persuaded that defendants are correct in this contention and that the trial court should have held as a matter of law that George Norwood did not die as a result of external, violent and accidental means, but on the contrary died from gunshot wounds which were intentionally self-inflicted. In order to demonstrate this error of the trial court it becomes necessary to analyze the evidence in some detail.

As was mentioned above, it was stipulated at the outset that the two policies of insurance with which we are here concerned were in full force and effect as of the date of George Norwood's death and also that George Norwood died in Denver on January 25, 1957 as a result of gunshot wounds suffered by him on January 24, 1957 on his farm, located in Yuma County. The only other evidence produced by plaintiff in her case in chief was the introduction of a certified copy of the death certificate of George Norwood, which carried the notation made by the deputy coroner of Denver that the deceased was 'accidentally shot while hunting alone.' Defendants objected strenuously to the admission of this document and particularly that portion which advised the jury that in the opinion of the deputy coroner of Denver, who quite obviously was acting on hearsay information, the death was 'accidental'. Defendants argue that such is not a 'fact' within the meaning of the applicable statute, C.R.S. '53, 66-8-24, and is 'hearsay evidence' of the rankest type. Defendants concede that under the statute and earlier decisions of this Court construing said statute the death certificate is admissible in its entirety. They urge, however, that we overrule these cases. Every disputed matter of law simply cannot be litigated and then re-litigated over and over again and the doctrine of stare decisis must control. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. United States National Bank, 98 Colo. 126, 53 P.2d 1180; and Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Cline, executor, 98 Colo. 275, 57 P.2d 1205 are ample authority for the trial court admitting into evidence the death certificate in its entirety. And even though the certified copy of the death certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts recited, its weight depends upon the source of the information upon which it is based.

Violent, external and unexplained death is universally presumed to be accidental. Supported only by this presumption of accidental death and by the copy of the death certificate, which by legislative fiat is made prima facie evidence only of every fact recited therein, the plaintiff rested her case. At this point in the proceedings the trial court was quite correct in denying defendants' motion to dismiss. There being no evidence either of a direct or circumstantial nature as to the manner of death, these presumptions would prevail. However, thereafter defendants and plaintiff in so-called rebuttal offered considerable evidence, all admittedly of a circumstantial nature (there being no eye-witness to the event), which sheds much light on the manner in which Norwood met his death. Whether this evidence overcomes the presumption of accidental death is the precise question to be...