National Housing Agency v. Orton

• Decision Date: 25 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 4414.,4414.
• Citation: 202 S.W.2d 243
• Parties: NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY et al. v. ORTON.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 243

202 S.W.2d 243

NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY et al. v. ORTON.

No. 4414.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

April 25, 1947.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1947.

Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; W. Tom Kenna, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by William T. Orton against the National Housing Agency and others. From a judgment for plaintiff for $9,500, the defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

King & Rienstra, of Beaumont, for appellants.

Adams & Daughtry, of Beaumont, for appellee.

WALKER, Justice.

William T. Orton brought this action against certain agencies of the United States Government to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him as a result of his falling, on or about November 25, 1943, upon certain steps attached to a men's dormitory in Orange, Texas. He alleged that defendants operated this dormitory. He named as defendants the National Housing Agency and its Administrator, the Federal Public Housing Authority and its Commissioner, and the United States Housing Authority and its Administrator. He alleged that the titles "Federal Public Housing Authority" and "United States Housing Authority" referred to and identified the same agency, to-wit, the corporation known originally as United States Housing Authority, and that National Housing Agency has supervisory control over this corporation. He alleged further that he was employed as a guard at this dormitory by these agencies, or by one of them, and was engaged in performing his duties as a guard at the time he was injured, and that his injuries were the proximate result of defendants' negligence in failing to have the steps properly lighted and in a safe condition when he fell.

The cause was tried to a jury and on their verdict (convicting FPHA and its Commissioner of negligence as pleaded, and acquitting plaintiff of contributory negligence) and on various stipulations, findings and conclusions the trial court rendered a judgment dated April 26, 1946, for $9,500 in plaintiff's behalf against United States Housing Authority and its Administrator and Federal Public Housing Authority and its Commissioner, but plaintiff took nothing against the National Housing Agency and its Administrator. The trial court sustained plaintiff's contention that Federal Public Housing Authority was the same agency as United States Housing Authority, and the judgment, in so far as it runs against United States Housing Authority is based upon this conclusion. The defendants against whom judgment was rendered (which, under the trial court's conclusion, represent a single corporation and its chief executive officer, in his official capacity only) have appealed.

It appears from the record that plaintiff served as a guard, or night watchman, from December 8, 1942, until October 5, 1944, at a large men's dormitory in Orange, Texas, adjacent to the shipyard operated by Consolidated Steel Corporation. During the night of November 25, 1943, as he walked down an unlighted flight of steps forming a part of an entrance to this dormitory, one of the treads in these steps (the third from the top of the flight) tilted, or turned under his foot, and caused him to fall suddenly and heavily to the ground and against the steps. These steps were made of wood, and the nails connecting this tread to its supporting timber were loose and thus the tread, itself, was loose. Plaintiff was engaged in the performance of his duties at the time, and the jury found that he sustained personal injuries as a result of this fall and assessed his damages at $9,500. Plaintiff was forced to terminate his employment on October 5, 1944, by reason of a paralytic condition which had become much worse at the time this cause was tried (he was almost helpless); and it was the theory of plaintiff's medical witnesses that plaintiff's fall on November 25, 1943, affected plaintiff's spinal column and spinal cord and thereby produced this paralysis. These witnesses testified that plaintiff's condition would steadily grow worse and that it would shortly cause plaintiff's death. It was appellants' theory that plaintiff's condition resulted from a scuffle which plaintiff had with a tenant of the dormitory during the night of August 31, 1944, a little over a month before plaintiff left his employment; but there was ample testimony to the contrary from plaintiff's witnesses, and the jury found that plaintiff's condition was not caused solely by the incident of August 31, 1944.

The jury found that Federal Public Housing Authority (referred to hereinafter as FPHA) and its Commissioner were guilty of negligence, as follows, proximately causing plaintiff's fall and injuries: (1) In permitting the nails, which attached the tread (causing plaintiff's fall) to its supporting timber, to become loose; (2) in failing to use ordinary care to inspect these steps prior to plaintiff's fall, to determine whether the steps were safe; (3) and in failing to replace the electric bulb, before plaintiff fell, which had illuminated these steps but which had burned out several days before plaintiff's fall.

