National Refining Co. v. McDowell
Decision Date | 10 March 1947 |
Docket Number | 39766 |
Citation | 201 S.W.2d 342 |
Parties | The National Refining Company, A Corporation, Respondent, v. R. Newton McDowell, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
From the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Civil Appeal, Judge Brown Harris
Affirmed
Respondent obtained a judgment against appellant on one count of its petition for $17,924.26, being the undisputed amount of an account due respondent from R. Newton McDowell, Inc. now a defunct corporation. Recovery was had upon the alleged ground that appellant had agreed to pay the account. On another count of respondent's petition the court found that appellant had made an equitable assignment to respondent of $17,924.36 of certain funds due appellant. One count of the petition was at law and the other in equity. Both counts were tried to the court in one hearing and will be reviewed as in equity. Laws 1943, p. 338, Sec. 114(d).
Appellant was president and owner substantially all of the stock of R. Newton McDowell, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the corporation. The corporation was engaged in the manufacture and sale of agricultural limestone under some program which was being financed through the R.F.C. It also sold crushed rock for highway construction. In carrying on its business, large quantities of gasoline and other products were purchased from respondent. The corporation had a line of credit with the R.F.C. up to $75,000, secured by a mortgage on all of corporation's equipment, and corporation had arranged so that all checks in payment of agricultural limestone should be sent to the R.F.C., where certain deductions were made to apply on corporation's indebtedness. The balances remaining, after these deductions were made, proved to be insufficient to pay the corporation's operating expenses. On September 24, 1940, corporation was indebted to respondent in the sum of $14,693.93. It further had some 200 creditors to whom it woned in excess of $100,000, in addition to sums due respondent and the R.F.C. These creditors were furnishing the merchandise, service and equipment that enabled corporation to carry on its operations. The corporation could not pay its debts, it had no money for operating expenses and no free assets upon which to obtain credit. It is apparent, however, from the correspondence and the testimony of appellant that appellant wanted respondent to extend the corporation time for the payment of its indebtedness and to continue supplying merchandise.
The matter of corporation's account was referred to T. O. Haggard, respondent's district manager at Kansas City, in the latter part of September, 1940, and he promptly contacted appellant, verified the account, heard appellant's statement that the corporation was "short of money" and learned that appellant was contemplating some personal deals. Haggard "investigated Mr. McDowell personally, investigated his company," found the facts as hereinstated and told appellant that he (Haggard) could not recommend that respondent extend any further credit to the corporation, that the facts "did not justify any further extension of credit." Appellant asked Haggard to return in a few days and said he though he would have something that would be of interest and justify credit. Appellant denied that Haggard ever told him the corporation's credit was to be shut off, that further sales would be refused, or that, it arrangements for payment were not made, no further credit would be extended. Appellant said Haggard came to see "when he was going to get some money." Appellant, however, fully understood that Haggard's purpose was "either to get the money or get an arrangement whereby he would feel sure he was going to get it or he would stop shipping."
Whether or not respondent actually stopped the sale of gasoline and other products to the corporation at this time is in dispute. The account, as filed by respondent, shows no charges between September 24, and October 19, 1940, while appellant's evidence shows invoices covering the delivery of some merchandise at Moberly, Missouri, apparently in respondent's St. Louis district, between said dates. In any event, respondent was entitled to stop sales and was demanding payment, as appellant admits.
In October, 1940, appellant wired respondent from Washington, D. C., as follows:
Appellant had been awarded a contract to acquire for the War Department several thousand acres of land at Weldon Springs, near St. Charles, Missouri, Appellant was to be paid a 5% commission, payment to be made out of the purchase price when the options were exercised and payments made to the owners.
On October 26, 1940, appellant wrote respondent, in part, as follows: * * *." (Italics ours).
On account of certain litigation that subsequently arose, appellant was not able to collect his commissions promptly, but he kept respondent fully advised by a series of letters appearing in the record, Similar messages apparently went to a few other creditors. One letter expressed thanks "for waiting on my account."
The contract with the War Department was signed by appellant on October 23, 1940. Concerning the contract, telegram and letter, appellant testified: Concerning the letter, appellant further testified (deposition):
Respondent's district manager Haggard saw appellant before and after appellant was awarded the five per cent contract for obtaining options to purchase land. Haggard testified:
On the strength of what appellant said to him, Haggard recommended to respondent that it extend further time on the old balance and open the account and allow the purchase of merchandise on credit. Respondent did reopen the account after Haggard made his report. It sold all of the merchandise asked for and did not crowd on the payment of the old balance, or threaten any suits.
It further appears that, after the receipt of the first telegram from appellant, the respondent sold corporation $8,730.76 worth of additional gas, oil and supplies, before the close of 1940. This suit was...
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