National Labor Relations Board v. Acme Industrial Co, 52

• Decision Date: 09 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 52,52
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. ACME INDUSTRIAL CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

385 U.S. 432

87 S.Ct. 565

17 L.Ed.2d 495

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner,

v ACME INDUSTRIAL CO.

No. 52.

Argued Nov. 14, 1966.

Decided Jan. 9, 1967.

Norton J. Come, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

E. Allan Kovar, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

In NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 87 S.Ct. 559, 17 L.Ed.2d 486, decided today, we dealt with one aspect of an employer's duty to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. In this case we deal with another—involving the obligation to furnish information that allows a union to decide whether to process a grievance.

In April 1963, at the conclusion of a strike, the respondent entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union which was the certified representative of its employees. The agreement contained two sections relevant to this case. Article I, § 3, provided, 'It is the Company's general policy not to subcontract work which is normally performed by employees in the bargaining unit where this will cause the layoff of employees or prevent the recall of employees who would normally perform this work * * *.' In Art. VI, § 10, the respondent agreed that '(i)n the event the equipment of the plant * * * is hereafter moved to another location of the Company, employees working in the plant * * * who are subject to reduction in classification or layoff as a result thereof may transfer to the new location with full rights and seniority, unless there is then in existence at the new location a collective bargaining agreement covering * * * employees at such location.' A grievance procedure culminating in compulsory and binding arbitration was also incorporated into the collective agreement.

The present controversy began in January 1964, when the union discovered that certain machinery was being removed from the respondent's plan. When asked by union representatives about this movement, the respondent's foremen replied that there had been no violation of the collective agreement and that the company, therefore, was not obliged to answer any questions regarding the machinery. After this rebuff, the union filed 11 grievances charging the respondent with violations of the above quoted clauses of the collective agreement. The president of the union then wrote a letter to the respondent, requesting 'the following information at the earliest possible date:

'1. The approximate dates when each piece of equipment was moved out of the plant.

'2. The place to which each piece of equipment was moved and whether such place is a facility which is operated or controlled by the Company.

'3. The number of machines or equipment that was moved out of the plant.

'4. What was the reason or purpose of moving the equipment out of the plant.

'5. Is this equipment used for production elsewhere.'

The company replied by letter that it had no duty to furnish this information since no layoffs or reductions in job classification had occurred within five days (the time limitation set by the contract for filing grievances) prior to the union's formal request for information.

This refusal prompted the union to file unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. A complaint was issued, and the Board, overruling its trial examiner, held the respondent had violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act¹ by refusing to bargain in good faith. Accordingly, it issued a cease-and-desist order. The Board found that the information requested was 'necessary in order to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently the grievances filed' and pointed out that the agreement contained no 'clause by which the Union waives its statutory right to such information.'

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. 351 F.2d 258. It did not question the relevance of the information nor the finding that the union had not expressly waived its right to the information. The Court ruled, however, that the existence of a provision for binding arbitration of differences concerning the meaning and application of the agreement foreclosed the Board from exercising its statutory power. The court cited United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, the United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403, as articulating a national labor policy favoring arbitration and requiring the Board's deference to an arbitrator when construction and application of a labor agreement are in issue. We granted certiorari to consider the substantial question of federal labor law thus presented. 383 U.S. 905, 86 S.Ct. 893, 15 L.Ed.2d 662.

There can be no question of the general obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027. Similarly, the duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-management relations during the term of an agreement. National Labor Relations Board v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 87 S.Ct. 559, 17 L.Ed.2d 486; National Labor Relations Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938, 77 S.Ct. 261, 1 L.Ed.2d 235. The only real issue in this case, therefore, is whether the Board must await an arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the requested information before it can enforce the union's statutory rights under § 8(a)(5).

The two cases upon which the court below relied, and the third of the Steelworkers trilogy, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, do not throw must light on the problem. For those cases dealt with the relationship of courts to arbitrators when an arbitration award is under review or when the employer's agreement to arbitrate is in question. The weighing of the arbitrator's greater institutional competency, which was so vital to those decisions, must be evaluated in that context. 363 U.S., at 567, 581—582, 596—597, 80 S.Ct. 1352, 1360—1361. The relationship of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different order. See Cary v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 269—272, 84 S.Ct. 401, 407—409, 11 L.Ed.2d 320. Moreover, in assessing the Board's power to deal with unfair labor practices, provisions of the Labor Act which do not apply to the power of the courts under § 301,² must be considered. Section 8(a)(5) proscribes failure to bargain collectively in only the most general terms, but § 8(d) amplifies it by defining 'to bargain collectively' as including 'the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to * * * any question arising (under an agreement) * * *.'³ And § 10(a)⁴ provides: 'The Board is empowered * * * to prevent any person from...