National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg Co

• Decision Date: 14 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 425,425
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. HIGHLAND PARK MFG. CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

341 U.S. 322

71 S.Ct. 758

95 L.Ed. 969

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

v HIGHLAND PARK MFG. CO.

No. 425.

Argued April 23, 1951.

Decided May 14, 1951.

Mr.

Mozart G. Ratner, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr Whiteford S. Blakeney, Charlotte, N.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Labor Relations Board entertained a complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against respondent, Highland Park Manufacturing Company, and ordered respondent to bargain with that Union. At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-Communist affidavits pursuant to statute, the officers of the C.I.O. at that time had not. The statute provides that 'No investigation shall be made by the Board * * *, no petition under subsection (e)(1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed * * * by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constitutent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party (etc.).' § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III), § 159(h), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h). (Italics added.) The order was challenged upon the grounds, among others, that the failure of the C.I.O. officers to file non-Com- munist affidavits disabled its affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order.

The general counsel of the Board had ruled that the Board could not entertain a complaint under these circumstances; but the Board, with one member dissenting, overruled him, for reasons stated in Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N.L.R.B. 11. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Board in West Texas Utilities Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 184 F.2d 233. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case, 184 F.2d 98, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, 181 F.2d 919, arrived at a contrary result, holding that the Board could not entertain the complaint. The conflicting results are each so well-considered and so throughly documented in opinions already appearing in the books that little could be added to either. We agree with the conclusions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

The definition of 'labor union' in the statute concededly includes the C.I.O. It is further conceded that the phrase 'labor organization national or international in scope' as found in § 10(c) refers to the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. (Italics added.) But it is claimed that when the adjectives 'national' or 'international' are alone added, they exclude the C.I.O., because it is regarded in labor circles as a federation rather than a national or international union. We think, however, that the use of geographic terms to reach nation-wide or more than nation-wide unions does not exclude those of some particular technical structure. The C.I.O., being admittedly a labor union and one of nation-wide jurisdiction, operation and influence, is certainly in the speech of people a national union, whatever its internal composition. If Congress intended geographic adjectives to have a structural connotation or to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition.

The language in its ordinarily accepted sense is consistent with the context and purpose of the Act, which we have defined at length in American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925. As the Court of Appeals for both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits has said, the congressional purpose was to 'wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of our Government.' 181 F.2d 919, 920; 184 F.2d 98, 101. It would require much clearer language of exemption to justify holding that the very top levels of influence and actual power in the labor movement in this country were untouched while only the lower levels were affected.

The further contention is advanced by the Board that the administrative determination that a petitioning labor organization has complied with the Act is not subject to judicial review at the instance of an employer in an unfair labor practice proceeding. If there were dispute as to whether the C.I.O. had filed the required affidavits or whether documents filed met the statutory requirements and the Board had resolved that question in favor of the labor organizations, a different question would be presented. But here there is no question of fact. While the C.I.O. officers have since filed the affidavits, they were not on file at any time relevant to this proceeding.

It would be strange indeed if the courts were compelled to enforce without inquiry an order which could only result from proceedings that, under the admitted facts, the Board was forbidden to conduct. The Board is a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hardly be valid. We think the contention is without merit and that an issue...