National Indem. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co.

Decision Date20 October 1986
Docket Number72539,Nos. 72538,s. 72538
Citation350 S.E.2d 278,180 Ga.App. 743
PartiesNATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Alfred B. Adams III, Atlanta, for appellant.

Walter B. McClelland, V. Jane Reed, Atlanta, for appellee.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Steele, an insured of plaintiff National, was injured in a March 1981 collision between his tractor-trailer and one owned by an insured of defendant Federal. National, an authorized foreign insurer in Georgia, had issued a policy containing a no-fault endorsement to Steele in Michigan. Under it, National paid Steele medical expenses and loss of income prior to filing a subrogation suit in 1983 to recover the sums paid its insured as against the alleged tortfeasor and its insurer Federal.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that National was entitled to subrogation but only as to the standard no-fault limit of $5,000. See OCGA § 33-34-4. National appeals on the basis that it was entitled to be subrogated up to the optional limit of $50,000 (Case No. 72538). Federal appeals contending that there was no right to subrogation under the laws of Michigan which it argues control in this case (Case No. 72539).

1. The trial court in its ruling relied on OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1): "Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections 33-34-4 and 33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except in those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded. The right of recovery and the amount of recovery shall be determined on the basis of tort law between the insurers or self-insurers involved. Expenses incurred in exercising the rights of subrogation under this Code section shall be at the sole expense of the insurers and self-insurers involved. If the responsible tort-feasor is uninsured or is not a self-insurer, the insurer or self-insurer providing benefits shall have a right of action to the extent of benefits provided against such tort-feasor only in the event that the person for whom benefits are provided has been completely compensated for all economic and noneconomic losses incurred as a result of the motor vehicle accident."

Since each of the vehicles involved weighed over 6,500 pounds, the provision would appear to be applicable. Nevertheless, Federal urges that this matter involves the law of contracts and under the theory of lex loci contractus the applicable substantive law would be that of Michigan (which does not permit subrogation). National takes the opposite tack, of course.

In our determination of the issue as to which law applies, we must consider also subsection (a)(2) of OCGA § 33-34-3: "All insurers authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state or controlling or controlled by or under common control by or with an insurer authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state which issue policies or contracts providing motor vehicle liability insurance coverage or any other similar coverage in any state or Canadian province shall include in the policies or contracts of insurance a provision which provides at least the minimum coverage required under Code Section 33-34-4 with respect to motorists insured under the policies or contracts who are involved in motor vehicle accidents in this state and, notwithstanding any provisions of the policies or contracts to the contrary, all such policies or contracts of insurance shall be deemed to satisfy the minimum requirements of this chapter if a motorist insured under the policies or contracts of insurance is involved in a motor vehicle accident in this state."

Federal asserts that where a foreign contract is the basis of the parties' rights and relationships the court should apply the substantive law of the state where the contract was entered into and performed, citing General Telephone Co. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984) and Howard v. Doe, 174 Ga.App. 415, 330 S.E.2d 370 (1985). While the principle is a sound one, it does not pertain to the facts here.

The right or absence thereof is purely a creature of statute. In plain terms, there is no subrogation, contractual or otherwise, for no-fault benefits paid under the statute unless the circumstances fall within the exception as provided. Banks v. Carter, 173 Ga.App. 93, 94, 325 S.E.2d 453 (1984). The existence of a contract does not entirely govern the extent of coverage since our statute imposes minimum coverage if none is provided or if the contractual language does not conform with our law. The statute preempts the law of subrogation as to no-fault benefits; it is the sole basis for recovery as well...

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2 cases
  • Starry v. Central Dakota Printing, Inc.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1995
    ...we stressed the strong territorial nature of statutorily-mandated no-fault insurance coverage. Likewise, National Indemn. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 180 Ga.App. 743, 350 S.E.2d 278 (1986), also relied on by Great West, involved a subrogation dispute between two no-fault vehicle insurers. Here......
  • Boatwright v. Eddings, 72488
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 22, 1986

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