National Subway Company v. City of St. Louis
Decision Date | 18 June 1902 |
Citation | 69 S.W. 290,169 Mo. 319 |
Parties | NATIONAL SUBWAY COMPANY v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. H. D. Wood, Judge.
Affirmed.
Chas W. Bates and Wm. F. Woerner for appellant.
(1) The city of St. Louis had a right to contract by ordinance for the payment of the sum plaintiff agreed to pay in order to obtain the necessary consent of the city to the use of its streets, and, hence, the contract so entered is binding. Charter St. Louis, art. 3, sec. 26, clause 2; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551; St. Louis v. Tel Co., 148 U.S. 105; St. Louis v. Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 468. (2) The provision for the payment to the city of the amount in question, provided for in the ordinance and accepted by respondent, being a valid provision, could be abrogated or modified only by the city by ordinance, speaking through its municipal assembly and mayor. The action or non-action of a department or member of a department can not make a new law, or operate to withdraw the consent of the city conferred by the ordinance. The action or duty of the street department was ministerial (145 Mo. 577, 592). The city never having enacted any further legislation, it follows that the ordinance always remained in force. The decision in State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551, upholding the ordinance, and overruling State ex rel. v Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, wherein it had been pronounced void, did not in legal contemplation make a change in the existing law, but decided that the law always had been as therein held. The respondent, therefore, had the right in law, at any time since obtaining the consent of the city, to the laying of its subways, to enforce its rights (if unjustly withheld) by mandamus, just as it did do in the last case. That it was misled by the first decision, or delayed exercising its privileges pending that decision, can not operate to exonerate it from its obligations. The fact of this obligation and its observance by the company, was one of the reasons moving this court to issue the mandamus (145 Mo. 564).
Boyle, Priest & Lehmann and Geo. W. Easley for respondent.
The sole consideration for the payment of the $ 3,000 in controversy, was the consent of the city to respondent's occupation of the streets for the purposes named in the ordinance. The city, by the refusal of its officer to grant the necessary permits, withheld the consent it had given. The $ 3,000 being paid for that consent, and that consent being thus withdrawn and withheld, there was an entire failure of consideration, and if the appellant were suing to recover that sum, such failure of consideration would be a good defense; or, under the general rule of the law that an action of assumpsit for money had and received is an equitable remedy that lies in favor of one person against another, when that other person has received money from the plaintiff, under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain the same, and which ex aequo et bono, belongs to the plaintiff, the respondent might have sued and recovered in assumpsit. Tamm v. Kellogg, 49 Mo. 118; 4 Wait's Actions and Defenses, p. 469, sec. 1. Or, might recover the same because the consideration for which it was paid has failed. 4 Wait's Actions and Defenses, p. 500, sec. 22.
This is a controversy submitted without action under section 793, Revised Statutes 1899. The agreed facts are as follows:
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State Ex Inf. Jones v. Light And Development Company of St. Louis
... 152 S.W. 67 246 Mo. 618 THE STATE ex inf. SEEBERT C. JONES, Circuit Attorney, ex rel. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, v. LIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant Supreme Court of ... 258; Schopp v. City, 117 Mo ... 131; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548; ... Subway Co. v. City, 169 Mo. 331; St. Louis v ... Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465. (3) While the Legislature ... ...