National Prohibition Party v. State, 87SA12

• Decision Date: 14 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87SA12,87SA12
• Citation: 752 P.2d 80
• Parties: The NATIONAL PROHIBITION PARTY and The Colorado Prohibition Party, Plaintiff- Petitioners-Appellants, v. The STATE of Colorado and the Secretary of State of the State of Colorado, Natalie Meyer, in her official capacity and not individually, Defendants- Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 80

752 P.2d 80

The NATIONAL PROHIBITION PARTY and The Colorado Prohibition

Party, Plaintiff- Petitioners-Appellants, v. The STATE of Colorado and the Secretary of State of the

State of Colorado, Natalie Meyer, in her official

capacity and not individually,

Defendants- Respondents-Appellees.

No. 87SA12.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

March 14, 1988.

Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Paul S. Hudnut, C. John Koch, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Denver, for plaintiffs-petitioners-appellants.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Maurice Knaizer, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-respondents-appellees.

ERICKSON, Justice.

Petitioners the National Prohibition Party and the Colorado Prohibition Party filed suit in the District Court for the City and County of Denver, challenging the enforcement of rule 16.6, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984). If a candidate is either independent or affiliated with a political organization as defined in section 1-1-104(17), 1B C.R.S. (1980 & 1987 Supp.), the rule requires him to circulate and file a separate petition before his name can appear on a ballot in a general or congressional vacancy election. See § 1-4-801(1), 1B C.R.S. (1980 & 1987 Supp.). Before the trial court, the petitioners claimed that the rule misconstrued the petition requirement of section 1-4-801(1), 1B C.R.S. (1980), and was unconstitutional under the United States and Colorado Constitutions. The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the petitioners claim rule 16.6, which has since been incorporated into section 1-4-801, violates equal protection of the laws and the right to political association. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we deny the petition.

I.

In 1984, the Secretary of State of the State of Colorado (Secretary) promulgated rule 16.6(a), 8 C.C.R. 1505-1. Rule 16.6(a) interpreted section 1-4-801(1), 1B C.R.S. (1980), as requiring each candidate for public office who is either independent or affiliated with a political organization as defined by section 1-1-104(17) to circulate and file a separate petition before his name can appear on a general election ballot. The requirements of the rule were first implemented by the Secretary in 1980. ¹ During several elections prior to 1980, the Secretary permitted any political organization subject to section 1-4-801(1) to submit a single petition containing the names of its entire slate of candidates.

On July 31, 1986, the Colorado Prohibition Party and the National Prohibition Party, political organizations subject to section 1-4-801(1), filed suit in the District Court for the City and County of Denver seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the rule misconstrued the plain language of section 1-4-801(1), and violated the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article II, sections 5 and 25 of the Colorado Constitution. ² After filing an answer denying the complaint's allegations, the respondents moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, holding that rule 16.6 properly interpreted the petition requirement of section 1-4-801(1) and that the rule was constitutional. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to section 1-1-112(2), lB C.R.S. (1980).

II.

During the pendency of the appeal, section 1-4-801(1), 1B C.R.S. (1980), of the Colorado Election Code was amended to incorporate the requirements of rule 16.6, see ch. 34, sec. 10, § 1-4-801, 1987 Colo.Sess.Laws 283-287, and now provides in relevant part:

(a) A petition for nominating independent candidates shall be prepared which shall contain the name and address of any candidate for the office to be filled. The petition shall designate in not more than three words the political or other name which the signers select. No name of any political party shall be used, in whole or in part, for this purpose. Each petition shall contain only the name of one candidate for one office; except that any such petition for a candidate for governor shall also include a candidate for lieutenant governor, and together they shall be considered joint candidates at the general election. In the case of nominations for electors of president and vice president of the United States, the names of the candidates for president and vice president may be added to the political or other name designated on the petition.

(b) The petition for each office shall be signed by registered electors residing within the district or political subdivision in which the officer is to be elected to the number of at least five thousand for the office of president and the office of vice president and one thousand when the nomination is for any other office to be filled or for joint candidates to be voted on by the registered electors of the entire state; of at least five hundred when the office is to be filled by the registered electors of a congressional district; of at least three hundred where the nomination is for a member of the general assembly, district attorney, or district office greater than a county office; and of at least three hundred or ten percent of all the votes cast in the county for the office for which the petition is being circulated, whichever is lesser, when the nomination is for an office to be filled by the registered electors of a county.

....

(e) No petition, except petitions for candidates for vacancies to unexpired terms of representatives in congress and for presidential electors, shall be circulated or any signatures obtained thereon prior to forty-nine days before the primary election.

....

(h) ... Petitions shall be filed not later than 3 p.m. on the Tuesday preceding the primary election or 3 p.m. on the fifty- fifth day preceding the congressional vacancy election.

Any political entity that fails to receive at least ten percent of the total vote cast in the preceding gubernatorial election is a "political organization" subject to section 1-4-801(1). §§ 1-1-104(17), (18), 1B C.R.S. (1980 & 1987 Supp.). Once a political organization obtains ten percent or more of the vote, it is entitled to the benefits, and subject to the burdens, of a political party. Id. Because the petitioners did not receive ten percent of the vote in the 1984 gubernatorial election, they do not qualify as a political party but as a political organization.

The petitioners claim that section 1-4-801(1) violates equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Colo. Const., art. II, § 25, and the right to political association, U.S. Const. amend. I and Colo. Const., art. II, § 5. ³ They argue that the section unconstitutionally discriminates against political organizations by requiring them to bear burdens that are not imposed on majority party candidates. Petitioners also contend that the statute fails to provide a means of ballot access for political organizations separate from that provided for independent candidates and thereby deprives them of the advantages of their political association. ⁴ We disagree.

Restrictions on the access of political parties to an election ballot impinge on the fundamental rights of individuals to associate for political purposes and of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively. ⁵ Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). These rights "are not absolute and are necessarily subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly and effectively." Munro, 107 S.Ct. at 536-37; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). Candidates can be required to make a preliminary showing of substantial support to qualify for a place on the ballot. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).

The Supreme Court, however, has only provided limited definitive guidance in determining the validity of restrictions on ballot access. Some cases suggest a strict standard of scrutiny, see Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); Williams, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24, while others employ a looser standard, see Anderson, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547; Jenness, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 13-20 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing inconsistency in Supreme Court cases dealing with ballot access restrictions); see also J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 781-85 (2d ed. 1983) (same). In Anderson, the Court demonstrated a preference for a more flexible balancing approach than the rigid, strict scrutiny analysis and noted: "Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws, therefore, cannot be resolved by any 'litmus-paper test' that will separate valid from invalid restrictions." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. To determine the validity of ballot access restrictions, a court must

first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.

Id. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570.

Petitioners contend that section 1-4-801(1), which...