National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cox

Decision Date16 March 1917
Citation174 Ky. 683
PartiesNational Life & Accident Insurance Company v. Cox.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (Common Pleas Branch, First Division).

HENRY W. SANDERS and JOHN S. MILLIKEN for appellant.

J. J. KAVANAUGH for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE SETTLE — Affirming.

In this action the appellee, Helen B. Cox, widow of John W. Cox, and beneficiary in a policy whereby the appellant, National Life & Accident Insurance Company, insured the life of her husband against death, resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury received accidentally and through external and violent means, recovered of the insurance company in the court below a verdict and judgment for $550.00, the full amount of insurance named in the policy. From that judgment the latter prosecutes this appeal.

It appears from the allegations of the petition that the death of John W. Cox resulted from injuries sustained by him under the following circumstances: On the night of December 21st, 1914, he visited the home of his friends, Thomas Cole and wife, at 343 East Jefferson street, Louisville. The latter, who, as well as Cox and his wife, the appellee, are people of color, occupied apartments on the third floor of the building, in attempting to leave which, Cox stumbled on the third floor platform and fell therefrom with great force down the steps to the second floor of the house. He was found at the foot of the steps with his head against a door. There were many marks or bruises upon his head, arms, small of the back, and lower end of the spine. At the request of Hetty Simmons, a colored woman who conducted the rooming house, the police officers were called in and he was arrested and taken to jail. On the following morning, the discovery being made that he was paralyzed from the waist down and otherwise helpless, he was removed from the jail to the Louisville City Hospital, where he remained confined to his bed until his death, which occurred five days later.

The answer of the appellant denied any liability under the policy, alleged that the death of the insured did not result directly and independently of all other causes from a bodily injury or injuries effected accidentally and through external and violent means, but was wholly caused by pneumonia or other disease having no connection with his fall down the stairway at the residence of Cole. The appellant asks the reversal of the judgment upon three grounds: (1) That the evidence introduced by appellee does not bring the case within the terms of the contract evidenced by the policy, for which reason the trial court should have peremptorily directed a verdict for the appellant; (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury; (3) that the trial court erred in rejecting certain record evidence offered by the appellant. The provisions of the policy upon which the first contention is rested are as follows:

"Does hereby insure John W. Cox, herein called the `assured,' in Class C as twist maker from the time this policy is delivered to the assured until twelve o'clock noon (standard time at the place where the assured resides) of the 1st day of May, 1914, and, for such further period as the advanced payment of the renewal premium of $2.25 per month will maintain this policy in force. Against loss of life, limb, limbs, sight or speech and hearing, resulting directly and independently of all other causes from a bodily injury which is effected accidentally and through external and violent means (excluding suicide, sane or insane), herein called `such injury' in the initial principal sum of $550.00."

Obviously, the above provision of the policy specifying the ground of the insurance company's liability is susceptible of but one construction. Its meaning is that in order for the beneficiary to recover upon the policy for the death of the insured, the evidence must show that the death was produced by external, violent and accidental means independent of other causes. In other words, the accident and injury resulting therefrom must be the proximate cause of the death to make the insurance company liable. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Cooper, &c., 137 Ky. 544; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Davies, 152 Ky. 600.

It appears from the evidence that decedent, John W. Cox, at the time of the accident resulting in his injuries, was about forty-five years of age and in excellent health; that he had been all of his life a robust, vigorous and industrious man and for many years had been employed by the Burley Tobacco Company as a "twist maker;" that his habits were good and he had worked regularly every day. These facts were furnished by the testimony of N. R....

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