The jury found further: (1) That plaintiff had no actual knowledge prior to his fall that the particular tread was loose; (2) that his exercise of reasonable and ordinary care and observation in the performance of his duties would not have necessarily informed him, before he fell, that this tread was loose; (3) that plaintiff was not negligent in failing to discover the defective condition of the steps, or in failing to replace the burned out electric bulb; (4) that plaintiff did not fail to keep a proper lookout where he was walking, at and immediately prior to his fall; and (5) that plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries were not due solely to an unavoidable accident.

None of the jury's findings referred to United States Housing Authority (hereinafter referred to as USHA) and as we have stated, the trial court's judgment against that agency necessarily depends upon the trial court's conclusion that FPHA was one and the same agency as USHA. The validity of that conclusion depends upon the sufficiency of the evidence to show, as a matter of law, that these two titles referred to the same agency.

The record shows further that the dormitory where plaintiff worked consisted of several large wooden structures housing men who worked in Orange. Nearly all of these men seem to have worked in shipyards, and there is some evidence that most of them worked at the shipyard operated by Consolidated Steel Corporation. There is also some evidence that Consolidated built naval vessels of various types, but the evidence does not show what sort of vessels were made elsewhere in Orange, nor (except as to two or three men who testified) does it show what kind of work the tenants did. However, only men who worked at these yards or at some other establishment engaged in work for the United States Government could secure rooms at this dormitory, and it seems a reasonable inference that rooms in this dormitory were available only to men engaged in National Defense Work. The relevant testimony is not wholly consistent; we refer to testimony given by plaintiff, by James Clifford Burrows, and by M. O. Bennett. The steps entrance to the south wing of Unit A of the dormitory. This dormitory was erected by on which plaintiff fell formed a part of the Farm Security Administration (referred to hereinafter as FSA) from appropriations made by various Acts of Congress, to-wit, the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 14, the Additional Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 197, and the Third Supplemental National Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1942, 55 Stat. 810, being Public Laws 9, 73 and 353, enacted by the 77th Congress. These statutes authorized the President, through such agencies of the United States Government as he might select, to provide temporary housing, by construction of buildings or otherwise, in localities where national defense activities had caused a shortage of housing and it must be assumed that FSA erected this dormitory at Orange under authority so to do, duly conferred by the President under the statutes just listed.

FSA designated this dormitory as DHTX 40 (it was subsequently, at some unstated time, designated as War Housing Project Tex—41075) and began construction on April 8, 1941. The dormitory was completed on June 13, 1941. FSA operated this dormitory until that agency transferred the operation of the dormitory to FPHA, and it must be inferred that if plaintiff was not always employed by FPHA (from December 8, 1942 until October 5, 1944) he was first employed by FSA and was transferred to FPHA at or about the time the operation of the dormitory was transferred to FPHA. However, plaintiff's testimony exhibits some uncertainty regarding the identity of plaintiff's first employer. Plaintiff was under the impression, when he began work as a guard on December 8, 1942, that he was an employee of Farm Works Administration and that he continued so to be for a period of two or three months and then became an employee of FPHA. Since the only agencies of the United States Government which ever had anything to do with the operation of the dormitory were FSA and FPHA, plaintiff doubtless erred in assuming that he ever worked for any agency other than these two. The significant fact, however, on this appeal is the fact that plaintiff was actually an employee of FPHA when he was injured. This fact, otherwise shown by the evidence, is established by the jury's finding in response to special issue No. 3, which with the jury's finding reads: "Do you find, from the preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff Orton, at the time he fell on said steps (if he did fall), was engaged in the due course of his employment as a night guard for the defendant, Federal Public Housing Authority and its commissioner in his official capacity? Answer `Yes' or `No' To which the jury answered: `Y...